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POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

'Only the naïve or innocent observer', says Sir Moses Finley in his book Politics in the ancient world, 'can believe that Pericles came to a vital Assembly meeting armed with nothing but his intelligence, his knowledge, his charisma and his oratorical skill, essential as all four attributes were.' Historians of the Roman Republic have been assiduous in studying clientelae, factiones and 'delivering the vote', but much less work has been done on the ways in which Athenian politicians sought to mobilise support. There have been studies of family connections and of links between individual politicians; there have been studies of the associations known as hetaireia; but many questions remain unanswered. W. R. Connor in The new politicians of fifth-century Athens contrasted an old style of politics, based on ties of philia within the upper classes, with a new style, which spurned philia and appealed directly to the people. Even in his old style, the votes of the ordinary, middling-to-poor citizens counted for more in the straightforward Athenian assembly than in the Roman comitia with their complex systems of block votes. Connor limits political friendship to the upper classes; he pours cold water on Sealey's suggestion that rich families might have brought pressure to bear on their tenants and other dependants (saying, 'The proud and independent Athenian might be expected to resist intimidation'); but apart from general references to largesse he does not really explain how an old-style Cimon or a new-style Cleon would ensure that the assembly was full of voters willing to elect him as general or approve a motion which he proposed. J. K. Davies has tried to take the matter further in Wealth and the power of wealth in classical Athens. He suggests that essentially there were three phases in Athenian political history: the first, in which aristocratic families with a hereditary control of particular cults exercised power through those cults; the second, in which aristocrats and their cults lost influence, and politics were dominated by rich men who used their wealth in various ways to acquire favour (charis) and so win the support of citizens; the third,

1 This paper was read to the Hellenic Society in London and to the University of Göttingen in January 1985, and an earlier version was read to the Oxford Philological Society in October 1982 and to the northern universities' ancient historians at Leeds in December 1982: I am grateful to those who discussed it with me on those occasions, and to the University of Durham for its Travel and Research Fund, and to the British Council and the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, under whose auspices I visited Göttingen.

I cite the following books by abbreviated titles: W. R. Connor, New Pol. = The new politicians of fifth-century Athens (Princeton 1971); J. K. Davies, A.P.F. = Athenian properied families, 600–300 BC (Oxford 1971); id., Wealth = Wealth and the power of wealth in classic Athens (New York 1981); M. I. Finley, Politics = Politics in the ancient world (Cambridge 1983); S. C. Humphreys, Family = The family, women and death (London 1983); P. J. Rhodes, Boule = The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972); id., Comm. = A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiou Politeia (Oxford 1981); P. Siewert, Trityten = Die Trityten Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes (Vestigia xxxiii, Munich 1982). H. Montgomery, The way to Chaeronea (Bergen etc. 1983), is good in the questions which he asks but disappointing in the answers which he supplies.

Not all the sayings and anecdotes which I cite are likely to be authentic, but they will have seemed plausible to those who retailed them, and those known to us from Plutarch and others who wrote under the Roman Empire may have originated in or closer to the society to which they refer. Caution is in order, but I shall not pause to discuss the likelihood of each item.

2 Finley, Politics, 76(–84). Dem. xiii 19 complains that men who are eager to be elected to office go around as δούλοι τῆς ἑπί τῷ χριστονευόμενῳ χάριτος, 'slaves to the need to win support for election'; Plu. Nic. 3. 1 leaves Pericles on the pedestal on which Thucydides placed him when he says that he led the city as a result of his true arœs and the power of his speech, and needed no χρησμονομενί, 'put-on-act', towards the masses or πλοτιστος, 'means of persuasion'.

3 This phrase is the title of ch. iii of L. R. Taylor, Party politics in the age of Caesar (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1949). Excessive reliance on clientelae as a master key seems now to be going out of fashion: see F. G. B. Millar, JRS lxiv (1984) 1–19.

4 E.g. B. R. I. Scawley, Essays in Greek politics (New York 1967); P. J. Bicknell, Studies in Athenian politics and genealogy (Historia Einz. xix [1972]); Davies, A.P.F.

5 See n. 69.

6 New Pol. 75–96, cf. the view of M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Ecclesia (Opuscula Graecolatina xxvi [Copenhagen 1981]) 220–2, and at greater length Die athenische Volksversammlung im Zeitalter des Demosthenes (Xenia xiii [Konstanz 1984]) 75–89 that in the fifth and fourth centuries there were groups of leaders but not parties of their supporters.


8 New Pol. 18–22 on largesse; 134 suggests that groups of friends could mobilise a majority in the assembly or council.
where the power of wealth in turn declined and what counted was rhetorical and administrative skill.9 Here I should like to continue this investigation.

For the seventh and sixth centuries I imagine most people would accept some version of what W. G. Forrest has described as a system of pyramids:10 serious political activity was the preserve of a limited number of nobles at the tops of the pyramids; underneath were the lesser citizens, each of whom tended to be linked by ties of various kinds to one of the nobles, and would normally give that noble his political support. Attacks on the old orthodoxy11 have made it harder than was once imagined to give a detailed account of how this will have worked in Athens, but the attempt should be made.

Some citizens, but not all, belonged to the nobility of the eupatridai, the families which had emerged most successfully from the upheavals of the dark age and which had closed their ranks against the others as the upheavals came to an end: they acquired a monopoly of public offices (probably filled without much competition when Buggins's turn came round), and they will have been the active participants at occasional assemblies of the citizen body. Some citizens, but not all, belonged to a genos. The view that the genē formed a wider aristocracy than the eupatridai, but still an aristocracy, has been challenged: the new emphasis on the religious function of the genē is probably right; but the suggestion of the iconoclasts that the genē and their members were not otherwise important is no less hypothetical than the old orthodoxy.12 We simply do not know what proportion of the eupatridai were also gemētai. Every citizen belonged to one of the four tribes, and also to one of an unknown number of phratries: it is reasonable to assume that the eupatridai, who will have been leading members of the tribe and the phratry to which they belonged, were able through these organisations to influence their lowlier fellow-members. The genē, even if we regard them primarily as families in which certain priesthoods were hereditary, may yet have had political influence: those who participated in a certain cult will naturally have looked up to the genē which provided the officials of that cult; and cults which attracted a wide circle of participants, like the Eleusinian cult of Demeter and Kore, will have brought a large number of men within reach of the influence of the genē concerned.

Before the reforms of Solon, one other kind of dependence is attested in Athens. Many men were hektēmoroi, not absolute owners of the land which they farmed but bound to surrender part of its produce to an overlord;13 and probably other men were dependent on the major landowners in other ways, for instance by dividing their working time between their own plot and the land of the great family. Like Sealey,14 I should guess that this economic dependence could easily have repercussions in other areas of life. We do not know how far overlords were eupatridai and gemētai, and hektēmoroi were not, though we should expect the eupatridai and gemētai to be among the richer members of the community. We do not know how often the overlord of a hektēmoros was a leading member of the hektēmoros' phratry or had a vested interest in a cult in which the hektēmoros participated; but I should guess that, in a society in which social and geographical mobility were rare, it often happened that the different forms of dependence did not compete but reinforced each other.

Forrest’s picture of pyramids will, then, be generally correct. Various kinds of link will have held a pyramid together: cult power, which Davies regards as characteristic of his earliest phase; power exercised through the tribes and phratries, which we may call social power; and power exercised by the great landowners over men economically dependent on them, the power of wealth.

Beyond this, for early Athens, we can look only at the well-known moments of crisis. In the

9 Wealth, esp. 88–131 (ch. vi).
12 I cannot share the belief of Bourriot 460–91 and Roussel 79–87, 146 that there also existed genē of another kind, the 360 of Ath. Pol. fr. 3 Kenyon.
14 P. 132 with n. 7, above.
seventh century Cylon failed to make himself tyrant. He was a distinguished man, an aristocrat and an Olympic victor; he had useful connections, the tyrant of Megara as his father-in-law and an encouraging oracle from Delphi. He must have thought he could win the support of a sufficient number of Athenians, but whatever the basis for his confidence it was unjustified: the citizens rallied behind the authorities 'in full force'.

In 594 Solon was appointed archon, and was given a special commission to solve Athens’ problems. He was a eupyrrhid; probably he was not responsible for the ‘purification’ of Athens from the killing of Cylon’s supporters, but probably he had encouraged the Athenians to embark on the war in which they captured Salamis from Megara. Also he was a poet, and in some of his poems he had written of Athens’ troubles and had blamed the rich for them: poems recited on occasions when many could hear them would reach far beyond the range of Solon’s own family connections, and this may have helped him to win the widespread support which Cylon had failed to win. Probably there was nothing remarkable in his being appointed archon; but his special commission made him more than just another archon, and to achieve that he must have won the confidence not only of the poor and unprivileged but also of his fellow aristocrats. Connections will not have been enough: in poems written after the event he complains that both sides felt he had let them down; no poems survive which would have gained the confidence of the aristocrats, but he must have put it to them that there was a crisis (a crisis which his appeal to the poor had in fact helped to crystallise), and that he could be trusted to handle it so as to protect the aristocrats’ interests. Nevertheless, what he did significantly weakened aristocratic kinds of influence. The institutionalised dependence of the hekte whoroi was abolished; it became possible for some men who were rich but not eupyrrhid to hold office, and the new council of four hundred will have drawn new men into political activity and have given the citizen assembly a new freedom; the judicial reforms gave a better chance of obtaining justice to men who were afraid to prosecute on their own account, or who when they did prosecute or were prosecuted came up against a hostile magistrate.

I have nothing new to say on the three factions (staseis), of the plain, the coast and beyond the hills, which provide the background to Pisistratus’ rise to power. All three leaders were eupyrrhids; the regional names should characterise not only the three leaders but a substantial part of their followings, though Pisistratus’ support cannot have been limited to men remote from Athens; the ideological labels of Ath. Pol. and Plutarch are clearly anachronistic, but Pisistratus did appeal to those who were still poor and unprivileged, and Megacles did sometimes support him but sometimes oppose him.17 Pisistratus had his natural family and local following, and his appeal to the poor; he also had prestige from his success in the latest war against Megara. In his rise to power we see various motifs: the bodyguard granted to a leading citizen unjustly attacked; a religious charade, naïve but evidently successful; marriage alliances, successively with Megacles and with a family from Argos; further support from outside Athens, including the mercenaries whom his wealth enabled him to hire.18 The effect of the tyranny was to continue the undermining of the old influences: a tyrant monopolising power is bad for the aristocratic families who want a share in power; taxation of the rich, and perhaps confiscation from some of them, and loans and perhaps grants of land to the poor, will have dealt a further blow to the economic dependence of the peasants on the great families; the encouragement of national cults and festivals will have lessened the importance of the local ones. In the background were the tyrants’ mercenaries and the threat of force, but more directly the tyrants’ power was exercised through patronage: state loans to small peasants, and state judges to give impartial decisions in their disputes;19 honour and office for nobles who cooperated, and exile or worse for those who did not.20

15 These points are all in the account of Thuc. i 126. 3–7.
19 Cf. Ath. Pol. 16.
20 Cf. Meiggs and Lewis 6, 6, And. ii 26.
The fall of the tyrants was followed by the resumption of aristocratic rivalry, until Cleisthenes ‘attached the δῆμος to his following’, a δῆμος in which allegedly he had shown no interest before.21 Argument continues about how Cleisthenes combined demes to form thirty trittyes and ten tribes, but if there is truth in the suggestion that he wanted to produce units of equal size, on which the organisation of the army could be based,22 that does not rule out the possibility that he had other objectives too. To arrive at his trittyes and tribes, Cleisthenes produced a number of extremely unnatural groupings: he at least did not mind if Probalinthus was separated from its neighbours both in the Marathonian tetrapolis and to the south, if Hecale north-east of Mount Pentelicon was isolated from the other demes of its tribe; and it is hardly accidental that the Alcmaeonids were to find themselves surrounded by familiar faces in the assemblies of the new tribes.23 Old associations, like the old tribes and the phratries, were not abolished; but the new units proved highly successful, and it soon mattered more to a man of Plotheia or Marathon that he belonged to Aegea or Aiantis and the men of Hecale did not think that he was given a warm welcome when he attended the festivals of Zeus Ἡκαλέσιος, it mattered more to a man of Decelea that he belonged to the deme of Decelea than that he belonged to the phratry of the Deceleans. The influence of the aristocracy, social and religious, continued to decline.

Cleisthenes had devised a system in which the Alcmaeonids were going to be advantageously placed: we should expect men ambitious for success to seek ways of exercising their influence through this new system.24 Cimon provides a good example: in the better versions of the story of his lavish hospitality he kept open house not to all Athenians but to his fellow demesmen,25 and there are more modest examples in Lysias of men giving financial support to members of their own demes.26 Men would support members of their deme or their tribe in the lawcourts: Andocides ends his speech On the Mysteries with an invitation to the members of his tribe chosen to speak for him;27 in Plato’s Apology the witnesses who will testify that Socrates is not an evil influence are headed by Crito, ἔμοι ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, ‘my contemporary and fellow demesman’;28 Hyperides reports that when Polyeuctus was prosecuted he asked for ten advocates from his tribe (and supporters from the rest of the citizen body as well).29 A particular barber’s shop in Athens was frequented by the demesmen of Decelea.30 At the beginning of the Theages Demodocus complains that his son has been excited by reports brought from the city by τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τυνες καὶ δημοτῶν, ‘some of his contemporaries and fellow-demesmen’;31 and there are many passages where words such as ἡλικιώτης, ‘contemporary’, or φίλος, ‘friend’, are combined with δημότης, ‘demesman’, or φιλάττωσι, ‘fellow tribesmen’.32 Classical Athens did not have the same elaborate series of age-classes as classical Sparta, but even before a programme of compulsory national service was instituted in the 330’s33 young men of eighteen and nineteen were classed as εφέβοι, distinct from fully-pledged adults, and were given opportunities for military service.34 There were other
contexts, such as the gymnasion, in which young Athenians could associate with their contemporaries in the gap between childhood restrictions and adult responsibilities. 35

These links inevitably have their sinister side. It was an argument against Polystratus, implicated in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, that he was a demesman and alleged kinsman of Phrynichus. 36 In 404 the oligarchic leaders who took the title 'ephors' appointed phylarchoi, tribal agents, to tell men how to vote. 37 If we can believe the allegations in Demosthenes lvii, Eubulides when demand of Halimus controlled the votes of many members in the deme assembly, 38 and his father had been a crooked deme-boss before him. 39

In Davies' account a period characterised by cult power is followed by one characterised by wealth power: he notices various kinds of expenditure by leading politicians which contributed to their lamprotes, which made them distinguished men. F. J. Frost in a study of Athenian politics in the sixth and early fifth centuries has argued that such lamprotes should be seen as a political end in itself, not merely as a means of acquiring support in the pursuit of further ends; 40 but it should not be overlooked that to one's fellow demesmen, like that of Cimon, could be expected to bring a grateful clientela as well as lamprotes. 41 The same can be said of some other kinds of expenditure. The liturgies in connection with Athenian festivals involved paying for, and taking responsibility for, a chorus, a relay team for a torch race, or the like; in many cases this was for an inter-tribal competition, and in many cases the tribe appointed its choregus; 42 the choregus who devoted his money and attention enthusiastically to his team could expect to win not only glory for himself but also glory for, and gratitude from, the performers and their families, and the whole tribe. The choregus of Antiphon vi draws attention to the way in which he recruited a chorus without making enemies; 43 a client of Isaeus says that his fellow tribesmen know how ambitiously (φιλοτιμοῦντα) he discharged his duties as gymnasarch. 44 In addition to the state liturgies there were deme liturgies: these provided further opportunities for patronage, and if here there was not the stimulus of direct competition it would no doubt be remembered that the man who had given this year's party for the demesmen's wives at the Thesmophoria had been keen and generous but the man who had given last year's party had not. 45

Not all the men who rowed the navy's ships were Athenian citizens, but many were, and a trierarch who was energetic and willing to spend more than the minimum would not only provide the navy with a good ship but would earn the gratitude of his crew. On occasions when oarsmen had to be conscripted, this was done (as we should expect) through the tribes and their subdivisions: 47 there are fifth-century boundary markers (horoi) from the Piraeus which served to indicate areas reserved for particular trittyes; 48 Xenophon twice mentions the tatriarchs, normally the commanders of tribal infantry regiments, in his account of the naval battle of Argoe; 49 and Demosthenes in his speech On the Symmories says that to man the fleet the generals should divide the dockyards into ten tribal areas and the tatriarchs should subdivide their

35 Humphreys, CJ lxxiii (1977/8) 101–2
36 = Family, 28. Other passages mentioning ἡλικίωται are Her. v 71.1 (Cylin assembled a 'heirexia of his contemporaries': evidence for the fifth century if not for the seventh); Ar. Vesp. 728, Nu. 1006; Lys. xx 36; Plat. Cito. 408c6, Soph. 218b3, Synp. 183c7, Ep. vii 332d4; [Dem.]. x 50, lii 4, Dem. lv 7; Aesch. i 42, 49 (and συνεργοῖς), ii 168 (συνεργοῖς 167), 184.
37 Lys. xx 11–12.
38 Lys. vii 43–4.
39 Dem. lvii 10–12.
40 Dem. lvii 106 of. 26. B. Haussoullier, La vie municipale en Attique (Paris 1883/4) 59–62, claimed that deme officials came from a limited range of families: I do not know how far the evidence now available supports this.
42 Lys. mentions expenditure in the pursuit of glory, xix 18, but expenditure to gain appointment to office (and opportunities for enrichment), xix = Humphreys, CJ lxxiii (1977/8) 102 = Family 28–9, remarks that in Athens 'clients' tended to be collective (demes, phratres and so on) rather than individual.
43 [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.13 claims that the people benefit from such payments.
44 Cf. Dem. xxi 13, xxxix 7, Ath. Pol. 56.3.
45 Ant. vi 11.
46 Isae. vii 36.
47 Isae. iii 80, viii 18–20.
49 IG i2 897–901.
50 Xen. Hell. i 6.29, 35.
trivial areas into sections for the separate trittyes. In 362 it was ordered that the bouleutae and demarchs should make out lists of demesmen and supply sailors—but the men produced by this method failed to appear or were incompetent, so Apollodorus recruited his own crew by offering financial incentives.

Gratitude and influence could be bought in other ways too. One could stand as guarantor for a man who was prosecuted or took a public contract; one could join with others in making a loan to a man in need: in Antiphon’s First Tetralogy engyai and eranoi are mentioned after liturgies as proofs of the defendant’s virtue. Not all disputes were taken to court: another way to acquire influence was to gain a reputation for fair dealing as a private arbitrator, and the cunning Themistocles as well as the upright Aristides is said to have done this. Simply knowing people was important: Themistocles is said to have known every one by name; in 421 Nicias canvassed men individually to urge them to support his peace with Sparta, and we have other references to individual canvassing.

Other forms of conspicuous expenditure would not win the support of particular citizens, but they would indicate that the spender was a patriotic Athenian, who made good use of his wealth and deserved the gratitude of the citizen body as a whole. Prompt payment of eisphora, the property tax, and generous epidoseis, voluntary contributions in response to a special appeal, come into this category; and so do private payments for public buildings. In lawsuits men list these along with their liturgies as evidence that they are public-spirited citizens. Themistocles and Cimon were rivals as builders as well as in other respects; while we find Demosthenes alleging that Midias avoided his obligations as far as he could, and when unable to avoid them exploited them for his private profit, that Aeschines never spent his money for patriotic purposes.

A form of display to which Davies attaches much importance is victory in the great games, especially in the contest which called for the heaviest expenditure, the chariot race. Now certainly horse-breeding was an acknowledged way of displaying great wealth; certainly cities did bask in reflected glory when a victory was won in their name (Athenians who won victories at the principal festivals were given dinner in the prytaneum), and the career of Cimon Koa l mes under the Pisistratids shows that victories could have political consequences. Naturally, those who had won victories tried to make the most of them (Alcibiades, after his extravagance in entering seven teams at the Olympics of 416, is made by Thucydides to say that this gave a corresponding impression of the city’s strength); and, naturally, their enemies claimed that to win such victories did not make a man a desirable citizen in other respects (Lycurgus objects that horse-breeding, and indeed festival liturgies, bring glory only to the individual and are not to be compared with useful expenditure such as trierarchies and public

50 Dem. xiv 22–3.
51 Dem. l. 6–7. In the same year the bouleutae were made to report those men whose ownership of property in their deme rendered them liable for pro se isphora (ibid. 8–9), I believe because it was suspected that rich men were failing to declare all their own property and this method would produce a more comprehensive register: see Davies, Wealth 143–6; Rhodes, AJAH vii (1982: published 1985) 1–19.
52 Ant. ii Tetr. i B. 12.
53 Plu. Them. 5.6, Arist. 4.2, 7.1.
54 Plu. Them. 5.6.
55 Plu. Nic. 9.5.
56 Thuc. viii 53.2, 93.2, Xen. Hell. ii 3.23; cf. lobbying before the allotment of jurors Dem. xix 1, xxi 4, Aeschin. iii 1.
57 On men’s reasons for expenditure of this kind see Lys. xix (n. 41), xcv 12–13 (to enhance one’s reputation and so have a better chance in the courts if disaster strikes). R. J. Seager in F. C. Jaher (ed.), The rich, the well born and the powerful (Illinois 1971) 7–26, and D. Whitehead, CEM xxxiv (1983) 55–74, discuss the democratic ethos requiring those with wealth and talent to use them for the good of the state, so that philotimia found an outlet in public service: notice especially Dem. xviii 257, xxi 159, [Dem.] xiii 25.
59 Cf. Rhodes, CAH v2, ch. iv, forthcoming.
60 Dem. xxi 151–74; xix 281–2, xviii 112–13; cf. also Lys. xxi 12, Xen. Oec. 2.6. Lys. xcv 3–5 casts aspersions on a man who has spent his money in the approved way.
63 Her. vi 103.1–3.
building projects\(^{65}\). If one looks at Davies’ list of Athenian competitors in chariot races\(^{66}\) one finds for the fifth century various Alcaeonids, Callias and Alcibiades (all men from socially and politically great families), and then Pronapes, Lysis and his son Democrats, and Tisias (of whom the last was of some account in politics but the others, as far as we know, were not at all important\(^{67}\)). Davies notes a sharp drop in Athenian chariot-racers in the fourth century, and suggests that this form of expenditure was abandoned because it no longer paid political dividends. I suspect that we are dealing here with a social phenomenon rather than a political, and that chariot-racing had never paid political dividends, but was a part of the life-style of the rich aristocracy which simply did not appeal so much to the richest Athenians of the fourth century.\(^{68}\)

\textit{Hetaireiai}, upper-class clubs, have been fairly thoroughly studied.\(^{69}\) Andocides claims that the mooting of the Hermae in 415 was the work of a hetaireia to which he belonged;\(^{70}\) in 411 Pisander when he came from Samos to Athens encouraged the \textit{synomosiai} (‘groups bound by oath’) or hetaireia ‘which already existed in the city with a view to lawsuits and offices’ to join forces and work against the democracy,\(^{71}\) in 404 the so-called ephors were appointed by the hetaireia,\(^{72}\) and in reaction to this link between hetaireia and oligarchy the fourth century law of impeachment (\textit{vòmos} \textit{eisagwgeitalkóς}) threatened any one who ‘combined for the dissolution of the democracy or organised a \textit{hetairikon}’.\(^{73}\) Plato in his \textit{Seventh Letter} says that he did not pursue a political career because nothing could be done without \textit{philo} and \textit{hetairoi}, and he could not find suitable associates;\(^{74}\) and elsewhere he mentions ‘the efforts of \textit{hetaireiai} for offices’ among things which the non-political philosopher avoids.\(^{75}\)

Leading politicians seem to have been surrounded by a circle of lesser men who worked on their behalf, holding offices, appearing in the courts and proposing measures in the assembly.\(^{76}\) According to Plutarch, Pericles saved himself for the great occasions and otherwise had various men acting for him\(^{77}\) (there is probably some truth in this, even if the example of Pericles’ using Epialtes to attack the Areopagus\(^{78}\) makes Pericles a dominant figure too early); by contrast Metiochus, a \textit{hetairos} of Pericles who rose to the generalship but dabbled in everything, fell into disrepute.\(^{79}\) Aristides is said to have used others to propose his decrees (so as to incur the hostility of Themistocles);\(^{80}\) likewise Demosthenes after Chaeronea (afraid that his name would lead to their rejection).\(^{81}\) Friends of Lycurgus were appointed ‘in charge of administration’ (\textit{πρεσβύτεροι \textit{dikaiokrátēs}}) to control Athens’ finances, after he had completed the four years’ tenure which was the maximum allowed.\(^{82}\) Chares was alleged to have spent part of the money voted for his campaigns on ‘speakers, proposers of decrees and private citizens sued in the courts’;\(^{83}\) Demosthenes refers to the men who will speak on Midias’ behalf as the ‘mercenaries’ who surround him, and says that there is also the \textit{hetaireia} of witnesses which he has organised;\(^{84}\) and

\(^{65}\) Lycurg. \textit{Loer.} 139–40.

\(^{66}\) \textit{Wealth} 167–8 (app. iii).

\(^{67}\) See PA 12250 = 12251 = 12253, 9567 = 9573, 3519, 13470 = 13479, and the relevant entries in Davies, \textit{A.P.F.}.

\(^{68}\) On Demades see p. 142, below.


\(^{70}\) And. i 61–4, g. 49, 54.

\(^{71}\) Thuc. viii 54. 4 g. 65.2.

\(^{72}\) Lys. xii 43–4.

\(^{73}\) Hyp. iv 8.

\(^{74}\) Plat. \textit{Ereb.} 525c–d5.

\(^{75}\) Plat. \textit{Theat.} 173d4. For allegations of corrupt appointments see [Dem.] lviii 29, Aeschin. iii 62, 73.

\(^{76}\) In addition to what follows, see the references to Cimon’s \textit{hetairoi}, Plu. \textit{Cim.} 5.2, 17.6–7, Per. 10.3; to Pericles’ friends, Plu. Per. 10.1; to Crito and Archde- mus, Xen. \textit{Mem.} ii 9.

\(^{77}\) Plu. \textit{Prac.} Ger. Rei. 811c–813a, Per. 7.7–8.

\(^{78}\) Plu. \textit{Prac.} Ger. Rei. 812d, Per. 7.8, 9.5.


\(^{80}\) Plu. \textit{Arist.} 3.4.

\(^{81}\) Plu. \textit{Dem.} 21.3.

\(^{82}\) [Plu.] \textit{X Orat.} 841b–c.

\(^{83}\) Th. 115 F 213, cf. Aeschin. ii 71.

\(^{84}\) Dem. xxi 139.
various passages of Demosthenes suggest that his opponents developed something approaching a party organisation.\(^8^5\)

Too much energy has been devoted to arguments about whether a particular set of men was or was not a hetaireia. We can identify two relevant uses of the word which are fairly common: of the small sets of upper-class men, like the one to which Andocides belonged, and through which Pisander worked in 411, who met for drink, talk, amusement and political jobbery; and of groups of men, commonly on the fringe of the leisure class, whom a leading politician could employ as his agents. Individual politicians will have had their lower-class supporters as well, men often in their own deme or tribe, whose allegiance they had secured by a good chorêgia or by financial or judicial help at a critical time, and they no doubt mobilised these supporters on important occasions. Unfortunately we do not know what kind of organisation lies behind the 191 ostraca prepared by fourteen men for use against Themistocles.\(^8^6\) For Athens' last ostracism we should probably accept that Hyperbolus wanted the Athenians to choose between Alcibiades and Nicias, but these arranged that the supporters of each should vote not against the other but against Hyperbolus, and Hyperbolus was ostracised.\(^8^7\) even if, as I believe, 6,000 votes was the quorum, not the number that had to be cast against the victim,\(^8^8\) this will have meant arranging for 2,000 or more votes to be cast against Hyperbolus.\(^8^9\)

There may be much that is dubious in Plutarch's account of the politics of Thucydides son of Melesias, his polarisation of the oligoi and the démôs, and his inducing his supporters to sit together in the assembly.\(^9^0\) However, Thucydides was active at the time when the Greeks started to think of themselves as oligarchs or democrats. Moreover, from 410/09 members of the boule were required to sit there in the places assigned to them;\(^9^1\) the idea that political allies could be more effective if they sat together recurs in the Ecclesiastusae;\(^9^2\) and it may well have been intentional that the elaborate system of allotting juries described in Ath. Pol. ensured not only that no one could predict which jurors would try which case but also that the same men would not sit together on the same panel day after day;\(^9^3\) (and the token mentioned in Ath. Pol. 65.2, whose functions is not explained, may have been used to assign jurors to seats\(^9^4\)). Although scholars have rightly grown afraid of the analogy of modern political parties, we should not be too reluctant to believe that political leaders might mobilise large numbers of supporters.\(^9^5\)

As fourth-century writers were aware, a change in the style of politics gathered momentum towards the end of the fifth century.\(^9^6\) For Connor, the new style is characterised by the abandonment of working through friends and by appealing directly to the people en masse;\(^9^7\) Pericles and Nicias both avoided social occasions and devoted themselves entirely to public affairs;\(^9^8\) Cleon on entering politics formally renounced his friends,\(^9^9\) and advertised himself as a

\(^8^5\) Dem. xiii 20–ii 29, xix 225–6, xviii 312–13.  
\(^8^6\) O. Broneer, Hesperia vii (1938) 28–43.  
\(^8^7\) Plu. Arist. 7.3–4, Nic. 11, Alc. 13, with the discussion of A. Andrewes in A. W. Gomme et al., Historical commentary on Thucydides v (Oxford 1981) 258–64.  
\(^8^8\) Plu. Arist. 7.6, with Rhodes, Comm. 270.  
\(^8^9\) Hansen (n. 6) loc. cit., is not prepared to believe in political organisation on this scale. Large-scale bribery of ordinary citizens is alleged by Lys. xxix 12.  
\(^9^0\) Plu. Per. 11.1–3; see the doubts expressed \(\rightarrow\) A. Andrewes, JHS xcvi (1978) 1–8, esp. 2, Hansen, loc. cit.; K. J. Dover in A. W. Gomme et al., Historical commentary on Thucydides iv (Oxford 1970) 238 on vi 13.1, concludes that 'it was not customary for the supporters of a particular speaker to sit all together', but that does not rule out the possibility that it was sometimes done.  
\(^9^1\) Phil. 328 F 140.  
\(^9^2\) Ar. Ec. 296–9.
lover of the démos;\textsuperscript{100} while Cimon had used his own wealth to win clientes, Pericles used the state’s wealth to pay stipends to jurors and officials,\textsuperscript{101} and to have public buildings erected under public supervision;\textsuperscript{102} Xenophon remarks in his Memorabilia that a man who dares to use violence needs many allies but one who is able to persuade needs none.\textsuperscript{103}

For Davies, power exercised through wealth was supplanted by power exercised through skill—skill in making speeches to the assembly and other public bodies, and skill in coping with the increasing complexity of Athenian administration:\textsuperscript{104} while Cimon put his wealth to political use, Pericles was uninterested in his estate, sold all his produce together, and bought in the market for his own needs;\textsuperscript{105} while Nicias was a great performer of liturgies,\textsuperscript{106} Cleon is not known to have performed any liturgies, but he is described by Thucydides as ‘by far the greatest persuader of the démos at that time’,\textsuperscript{107} and seems to have been the first to adopt a new style of oratory, extravagant both in manner and in content;\textsuperscript{108} in the fourth century elective financial offices were devised for men of administrative ability, the control of the treasuries in its original form as held by Eubulus, and later when that office had been weakened the post ‘in charge of administration’ held by Lycurgus;\textsuperscript{109} men from poor backgrounds, such as Demades, began to make a name for themselves in politics.\textsuperscript{110}

The deliberate appeal to the démos as such, which Connor places at the centre of his picture, is amply attested for the late fifth century, but it was, I think, a passing phase. I believe that the democracy of which fifth-century Athenians were proudly conscious did not come into existence accidentally, as a by-product of factional manoeuvring or foreign policies, but was brought to completion in the middle of the fifth century by men who seriously believed that the state ought to be run on democratic lines.\textsuperscript{111} The appeal to the démos, by Pericles and by Cleon in their different styles, reflects this attitude; without it I doubt if the Old Oligarch would have described the Athenian democracy as rule by the lower classes in their own interests.\textsuperscript{112} In the fourth century this motif disappears: after two experiences of oligarchy based not on patronage but on violence, every one accepted democracy, but we no longer find the old enthusiasm for it; Isocrates and others talked of the Good Old Days, Plato and Aristotle pointed out the weaknesses of democracy, Demosthenes’ opponents accused him of being undemocratic while he accused them of being unpatriotic;\textsuperscript{113} but no one found it necessary to parade his devotion to the démos as Pericles and Cleon had done.

The importance of oratory is undeniable. The sophists taught the arts of argument and rhetoric as those which were needed for political success (Plato’s Gorgias defines rhetoric as ‘the art of using words to persuade jurors in a lawcourt and councillors in a council-chamber and members in an assembly, and in every other meeting which is of a political nature’\textsuperscript{114}); and the Athenians became connoisseurs of political speeches (Thucydides’ Cleon describes them as ‘spectators of words, hearers of deeds, judging the possibility of future acts from those who make good speeches to recommend them, and past acts from those who appraise them well, not regarding facts they have seen for themselves as more reliable than facts they have merely heard of’\textsuperscript{115}). Presentation may have counted for too much and substance for too little, but the Athenian citizen is more likely than the modern M.P. to have gone to a meeting intending to make up his mind as a result of the debate. Pericles left no written works,\textsuperscript{116} but he is said to have been the first man to write out a lawcourt speech in advance,\textsuperscript{117} and we have ample evidence of

\textsuperscript{100} Ar. Eq. 732, 1340–4, cf. (Pericles) Thuc. ii 43.2.
\textsuperscript{101} Ath. Pol. 27.3–4, Plu. Per. 9.2–3.
\textsuperscript{102} Plu. Per. 12–14.
\textsuperscript{103} Xen. Mem. i 2.11.
\textsuperscript{104} Wealth 114–15.
\textsuperscript{105} Plu. Per. 16.3–4.
\textsuperscript{106} Plu. Nic. 2.4.1.
\textsuperscript{107} Thuc. iii 66.6; cf. iv 21.3.
\textsuperscript{108} Ath. Pol. 28.3 with Rhodes, Comm. 352–4; cf. Eupolis fr. 207 Kock on Syracosius.
\textsuperscript{110} Wealth 117.
\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Rhodes, CAH v², ch. iv, forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{112} [Xen.] Ath. Pol., esp. i.1–9.
\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Rhodes, LCM iii (1978) 208–9.
\textsuperscript{114} Plat. Gorg. 452d1–4.
\textsuperscript{115} Thuc. iii 38.4.
\textsuperscript{116} Plu. Per. 8.7.
\textsuperscript{117} Suid. Πηρικλῆς (Π 1180). On Pericles as a persuasive speaker see Eupolis fr. 94 Kock.
the importance of oratory, in the assembly and in the lawcourts, for the century after his death. The word rhetor, indeed, comes almost to mean 'politician'.

The sophists also introduced theoretical discussion of various political topics: whether states ought to be ruled by one man, a select few or the many; whether one needs particular skills to know what is best for one's state (discussed, for instance, in Plato's Protagoras;\textsuperscript{118} Book iii of Xenophon's Memorabilia begins with five chapters on what is required of good military officers followed by two on what is required of good politicians). This, I think, is the origin of the idea of the politician and the soldier as specialists, like the doctor and the cobbler. The administration of the Delian League required a grasp of detail, which must have been possessed by the political leaders who interested themselves in the subject but can hardly have been possessed by every citizen who attended the assembly to vote on the subject;\textsuperscript{119} but there is no evidence that in the fifth century the Athenians departed from the principle that civilian jobs could be done by any public-spirited citizen. When Pericles and Nicias avoid dinner parties to concentrate on affairs of state,\textsuperscript{120} they are cultivating their reputation as full-time politicians, but they are not claiming the possession of any special expertise.\textsuperscript{121} It is only when we come to the middle of the fourth century, to such works as Demosthenes' speech On the Symmories and Xenophon's Revenues, to such administrators as Eubulus and Lycurgus, that we find men displaying financial expertise (we know hardly anything about the poristai, providers [sc. of revenue], of the late fifth century,\textsuperscript{122} but there is no reason to suppose that they were of a different nature from other fifth-century officials). Expertise of another kind is to be found in Aeschines, who held various secretarial posts\textsuperscript{123} (and learned the art of public speaking as an actor\textsuperscript{124}) before he entered politics, and the statement that Lycurgus employed the services of an Olynthian who was 'most capable with regard to decrees'\textsuperscript{125} is so strange that I am prepared to believe it.

Apart from the appearance of experts, there is a change in the kind of man who rises to the top in politics: no longer usually the well-born,\textsuperscript{126} after a while no longer necessarily the rich; and with a premium on rhetorical skill we find in Demosthenes and Hyperides an anticipation of what was to become common in the late Roman Republic, the man who comes to politics from writing speeches for the lawcourts. Davies shows, interestingly, that the new-style politicians were not always from rich families, did not make political marriages, and failed to transmit their skill and their political standing to their sons and grandsons, but the specialist generals of the fourth century were still from rich families and did still tend to belong to or to found dynasties.\textsuperscript{127}

Those who could afford to do so continued to use their wealth in ways that would advertise their public-spiritedness and win them supporters: with Demosthenes' contrast of himself with Midias and Aeschines,\textsuperscript{128} with Lycurgus' attack on Leocrates,\textsuperscript{129} we are in the same atmosphere as with the speeches of Antiphon and Lysias; the allusions to the supporters hired by Charis and

120 Cf. p. 139 with n. 98, above.
121 According to Plu. Nic. 6.2 Nicias attributed his successes not to his ability but to fortune. Thuc. viii 68.1 writes of Antiphon that he avoided public appearances, was suspected by the masses because of his reputation for δεινότης ('cleverness', still not expertise), and was a powerful supporter of contestants in the law-courts and the assembly.
122 See Rhodes, Comm. 356, citing Ant. vi 49, Ar. Ran. 1305.
123 Dem. xix 200, 237, 249, xviii 261, 265.
124 Dem. xix 200, 246, 337, xviii 129, 180, 265.
125 [Plu.] X Orat. 842c.
127 Wealth 117 → Humphreys, C J lxxiii (1977/8) 99–100 = Family 24–6, discusses the circumstances in which marriage could be politically significant in Athens. Private wealth was an advantage to fourth-century generals because they might have to dip into their own pockets when public provision for their campaigns was inadequate.
128 Cf. p. 137 with n. 60, above.
129 Cf. p. 138 with n. 65, above.
Midias suggest that little has changed; the conspicuous upstart Demades is found not only as choregus and trierarch but even as a chariot-racer (which I think is a piece of social ostentation, not a political investment). But a politician who, like Aeschines or Demades, is worth substantial bribes and so can enrich himself by his political activity has already become a man of influence and importance.

How could a man rise to that level? How, particularly, could a man with no inherited advantages, with no family distinction to give him a start, with no money to build up a clientela or advertise himself as a public-spirited citizen?

Athens, unlike Rome, did not have a political career structure with many men at the lower levels and some of them climbing to the top. There were many offices which a man might hold; archons, even in the fifth and fourth centuries, were more important than inspectors of weights and measures, and they had the advantage that their term of office was followed by life membership of the Areopagus; but the archonships and most other civilian offices were filled by lot and could be held only for one year in a man's life; most could not be ranked in any order of importance; and for nearly all one became eligible at the age of thirty. Life might be short, and an ambitious man would not want to wait until he was thirty to start attracting public attention: Xenophon in the Memorabilia writes of Glaucan attempting to be a public speaker (δημογγορέω) and eager to become a political leader when he was not yet twenty. What could he do? The answer given by Socrates is that he needs to acquire knowledge — of Athens' revenue and expenditure, her own and her enemies' strength, the defence of the country, the corn supply.

Other answers can be given too. He could attach himself to some one already active in politics, to learn from him and to be supported by his supporters (this is not invalidated by the fact that Plutarch's examples begin with the chronologically unlikely attachment of Aristides to Cleisthenes). Such a course was easier for those who already had connections, but possible for all: Aeschines seems to have entered politics as a supporter of Aristophon. From the age of twenty (probably) he could attend the assembly, vote and even try to make speeches (though the oldest citizens were invited to speak first, in theory if not in classical fact). A rich man could learn rhetoric from a professional teacher, but a poor man might discover a natural gift for speaking, in his decaem assembly and then in the city assembly: we have noticed Aeschines' career as an actor, and Demades was an extempore speaker who left no written works. He could attend the lawcourts, as a spectator, and indeed as a witness, speaker or even litigant (though he could not serve as a magistrate or on a jury until he was thirty). A man who was rich and whose father had died (so that he was in control of his own property) could perform liturgies: we first encounter Pericles at the age of about twenty-two, as choragus for Aeschylus when the Persæ was produced. Apollodorus was, son of the former slave Pasion, spent large sums on an extravagant style of life and on liturgies. Once the age of thirty was reached, a man could start holding the various civilian offices which were filled by lot, and a man without

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130 Cf. p. 138 with nn. 83–4; above.
131 Pace E. Badian, JHS lxxxi (1961) 34 n. 114.
132 He was particularly ostentatious as choregus: Plu. Phoc. 30.5–6.
133 Davies, A.P.F. 100–1.
134 Cf. pp. 137–8 above.
139 Rhodes, Boule 173, from Xen. Mem. iii 6.1.
140 Rhodes, Boule 37–8, citing Aeschin. i 23, iii 2, Plu. An Seni 784c–d. Lys. xvi 20 replies to those who disapprove of young speakers. F. Bourriot, Hist. xxi (1982) 417 with n. 63, suggests that only an exceptional man would propose a decree before he was thirty.
141 Cf. p. 141 with n. 124, above.
142 Plu. Dem. 8.7, 10.1.
143 Cic. Brut. 36, Quint. ii 17.13, xii 10.49.
145 Davies, A.P.F. 457.
146 IG ii2 2318. 9–11.
147 Davies, A.P.F. 440–2.
other advantages might be likely to do this: Aeschines, we have noticed, held various secretarial posts; Eubulus, we happen to know from an inscription, was one of the nine archons in 370/69.

Further opportunities were provided by the army: Aeschines had a good military record. Training was available for young men of eighteen and nineteen until the mid 330’s, and was then made compulsory. Otherwise Spartan training is regularly contrasted with Athenian lack of it, but it is hard to believe that Athenian soldiers never joined their regiments except to confront the enemy: Andrews has suggested that the Athenian army drilled not as a whole but in small units, perhaps trittys-based. Though in the fourth century there was a tendency for the generalship to become a separate profession, a military reputation was an important part of the reputation of a leading citizen, and inspiring confidence as a military officer was one more way in which a man could gain the support of the citizens as a whole, and particularly those of his own tribe.

Military offices were filled by election, re-election was possible without limit, and there was a hierarchy of offices. The young, epheboi at any rate after the mid 330’s, had their own officers. It has normally been assumed that for the regular offices, as for the civilian posts, one had to be over thirty. The only career which has been seen as an obstacle is that of Iphicrates: an entry in Harpocration, derived from the Athides, uses the verb stratégiein of him in 391/0, when according to other sources he was little over twenty, but the troops he was commanding were mercenaries, so he may not have been an Athenian general then. It is implied in the oligarchic constitution of summer 411 in Ath. Pol. that the age requirement does not exist for generals (but that could be a matter of careless drafting or summarising); the requirement does exist for all military officers in the ‘future’ constitution in chapter 30. In the present state of our evidence I am prepared to keep to the normal assumption for generals; but I am not so sure that it is correct for the other offices. The officers had to be men who could be trusted as commanders, as the Athenians recognised in their method of appointment. In Xenophon’s Memorabilia Nicomachides is disappointed when he is not elected general after serving as lochagos and taxiarb but an inexperienced man is elected: I should like to think that normally experience was rewarded, and that if a man was elected general when barely thirty it was because he had already been able to prove himself in one or more of the lower offices. Phocion was entrusted by Chabrias with the command of the fleet’s left wing at Naxos in 376, when he was

148 Cf. p. 000 with n. 123, above.
149 SEG xix 133. 4.
150 Aesch. ii 167–9.
151 Cf. p. 335 with nn. 33–4, above.
154 R. T. Ridley, AC xviii (1979) 508–48, esp. 530–47, looks for evidence that Athenian hoplites trained; W. K. Pritchett, The Greek state at war ii (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974) 208–31, studies military training and on p. 217 concludes that there was no compulsory training for Athenian hoplites. E. L. Wheeler in GRBS xxii (1981) 223–33 follows Pritchett on the lack of training at Athens (esp. 229–30 with n. 37) and argues that pyrrhic dances were of little relevance to military training, and in Chiron xiii (1983) 1–20 discusses hoplomachoi as ‘military sophists’ in the late fifth and early fourth centuries and argues that they originated in Arcadia (cf. Hermippus fr. 83 Wehrli and Ephorus 70 F 54, ap. Ath. iv 154d–e). Plat. Lach. 178a–184c and the other texts cited by Wheeler indicate that experts in hoplite-fighting existed but were not highly thought of; Arist. Pol. vii 1338b24–9 says that once only the Spartans trained but now all do; there must have been some training for the contest in esantra at the Panathenaic, a competition in military prowess between tribal teams (Ath. Pol. 60.3 with Rhodes, Comm. 676).
156 Ath. Pol. 43.1, 61, 62.3; for the hierarchy cf. Ar. Av. 798–800.
159 Harpocration, Ζευκίνων ἐν Κορινθίῳ (Andr. 324 F 48, Phil. 328 F 150).
160 Just. vi 5.2, Oros. iii 1.21.
161 Ath. Pol. 31.2 (31.3 on other officers is too brief to justify conclusions).
162 Ath. Pol. 30.2.
twenty-six;163 and it appears in Menander's Samia that Moschion had been phylarch while still young.164

We might expect a political career to be more difficult for a man without inherited wealth and connections,165 and the attainment of a position of importance therefore to come rather later in life: on the whole the evidence for the politicians of the Demosthenic period confirms this. Of men from a rich background Aristophon, born in the 430's, earned ateleia by his conduct in 404/3,166 and was responsible for the re-enactment of Pericles' citizenship law in the following year;167 Androtion, born about 410, had a political career of thirty years or more behind him in the mid 350's;168 Phocion, born in 402/1, was given a subordinate command at the age of twenty-six,169 and when he died at the age of eighty-three had been general forty-three times;170 Hyperides, born in 390/89,171 prosecuted Aristophon in 362;172 Demosthenes, born in 384,173 was active in politics from about 354; but Lycurgus, born about 390, is not heard of until 343.174 Contrast with these some men from humbler backgrounds: Eubulus, born not later than 400 and one of the nine archons in 370/69,175 is not heard of in politics until the mid 350's; Aeschines, born in the 390's,176 likewise entered politics about the mid 350's. Demades and his son Demeas present an effective contrast: the upstart father was born about 390,177 as one of the guarantors of the ships which Athens lent to Chalcis in 341/0178 he must have become rich by then, but otherwise we know nothing of his public career until 338; the son, born perhaps in the 350's, was the author of a decree of the assembly179 and was prosecuted by Hyperides180 before 321.

More work is needed, but I hope that in this paper I have shed some light on political activity in classical Athens.

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163 Plu. Phoc. 6.5 with 24.5.
164 Men. Sam. 15. According to l.13 he had been a choregus while his adoptive father was still alive: had he volunteered with his father's support?
165 Dem. xviii 257-62 contrasts his own respectable with Aeschines' disreputable upbringing and career.
166 Dem. xx 148.
168 Dem. xxii 66, xxiv 173.
169 Cf. p. 143 with n. 163, above.
170 Plu. Phoc. 8.2.
171 This is the correct inference from the fact that he was a dialýstès in 330/29 (IG ii² 1924 11), contr. Davies, A.P.F. 518.
172 Schol. Aeschin i 64, Hyp. iv 28.
174 Davies, A.P.F. 350-1; first appearance [Plu.] X Orat. 841e cf. some MSS of Dem. ix 72.
175 Cf. p. 143 with n. 149, above.
176 C. 398 D. M. Lewis, CR² viii (1958) 108; but Dr E. M. Harris will argue for the date which used to be accepted, c. 390.
177 His and his son's birth dates: Davies, A.P.F. 100.
178 IG ii² 1623 188-9.
179 Hesperia xiii no. 5 (non-probouleumetic, pace Davies, A.P.F. 101).
180 Hyp. fr. 87-91, 92-3, Kenyon = 26B, 33B Burtt.