THE RELATION OF THE APOLGY OF SOCRATES 
TO GORGIAS' DEFENSE OF PALAMEDES AND 
PLATO'S CRITIQUE OF GORGIANIC RHETORIC 

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Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐέσομεν εὕδειν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν 
ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον . . . 
(Phaedrus 267a) 

ῥῆτορος δὲ (ἀρετῆ) τάληθη λέγειν. 
(Apology 18a) 

THE existence of clear verbal parallels discernible in Gorgias' 
Defense of Palamedes and Plato's Apology of Socrates raises a prob-
lem which has occasioned only little scholarly notice. ¹ What is more 
important, it has received no really satisfactory interpretation. True, a 
number of scholars have recognized the imprint, both in matters of 
phrasing and rhetorical topoi, of Gorgias' Palamedes on the Apology of 
Socrates.² Yet, in spite of the curious implications of this presumed 
Platonic debt to Gorgias (curious at least in the light of Plato's attitude 
toward Gorgias and his rhetoric), only three scholars, Joseph Morr, 
Anton-Hermann Chroust, and Guido Calogero, have sought an explana-
tion for these similarities, which are, I submit, far too precise, and, what 
is more important, far too pointed, in their implications to be reasonably 
accounted for by reference to the conventions of didactic oratory. 

In a succinct and important study, Joseph Morr³ pointed to the verbal 
echoes in Plato, and concluded that they are conscious allusions to the 
Gorgianic work; by reminding the reader, Morr argued, of an earlier 
account of a wise man unjustly condemned, Plato endeavored to set 
Socrates against the larger backdrop of myth, and to enlarge thereby the 
meaning of his death. Essentially the same view was held by A. H. 
Chroust in a later study; ⁴ this scholar made a special contribution by 
suggesting that the conception of Palamedes as the archetype of the 
dishonored philosopher was already current and accessible to Plato.⁵ 
For Calogero⁶ the parallels suggested that Gorgias was a philosophical
mentor of Socrates, and the source of the famous doctrine, *nemo sua sponte peccat.*

A Platonic adaptation of the *Palamedes*, if it can be demonstrated, necessarily involves certain larger implications, which I shall consider at the conclusion of the present study. To this extent, Morr and Chroust were right when they sought some sort of general explanation for the similarities they had observed in the two texts. Nevertheless, Calogero, although his conclusions seem to me unacceptable, was, methodologically at least, on more secure ground when he attempted to relate the parallel elements in the two works to some problem with which the two men had, or could have had, a common intellectual concern. It is this method which I propose to follow. For I shall try to show that the *Apology* embodies a rejection in detail of the particular assumptions upon which the *Palamedes* was built. In fact, the polemical relationship between the two works is so intimate that one may justly call the *Apology*, at least on one level of its complex meaning, an *Anti-Palamedes*.

Now, the proposition that the *Apology* represents, at least on one level of its meaning, an effort to subject one of the works of a leading Sophist to a fundamental critique by means of an adaptation with polemic intention is not in itself surprising in view of what we are otherwise familiar with in Plato's literary treatment of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. Moreover, the work we are discussing, apart from the notion of formal imitation, is marked by clear contrasts which Plato has Socrates draw between his own activities and those of the Sophists and rhetors.

The passage which most explicitly focuses this antithesis is 19d–20c, where Socrates unambiguously distinguishes himself from those teachers who make a claim to wisdom, and who impart this commodity for a fee. There is an ironic implication throughout that the claims to wisdom of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias are more than a little naive and unfounded. In another passage (31d–e) Socrates declares that he purposely avoided an active role in politics because such participation would have involved a serious compromise of his beliefs; the necessary implication is that those who are active in politics continue successful and unscathed only because they gratify the whims of the *demos*. Among these, the rhetors are certainly to be numbered. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the rhetors are not the only ones alluded to here, since the Sophists also took an active part in Greek political life.

So unambiguous a position on the part of Socrates toward the activities of the Sophists and rhetors, and what we otherwise know of
Plato’s estimation of the value of Gorgianic rhetoric, of which the *Palamedes*, as I shall show, is a major exposition, suggest the necessity of rejecting out of hand any hypothesis that Plato used the *Palamedes* for the purpose of imparting dignity and significance to Socrates’ death. So sympathetic a use of the Gorgianic work would in fact imply a kind of approbation — a notion which we cannot accept without also assuming a striking lack either of consistency or integrity in Plato’s philosophical position. Morr was perhaps aware of this disquieting implication of his thesis, since he took pains to emphasize what is perhaps the only favorable explicit estimate (*Meno* 76c) of Gorgias’ intellectual accomplishments in the Platonic corpus — a complimentary account of a theory of color which the Leontine philosopher had worked out.⁹

Nevertheless, despite the fair assumption of the inappropriateness of a sympathetic Platonic reworking of the *Palamedes*, it is still true that the *Apology of Socrates* contains a good number of passages which exhibit surprising and apparently more than accidental similarities to passages in the *Palamedes*. It must first be noted, however, that many of the examples recorded by the scholars whom I mention above are far from convincing, since they can easily be explained by the fact that the two defenses are quite similar in their general character. Among other things, both are delivered by defendants with a reputation for wisdom in reply to accusations which are, in part, attributable to envy. Accordingly, we should not be surprised if we read that both men are called *σοφοὶ* (*Pal. 25* and *Ap. 18b*) and *εὐεργέται* (*Pal. 30* and *Ap. 36c*), or that the accusation arises from *φθόνος* (*Pal. 3* and *Ap. 28a*). How else, one asks, could Plato have expressed these notions? Such criticisms aside, there are still a number of verbal correspondences so striking, whether considered separately or, more impressively, as a group, that no student of the *Apology* can, in my opinion, afford to ignore them unless he is also willing to forgo the understanding of an important dimension of the work’s meaning. Before discussing what I consider to be the significance of these verbal similarities, however, I should like first to catalogue the passages in the two works which seem to me most important in this respect. Furthermore, in order to emphasize the contextual importance which these passages appear often to have, I shall incorporate them into a short analysis of the *Palamedes* and give, in each case, the parallel passage from the *Apology* for the purpose of comparison.

The structure of the *Palamedes* is fortunately straightforward and perspicuous and may easily be represented in summary outline:

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I. Prologue (1–5) The question here is not death, since all men must die; my honor is at stake. If Odysseus made this charge on the basis either of conjecture or sure knowledge, he is to be commended; but if it was prompted by evil or villainy, he is the most wicked of men. However, I know that I didn’t commit this crime, and am thus certain that Odysseus is not relying on sure knowledge. He is therefore relying on conjecture, and I shall endeavor to show you that such a conjecture is unreasonable.

II. Refutation (6–27)

A. Argument (6–21)

1. (6–12) Granted that I did want to communicate with the enemy, it would have been impossible.

2. (13–21) Granted that it was possible to communicate with the enemy, why should I have wanted to?

(15) Some will say money prompted me. But this is not applicable to me, since I am not a slave to pleasure and do not need a large fortune.

With this Gomperz compares

\[ \text{With this Gomperz compares} \]

\[ \text{Gomperz compares} \]

\[ \text{Gomperz compares} \]

\[ \text{Gomperz compares} \]

B. Interrogation of the Plaintiff (22–27) The plaintiff is irresponsible. His accusation is self-contradictory.

(26) You accuse me, in effect, of being both wise and foolish at the same time.

With this Gomperz compares

\[ \text{With this Gomperz compares} \]

\[ \text{Gomperz compares} \]
III. Address to the Judges (28–36) Is it likely that a man such as I could have committed a crime of this nature? I have always tried to help you. I have, in fact, been your benefactor. In other respects, too, I deserve not to suffer at your hands.

(32) οὖθ' ὑπὸ νεωτέρων οὖθ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρων

Morr 13 compares,

εἴτε νεωτέρος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος (Ap. 33a)

Chroust 14 also compares,

καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ (Ap. 30a)

and

καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους (ibid.)

(Ibid.) I have not harmed the aged, and have helped the young.

τοῖς εὐνυχοῦσιν οὐ φθονερός, τῶν δυστυχοῦντων οὐκτίμων

Morr 15 compares,

καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτάν, . . . (Ap. 33b)

(34) I will not use the customary methods which are designed to arouse pity. You must consider the facts.

ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ . . . , μηδὲ τὸν ὀλίγον χρόνον τοῦ πολλοῦ

σοφότερον ἡγεῖσθαι κριτήν, μηδὲ τὴν διαβολὴν κτλ.

With this Gomperz 16 compares,

ἐξελέεθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἃν ύμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ

ἐσχετε ταῦτῃ ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. (Ap. 19a)

(36) If you kill me unjustly your crime will become known to all.

καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν φανερὰν ἀπασῖν ύμεῖς ἔξετε τῆς ἀδικίας, . . .

Gomperz 17 compares,

ἀνωμα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν . . . ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, . . .

(Ap. 38c)

IV. Conclusion (37) This is my defense. A summary is appropriate only when one is addressing inferior judges. For you, the first men of Greece, this is not needed.

It will be noted first of all that the verbal correspondences in the section devoted to an Address to the Judges are much less striking than
those found in the Refutation. Nevertheless, I have decided to include them for two reasons. First, it is precisely this section which contains the most impressive parallels in the matters of arrangement and topoi of argument. Accordingly, although the verbal allusions in Plato listed for this section might have little independent significance, the fact that most occur in a section which is in another respect so reminiscent of the corresponding portion of the Palamedes will perhaps justify their inclusion. Secondly, the contrast between young and old, rich and poor, which is found in Palamedes 32 and paralleled in the Apology, is certainly a commonplace. It is striking, however, that both of these antitheses, in the same order and in equally close conjunction, occur in the two works. This consideration is, I think, much less suggestive of the merely accidental.

It should first be pointed out that previous examinations of the verbal parallels in the Apology and the Palamedes have been little more than lists such as we have above in which similarities in diction in the two works are confronted. However, the real impressiveness of these similarities has been overlooked because of a failure to examine their relevance to the total meaning of the two works. After a brief discussion of such comparative lists, scholars have drawn the general conclusion that the Palamedes was in some way used by Plato in the composition of his Apology.18 But it is surely not enough merely to list verbal similarities, and then straightway offer some hypothesis to explain them. For despite those cases in which passages are strikingly parallel with regard to both diction and special context, the hypothesis of Platonic borrowing cannot easily be confirmed to the satisfaction of a critic of this view. A reasonable and convincing proof must first be given that the Apology represents more than a conglomerate of quotations from the Palamedes, and that there was in fact some very good motive for imitating the work of Gorgias.

II

In the matter of the general outline of the two speeches some remarks should be made. First, if one analyzes these two works, using the traditional terminology for the divisions of the dicanic speech, one is struck by the fact that each work contains a combination of several features which makes it unusual in the body of conventional courtroom oratory, and that, further, this same combination of features is common to both.19 What impresses one first is the absence of the normal sequence, prooimion — (prothesis) — diegesis — pistis — epilogos. In these two
works, after a short prooimion, and in the case of Socrates’ defense, a prothesis necessitated by the dual nature of the accusation, each speaker immediately embarks on his pístis, or refutation. In both the diegesis of the usual sort is absent. Moreover, the refutation is handled by each speaker in a distinctly similar manner. Palamedes first shows that according to all considerations of probability an accusation of the nature that Odysseus has brought against him is impossible to conceive of; then, in his interrogation of Odysseus, he points out, while casting doubt on Odysseus’ honesty, that the indictment contains two elements which are mutually inconsistent. Socrates, in like manner, presents a defense which is bipartite in its structure. In the first portion, Socrates informs the jury of the innocent nature of his pursuits, and draws reasonable inferences about the origins of the widespread prejudices which were the ultimate basis for the accusations of the plaintiff; in the second part, a refutation of the plaintiff, Socrates demonstrates to Meletus and to the jury that the two parts of the accusation, considered logically, cancel each other out, and that Meletus knows this as well as anyone. From a formal point of view, then, each defense has been conceived along similar lines. The difference of method discernible in the first portion of the pístis is a matter of importance which cannot, however, be discussed now.

The pístis is in each case followed by a long and earnest address in which the defendant urges the jury to consider the moral implications of its actions — to consider, in fact, the face they will make in the world for having sentenced to death a wise man and benefactor of their society. In the Palamedes the statement that the Greeks will gain an evil name for having voted for the defendant’s condemnation occurs before the vote; in the Apology, such an unhappy outcome for the good name of the Athenians is the necessary implication of Socrates’ frank estimate of the valuable service he has rendered Athens under the inspiration of the god Apollo, although the explicit declaration of this unfortunate prospect cannot occur until the final section of the speech. A further element in the section following the pístis which links the two works is the high moral tone with which the defendant rejects the humiliating role of suppliant. Both Palamedes and Socrates rise to the level of a man who is haled into court unjustly and refuses to see the jury in whose hands he is placed belittle themselves by dispensing mercy in such mean circumstances; both assume remarkable responsibility for the scruples of their potential persecutors.

These observations, however, give us a hint of similarities which exist only in the broad outlines of the two speeches. A closer examination of
detail will suggest further and more precise relationships. Striking similarities in detail may be discerned in the erotesis, or interrogation of the plaintiff; in the Palamedes this is contained in sections 22–26, in the Apology, 24b–28a. An erotesis incorporated into the text, although rare, is nevertheless found in three of the Attic orators. But the interrogations contained in the speeches of Plato and Gorgias are different from these other examples both in their length and in their elaboration. And what is more important, in addition to their special character in contrast to these examples, they also exhibit clear similarities to each other, especially in their use of rhetorical topoi.

Both defendants employ an extremely clever topos to undermine the claims of the plaintiff to serious consideration: there is the possibility, they suggest, that any accusation which contains so many contradictory elements is the work of a man not entirely to be taken seriously. Palamedes exclaims (25), “How can we have confidence in a man who discussing the same subject with the same man on the same occasion yet makes statements which contradict each other?” Socrates, in a characteristic manner, makes the wry suggestion that Meletus in making an accusation which is so illogical is “really joking with a straight face” (Ap. 24c).

There is another topos of argument employed by both defendants, in which the conclusions, phrased in a way which would be extraordinarily similar in any case, are in the face of the identical contexts strongly suggestive of conscious borrowing on the part of one of our authors. In the Palamedes (25–26), the speaker sums up the accusation and makes his refutation in the following manner: I stand accused, he says, of having tried to betray my fatherland in a manner which necessarily involved a good deal of cleverness (sophia). In the terms of your accusation, I may therefore be described as a clever traitor. But, treason is folly (moria), so that you are accusing me of possessing two qualities which cannot coexist in the same person, viz., cleverness and folly. Therefore, since this combination of qualities is impossible, I either acted in accordance with this cleverness which you attribute to me, and did not attempt to betray Hellas; or, I did attempt treason; but then I could not possess the cleverness which you represent to the jurors. “Therefore, because of either statement (i.e., if either is true) you are proved to be a liar (i.e., in your accusation that I am a clever traitor).” The Greek of the last sentence is,

οὐκοῦν δι' ἀμφότερα ἀν ἐνὶς ψευδῆς.

In precisely the same manner Socrates endeavors to disprove the
The Apology of Socrates and Gorgias' Palamedes

accusation that he corrupted the Athenian youth with full knowledge of his actions. After an identical line of argument he concludes (25e):

"Either I did not corrupt knowingly; or, if I did, it was done without my desire."

οὕτε σὺ γε κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ψεῦδη.

III

Further, in the self-portraits which we find in these two works there are three topoi which both speakers use in common in their efforts to characterize their lives as altruistic and, above all, innocent. Both defendants first of all emphasize the fact that they are men of wisdom (or, at least in the case of Socrates, so reputed by their contemporaries); secondly, that their wisdom has enabled them to bestow great benefits on society; and, lastly, that their material possessions are rather less ample than most of their fellows.

If we consider first the claims of Palamedes and Socrates to the roles of wise man and benefactor, we observe that, although the topoi are identical, as was the case in the sections previously discussed, there is now a clear difference in the manner in which these topoi are employed by each speaker. We find that Socrates' characterization of the wisdom which he allows that he possesses, and of the benefits which this wisdom has permitted him to bestow on society, involves more modest pretensions than is the case with Palamedes.

The defendant in Gorgias' speech, in a characteristic argument from probability, points to the absurdity of assuming that he had attempted the betrayal of Greece (or done anything else for that matter) for the sake of gaining honor and esteem. Why should he have? "For I was honored by the most honorable men for the most honorable pursuits — by you, for wisdom." (16). There is no hint here, as there is with Socrates, that there is a disparity between the sense in which he is deemed wise by the multitude and the sense in which he personally accepts this designation. Palamedes' reputation is securely anchored to the popular conception of the wise man as clever and inventive, and it is to this conception that he frankly appeals in the final section (30) of the speech where he recalls the many contributions which he has made to the material and intellectual advances of Greek society.

In contrast to this rather ample catalogue which constitutes the substance of Palamedes' claims to σοφία and εὐεργεσία, Socrates advances
the suggestion that he may indeed have a right to that sort of modest wisdom which befits an ordinary mortal, but certainly to nothing more (20d; cf. also 23b). Like Palamedes, Socrates declares that this wisdom has enabled him to bestow important benefits on society. But, unlike Palamedes, who details the many positive achievements which have made him illustrious (achievements which we may be sure would have left the Platonic Socrates quite unimpressed), Socrates takes great pains to point out that the good services which he has done the Athenian state are the product of a negative criticism which is merely a necessary preliminary to genuine wisdom. Socrates repeatedly says that his wisdom consists merely in the fact that he knows that this wisdom is worth nothing, or practically nothing. His chief benefit to Athenian society, viewed in this light, is to have shown to those of its members who have a pre-eminent claim to wisdom that they are really ignorant of those important matters which they profess.

We may now proceed to an examination of the third topos which both Socrates and Palamedes employ to fill out the picture they present to the jury of the wise and abstinent man — the topos of meager means, of penia. Both Palamedes and Socrates see in the modest circumstances of their lives a means of disproving some part of the accusation against which they are defending themselves. For Palamedes, who again bases his argument on considerations of probability, any suggestion that he initiated a plot to betray the Greeks to the barbarians because of a desire for wealth is clearly absurd. He reminds the jury that his means, although moderate, have always been quite sufficient for his desires, which are also moderate. Furthermore, he has never sought fame and public esteem from a display of wealth. "My life is my witness!"

\[\text{ως δ' ἀληθὴ λέγω, μάρτυρα πιστῶν παρέξομαι τὸν παροιχόμενον βίον} \]

(15)

Socrates likewise makes use of his humble means to disprove an implication which the popular conception of him as a Sophist would necessarily involve. The Sophists receive payment for their instruction; Socrates denies emphatically that this has ever been true in his case. Even Meletus has not dared to utilize this element in his slanderous indictment.

\[\text{ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἐγὼ παρέξομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ως ἀληθὴ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν}. \]

(31c)

Apart from the unimportant matter of word-order, the phrases are virtually identical. The only difference is the substitution, in two cases,
of synonymous, or equivalent, phrases (i.e. ἴκανόν for πιστόν, and the specific τὴν πενίαν for τὸν παροιχώμενον βίον).

These substitutions are not without significance. We ought first, however, to observe that, as in the case of the handling of the topoi of sophia and euergesia, an important point of difference can be discerned in the treatment of this topos too. The crucial distinction in Palamedes' account is focused in the word μέτρια; he is not rich, to be sure, nor has he ever needed wealth to satisfy his modest desires; but he is not, on the other hand, poverty-stricken for

χρήματα μὲν μέτρια κέκτημαι. (15)

With Socrates the case is quite different. In the first section of the Apology he also refers to the well-known fact of his poverty; in that instance, however, to show that because of his service to the god he had not only neglected to tend to affairs of the state, a fact for which he had been bitterly reproached; he had also failed to take any care of private matters, to such an extent, indeed, that the only apt description for the state of his life was πενία μυρία (23c).

At this point I suggest that the similarities we have observed are to be accounted for by the assumption that they are the result of a conscious reworking of the Palamedes by Plato. But what is Plato's purpose here? Why, indeed, would Plato rework Palamedes' assertion in order to emphasize the differences between Socrates' profession of absolute poverty and Palamedes' rather tepid protestations? The explanation, I submit, lies in the words which make up the last portion of Socrates' statement. "I live in incredible poverty," he says "because of my service to the god." With Palamedes, it should be observed, the three topoi we have been discussing are used merely as fodder for arguments from probability. In the case of Socrates however, his great poverty, his reputation for wisdom, and his activities as benefactor of Athens, are all viewed primarily as the consequences of the special role to which the oracle of the god of Delphi has led him. "My poverty is great," Socrates is saying, "because I have neglected my own and the city's affairs in order to carry out the god's command in the sense that I understand it. I am the wisest of men because I know that human wisdom, when compared to that of the god's, is worth nothing. I am a benefactor of Athens because in my examinations of her leading citizens — an examination prompted by the god's oracle — I have uncovered their ignorance so that they are now in a position to begin to acquire real wisdom."
IV

In a courtroom defense the essential problem is the refutation of the plaintiff’s accusation. In view of this, it is not surprising that the differences which were implied in the treatment of topoi in the two speeches should find their clearest expression in the point of view from which each defendant considers the difficulties of his defense. It should be made clear from the start, however, that the manner of refutation which we find in Plato’s Apology is by no means a mere technical variation of the rhetorical procedures employed in the Defense of Palamedes. Rather, as I shall attempt to show, it is a conscious and thoroughgoing criticism of the philosophical outlook which is implied (or which to Plato seemed to be implied) by the rhetorical methods which Palamedes uses in his defense against the charges of Odysseus. But what is this outlook?

I ought perhaps to begin by observing that in the composition of the Palamedes only those elements of the myth which have set the trial in motion are alluded to by Gorgias, whereas details which are found in other versions of the story are omitted. Indeed, only two facts are introduced: that Odysseus has charged Palamedes with having attempted to betray his fellow Greeks to the Trojans, and that for this allegation Odysseus has offered no proof whatsoever. This latter state of affairs is effectively underscored by the omission of any reference to the letter, allegedly from Priam, which Odysseus planted in Palamedes’ tent.24 Because of this, Palamedes, in his examination of Odysseus’ charge, is forced to offer conjecture in his search for possible explanations for Odysseus’ behavior (3). Either Odysseus know (ἐπιστάμενος) that I am guilty of treason, or he has surmised (δοξάζων) it from good evidence. In either case, his accusation can be construed as evidence of patriotism. The other alternative is that he does not have certain knowledge of my betrayal, and that he has no good reason to conjecture such an action on my part. If this alternative is true, the plaintiff has concocted the accusation from motives of envy and villainy. It should be noted that at the very beginning of the defense the familiar and important distinction between doxa and aletheia is introduced.25 This must be emphasized, because, as we shall see, it is precisely in the application of these concepts to the dicanic context that the heart of the difference between Gorgias and Plato lies.

In the fourth chapter of the Palamedes, the defendant makes the first of several statements concerning the difficulties and perplexities which must originate from an accusation of the kind which Odysseus

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In the fourth chapter of the Palamedes, the defendant makes the first of several statements concerning the difficulties and perplexities which must originate from an accusation of the kind which Odysseus
has so recklessly instituted. Palamedes’ words are important, and should be quoted in full: “Where shall I begin my discussion of these matters? What shall I say first? To what point in my defence shall I turn? For an accusation unsupported by proof causes in me a state of manifest perplexity, and because of this perplexity I must necessarily be at a loss with regard to my defense, unless I learn something from the truth itself and the present necessity, teachers more dangerous than resourceful (i.e. more likely to lead me on a perilous course than to provide me with the means to safety).”

“The truth itself” means here, of course, “the facts of the matter.” But what is “the present necessity”? This surely means the “demands of the present situation,” or “the necessity of defending myself at this place and at this time.” 26 Compare here the passage (32) where Palamedes apologizes to the jury for indulging in self-praise: “To be sure, it is not my place to praise myself. But the present situation has compelled me to do even this (δε παρὼν καιρὸς ἡνάγκασε καὶ παῦτα), to defend myself in every way possible now that I stand accused.”

More important, however: Why are these two “teachers” more likely to involve Palamedes in danger than to provide him the means with which to extricate himself? And why is it only these two that he mentions? To take the first question, and the phrase αὐτῇ ἦ ἀλῆθεια, let us recall the passage in Chapter 33 where Palamedes disclaims all intention of persuading the jurors with tears and lamentations to vote for his acquittal. He adds that he will tell them exactly how it happened (διδάξαντα τάληθές) — “a procedure in accord with what is most manifestly just.” This profession does not mean, however, that in Palamedes’ opinion a straightforward narration of the truth will insure an acquittal. For Palamedes is still anxious, and the next two chapters are full of exhortations to the members of the jury. They are urged not to pay more heed to words than to facts, nor to give greater weight to the charges than to the refutation, nor to consider a short space of time a “wiser judge” than a long period of deliberation, nor, finally, to think the accusation more to be believed than their own experience of the matter. In terms of the Gorgianic formulation, the jury should pay more heed to aletheia than to doxa, especially since by voting for Palamedes’ condemnation they will involve themselves in the irreparable ignominy of having executed an innocent man. The point is made even clearer further on (35), when Palamedes advises the jury to prolong their deliberation, and to form a verdict in accordance with the truth of the matter (μετὰ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίαν ποιήσατε).

And so, although Palamedes considers a truthful narration of events
the most just procedure in a courtroom defense, he is not for that reason deluded about the uncertainty which attends its use. He has clear awareness of the power of doxa in human affairs, and for this reason he anxiously urges the jury to give lengthy consideration to the question before them. It is in this sense, I submit, that "the truth itself" is a "teacher more dangerous than resourceful." As Palamedes says (35), "If it were possible that the facts of this case could become clear and palpable to my audience through my words alone, the verdict would be easy to arrive at (εὑπορος) from what has been said" (with εὑπορος cf. πόριμος of 4, which was used as the opposite term to ἐπικίνδυνος). A clear presentation of the facts of the matter, however, does not insure belief, and so it is one source of Palamedes' apprehension.

We may now inquire why ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη is a risky and difficult "teacher" in Palamedes' perplexity. The text does not offer as full a development of this theme as is the case in the discussion of the dangers implicit in the use of aletheia. We may nevertheless form some tentative conclusions in this matter on the strength of several hints in Gorgias' exposition. First, however, there is the common-sense observation that any defendant must of necessity consider as perilous a situation in which he is constrained to defend his life in a short space of time before a body of men who have nothing to base their verdict on save the conflicting claims of the plaintiff and the defendant. To repeat here the more despairing aspects of Palamedes' discussion of the role of αὐτῆ ἡ ἀλήθεια in a defense of one's life: there is always the risk that doxa may prevail, unless enough care and circumspection are observed, since the defendant is dealing with a highly volatile part of the human mind. And if, as Palamedes says, he cannot rely on words alone to communicate the true facts of the matter (cf. 35), the consequence is that the defendant is faced, if he is to save his life, with the necessity of producing an impression of the truth which will lead to his acquittal. It is a reflection of this necessity, and of the procedures consequent upon it that ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη is to be understood. The term is intended by Gorgias to mirror the compulsion laid upon the defendant to rely on techniques of proof designed to create the impression of truth. And let us remember that arguments based on probability, so abundant in this work (vid. 9, εἰκός, where this technique is given its name), are a major species of this type of proof. That this is the sense of the term in the context of the Palamedes is made clear, I think, by a passage already quoted above. Palamedes apologizes for having to praise himself with such frankness (32). He has been compelled, however, by the present situation (δὲ δὲ παρὼν καυρὸς ἡμᾶς). It is clear why he has chosen
this particular line of proof. It is intended, with its long catalogue of benefits bestowed upon the Greeks, to make it seem impossible that he could have committed the crime of which he had been accused. His self-praise is to serve, he says, as a sign (σημεῖον, 31), which would point to the impossibility of his guilt.

There is, thus, some reason to believe that the two terms, αἰτή ἡ ἀλήθεια and ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη, represent a special application to a dicanic context of the antithesis aletheia–doxa. Ananke, then, is the special constraint imposed upon the man who must defend his life, and who has not the sure means of representing in objectively convincing terms the fact that the plaintiff’s accusation is untrue. Such a man must therefore foster in his listener’s mind the subjective impression (doxa) that the claim that he makes is true. This is the reason why Palamedes calls ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη a “teacher more dangerous than resourceful.”

In summary, a defendant unjustly accused and on trial for his life must take two things into consideration: his personal and certain knowledge that he is innocent of the charge, and the necessity of convincing the jury that this is so. Now, although Palamedes states that aletheia is more conducive to belief than doxa, he is at the same time aware that it is not always possible to make the truth of the matter immediately obvious to his listeners. Accordingly, there must be a second “teacher” to direct him in his perplexity, and this “teacher” is the ineluctable necessity of persuading the jury of his innocence, even if this must be done by means of arguments based on doxa. And so, although Palamedes concedes the absolute superiority of truth (or, at least concedes that it will prevail in due time), he nevertheless grasps the fact that in this contest for his life he is compelled to recognize the unique demands (cf. ἀνήκεσθαι, 34) of his situation. For, unlike Socrates, Palamedes believes that it lies within the power of the jury to do him real and irreparable harm (cf. 2). Both teachers, then, are dangerous. But why does Palamedes turn to no others but these two? The answer is clearly that there can be no others, for doxa and aletheia, of which they are but the special manifestations, are, for Gorgias, the only two modes of comprehension available to man.

With regard to the defense, we may say, moreover, that the “teacher” who exercises the more potent influence on Palamedes is ἡ παροῦσα ἀνάγκη. A clear indication of this fact is that Palamedes, for the most part, has not chosen to wait and see if the jury will give their verdict long and thoughtful consideration, and make their decision “in accordance with the truth.” He has instead devoted the greater part of his defense to the aim of engendering in the minds of his listeners the
impression that on all grounds of probability it is utterly unlikely that he would have been able in the first place to effect a betrayal; and, granted that he had been able, that he would conceivably have wished to do so. There is, moreover, reflected in the diction of the Palamedes a sense of pervasive anxiety. Always mindful of the fact that the one outcome involves an “irreparable” act, Palamedes emphasizes repeatedly the difficulties and uncertainties of the mechanism of persuasion and belief. Indeed, in the ten chapters of the speech where πείθω and words of the same root (πείθος, etc.) are found, these words occur twenty-three times. Despite a clear apprehension of these difficulties, however, Palamedes is nevertheless compelled to employ, as the chief instrument of his defense, arguments based on probability. For although Palamedes may concede that under certain conditions truth has a greater power than opinion to engender persuasion, he nevertheless shows us by the style of his defense that in the exigencies of the moment the demands of “present necessity” must be the more deferred to.

V

This, if I am correct, is the philosophical position which forms the basis of Gorgianic rhetoric. Plato, in his Gorgias, as we know, subjected rhetorical doctrines which he attributed to Gorgias to a detailed criticism. In the following section I shall attempt to show how, in its essential features, the elements of this criticism answer to those which we have found in our analysis of the rhetorical outlook of the Palamedes. By thus pointing out an identity with the main features of Gorgianic rhetoric as set forth in the Palamedes, I hope to establish beyond reasonable doubt Plato’s familiarity with the concrete features of this rhetoric. Although this familiarity may seem an obvious fact, I have chosen to investigate it in order to strengthen the probabilities of my hypothesis that there exists between the Apology and Palamedes a conscious connection, already suggested by the verbal parallels we have examined above. Moreover, by emphasizing the existence of this explicit critique of the rhetoric of Gorgias, I hope to proceed more securely to an exposition of my thesis that the Apology is, in one of its aspects, an implicit critique of this same rhetoric.

Before turning to the Gorgias, however, let us look in passing at the Phaedrus, since it contains a passage which is relevant to the present discussion. The long, ironic catalogue (265d–268e) in which Socrates gives the reader a sketch of the “accomplishments” of the students of techne rhetorike contains an account (267a) of the theories of Gorgias
and Tisias in which are found the lines quoted at the beginning of this study. Socrates says, “And shall we pass over Tisias and Gorgias who considered that the probable was more to be esteemed than the true?” (οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον). In the light of our analysis of Gorgias’ point of view, as evidenced in the Palamedes, this observation is seen to be in large measure correct. Of course, if it is taken in its strict sense, without further qualification, it contains something of a misrepresentation. For we have seen how Palamedes, although he tends in the exigencies of the courtroom to prefer arguments from probability, nevertheless freely grants the primacy of truth in producing persuasion (24). Accordingly, Plato’s remark should have been modified by some indication that this preference of Gorgias obtained only in certain conditions. To be just, however, Socrates is talking about theories of rhetoric which were for the most part devised for use in dicanic oratory. Nevertheless, the remark, scornful in character, and just correct enough, should probably be viewed either as a distortion or as the expression of a misunderstanding natural enough in view of the antagonism which Plato felt for this kind of rhetoric.

Let us, however, turn to the Gorgias and the more cogent evidence which it contains. The passage which is relevant here is a dialogue of Socrates with Gorgias (454c–461b), containing an elaborate analysis of the art of persuasion, in which Plato introduces philosophical distinctions of great importance for his criticism of Sophistic rhetoric.

In the first section (454c–454e) of this lengthy analysis, Socrates sets up a distinction which is the foundation for his later rejection of Gorgianic persuasion on the grounds that it involves an inferior faculty of the mind. At the very beginning of their discussion, Socrates has Gorgias concede that “to have learned something” (μεμαθηκέναι) and “to have believed something” (πεπιστευκέναι) are two entirely different matters; or, to put in substantival rather than verbal terms, mathešis is different from pistis. (This distinction implies another, that of episteme vs. doxa, an implication realized in the case of the latter term shortly afterward.) An important addition to this distinction is made when both speakers agree that, whereas pistis may be either true or false, episteme is never anything but true. At this point the notion of persuasion is introduced with the observation that it is proper to describe both those who have learned and those who have believed as “persons who have been persuaded.” Socrates brings this portion of the argument to a close with an attempt at a formulation which will summarize the conclusions which have been agreed upon up to that point. “Let us posit two forms of rhetoric: one imparts belief which has no
basis in certain knowledge; the other imparts knowledge." Socrates
then asks Gorgias pointedly to what form of persuasion a rhetoric ought
to be assigned which deals with questions of right and wrong in large
public gatherings such as, among other things, law courts. Gorgias
obliges Socrates by indicating that it is a species of that kind of persua-
sion which produces belief that is without sure knowledge. After this
important feature of Gorgianic rhetoric has been agreed upon, the
remainder of the discussion is devoted to an examination of the impli-
cations of this agreement. In 455a these two ἐιδη of persuasion receive
their definitive nomenclature: one is called πειθῶ πιστευτική, the
other πειθῶ διδασκαλική. Put in another way, the business of the
rhetorically trained speaker is not to instruct members of law courts, or
other public gatherings, on matters of right and wrong; he need only
implant a certain belief about these matters. He must be πειστικός,
not διδασκαλικός.\(^{28}\)

I should here like to argue that the two forms of persuasion enunci-
ciated by Socrates in this discussion bear a very close resemblance to
the methods of those two "teachers" whose guidance forms the basis of
the rhetorical outlook of the Palamedes. That Palamedes in those sections
where he relies heavily on arguments from probability is following
the procedures of πειθῶ πιστευτική is obvious. It may seem at first
sight, however, an unjustifiable procedure to connect πειθῶ διδασκαλική,
which in the Gorgias is defined as the form of persuasion which instructs
law courts and large assemblies on questions of right and wrong, with
αὐτή ἡ ἀλήθεια, which simply means in the Palamedes "the facts of this
particular case." Several considerations, however, may make this con-
nection more likely. First of all, it seems that by large assemblies
Plato does chiefly intend the law courts. The law court, at any rate, is
the only example of a large assembly singled out for explicit mention
(454e and 455a). But this is puzzling, and one may legitimately ask
what the function is of instruction on questions of right and wrong in
the courtroom, where strictly speaking it is only a matter of determining
the responsibility of the defendant for a specific act. Plato, however,
surely does not recognize any distinction between the theoretical and
the concrete in the sphere of ethics, since for Plato the defendant,
although on trial for a specific act, ought nevertheless ideally to lay
before the court for judgment, not merely the facts relating to the case,
but also his entire moral nature. That this is so we may conclude from
two passages in the Gorgias. In the first (522c–e), Socrates remarks
that the innocent man needs no defense but a life lived with justice.
In the other (480a–d), Socrates lays the paradox before Polus that the
best use to which rhetoric can be put is not to enable the guilty man to obtain an acquittal, but to help him persuade the jury that he stands in need of punishment. From the Platonic point of view, then, the narration of the actual facts of the case and the instruction of the jury on matters of right and wrong are only two ways of describing the same fact, since no examination of an individual act can in any case be separated from ethical considerations of a more general nature. The Greek of Plato’s πειθΩ διδάσκαλική makes the transition from the concrete to the general, natural enough in any case to Plato, all the easier, since διδάσκειν means both “to teach” and “to inform about some specific event.” Lastly, and perhaps most important, Plato’s two forms of persuasion and the two “teachers” of Gorgias correspond in one further important respect, since the two terms reflect in each case Plato’s and Gorgias’ estimation of the role of doxa and aletheia in the contest of the law courts.

The abundant use, moreover, of arguments from probability goes a long way in creating the impression that πειθΩ πιστευτική is the form of persuasion which is more favored by Gorgias. (Pistis is an important concept in the Palamedes, but a full discussion of its meaning in the work, as well as the important place it occupies in Plato’s critique of Gorgias, must be reserved for our discussion of the Apology of Socrates.) Nevertheless, the bald admission by Gorgias that his rhetoric favors the techniques of πειθω πιστευτική and not πειθω διδασκαλική, does somewhat simplify the complex nature of Gorgias’ position. For it seems unlikely that the historical Gorgias would have assented to this conclusion, since it did involve an oversimplification of the position we find in the Palamedes, and a consequent misrepresentation of his attitude toward the use of “the truth itself.” He did not, in the words of Socrates in the Phaedrus, esteem the probable above the true, or pistis above episteme; at least not in the unqualified sense of Plato’s statement. Plato does, however, introduce one consideration which corresponds to Gorgias’ ἡ παροδσα ἀνάγκη, and which serves, as does this factor in the work of Gorgias, to mitigate the general omission of a rhetoric which instructs, and the almost complete dependence on the form of persuasion which strives to create a certain pistis. In 455a Socrates observes that the rhetor must be πειστικός μόνον. “For he would not, I suppose, be able in so short a time to instruct (διδάξω) so large a group of people on such important matters (viz. right and wrong).”

Despite some simplification, then, the major points of the Gorgianic position are enunciated in the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias.\(^29\) The two “teachers” which serve Palamedes in his perplexity, αντι
ή ἀλήθεια and ή παρούσα ἀνάγκη, find their parallels in the two forms of Platonic persuasion, for it is αυτή ή ἀλήθεια which the defendant seeks to communicate in his use of πειθῶ διδασκαλική, and it is ή παρούσα ἀνάγκη which compels him to employ πειθῶ πιστευτική. Moreover, the very two terms (i.e. διδάσκω and πιστεύω) which are chosen by Plato to differentiate the two classes of persuasion are reminiscent of the terms employed by Gorgias to describe the procedures which each “teacher” enjoins upon the defendant. In the matter of πειθῶ διδασκαλική, we have already quoted the passage (33) where Palamedes states that he will act in accordance with what is most manifestly just by “teaching the truth of the matter” (διδάξαντα τάληθές). So far as πειθῶ πιστευτική is concerned, in the long passage (6–21) devoted to the use of arguments from probability, a form of this persuasion which present necessity compels the defendant to use, it has been pointed out that terms such as πιστός, πιθανός, are extraordinarily frequent. Moreover, as I have argued, there is implied in Gorgias’ phrase, ή παρούσα ἀνάγκη, the awareness that the special circumstances of mass persuasion necessitate the use of a special kind of rhetoric, and this awareness finds its echo in Plato (455a).

It should be noted, moreover, that Plato, although aware of this mitigating factor, is far from condoning Gorgias’ position, as the remainder of this portion of the dialogue makes clear. For, in Plato’s eyes, Gorgias is vulnerable on two major counts. First, he has chosen to induce agreement by fostering a subjective opinion that a given notion is true, rather than by convincing the listener of its truth by the slow and dangerous methods of rational instruction. Secondly, although Gorgias (at least the Gorgias of the dialogues) did not disagree that his method was in fact, to create a certain doxa in matters involving questions of right and wrong, he nevertheless did maintain, by implication that he possessed the knowledge necessary to discriminate between what was truly right or wrong.

This latter fact emerges quite clearly from Gorgias’ reply to a series of questions which Socrates has put to him in an effort to understand the role which a knowledge of right and wrong plays in the art of rhetoric (459c–460a). Socrates asks Gorgias whether or not he will be able to impart a knowledge of right and wrong to a student who has come to him for instruction in rhetoric, even though this student does not possess a clear understanding of this subject, so crucial in the court rooms and assemblies. Gorgias’ answer is straightforward: “Well, Socrates, I suppose so. If he happens not to know this, he will learn this too from me” (460a). The word which Gorgias uses here is μαθήσεται:
VI

To turn now to Plato's *Apology*: Socrates finds himself in a situation identical to that of Palamedes and, like him, experiences serious perplexity in the face of the necessity of refuting his accusers. Despite this common awareness of present exigency, the consequences, as they are manifested in the spirit of Socrates' defense, are profoundly different. It is the manner of this defense, and the point of view which determines it, that I shall now consider.

As Socrates recognizes, the crucial feature in his defense is the need to give the correct version of the slanderous stories which had centered around his name for many years past. These slanders consisted principally in the suggestion that Socrates was a combination of impious natural philosopher and amoral Sophist. The need to explain the true nature of his activities which had been so prejudicially construed is therefore primary, since Meletus is introducing charges which are merely a special expression of the prejudices then current in Athens (19a–b). To give a true and convincing account of his strange behaviour is, in other words, the crux of his defense.

Despite a clear awareness of the importance of this task, which occupies the first portion of the defense (18e–24b), Socrates proceeds in a simple and straightforward fashion. For, unlike Palamedes, to whom the presentation of "the truth of the matter" seems both an inadequate and dangerous procedure, Socrates puts his trust in a simple narration of the incidents which had given rise to the popular image of him as a corrupter of youth and an atheist. He even does this in the face of the possibility that his words may be construed as flippant, and thus...
prejudice his case (20d). The words which he uses in this section to describe his procedure in presenting the case to the jury are those we associate with calm narration, not anxious persuasion (cf. ἀποδείξεως, 20d; διδαξεῖν, 21b). At the conclusion (24a) of this account he declares: "This is the truth, men of Athens, and in speaking to you I have concealed no matter either great or small, nor have I held anything back." We should also note here that the word πείθω, which is the vox propria of πείδω πιστευτική, is not once employed in this section, although it would have been natural to do so. To put the matter in terms which Palamedes might have used, Socrates is but little influenced by the demands of ἡ παρόδοσα ἀνάγκη.

In contrast to Socrates, the plaintiffs are represented as being eager to implant the pītis of Socrates' guilt in the minds of the jury by whatever means possible. "The plaintiffs have spoken very persuasively," Socrates says, "although nothing of what they have said is true" (17a).31 In his cross-examination of Meletus, Socrates seeks to discredit the points of Meletus' indictment, and at the end of each argument he taunts Meletus with the suggestion that he has failed to persuade anybody (ταύτα ἐγὼ οὐ σοι πείθομαι, 25e; ἀπιστῶς γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, 26e; ὡς δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἄν . . . οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν. 27e). But not only does Meletus try to implant a false pītis in others — he is himself a victim of false pītis, since he has enough confidence in the power of the Athenian prejudice about Socrates to base his case on it (19a–b). Indeed, this activity of false persuasion is shown to extend far back into the past (18b–d, where note the characteristic πείθω).

Against this dark background of untruth and false opinion Plato sets the figure of Socrates, the embodiment of truth. This may perhaps seem an unwarranted overinterpretation of a situation in which it is a matter of course for the defendant to represent his own statements as true, and those of the opponent as false. Indeed, the affectation of an innocence which is horrified in the face of the unscrupulous allegations of the plaintiff is a natural topos. However, a topos employed at some point or other in a speech is one thing; another thing is the Socratic defense, whose whole tendency is characterized by a calm awareness of innocence, and a disinclination to employ in the account of his mission any methods but those of rational persuasion and simple narration of the truth. Needless to say, it is irrelevant from the point of view of this discussion whether or not we consider the several items of this account, such as, for example, the story of the oracle, literally true. What is important here is Plato's ethopoetic intent. The story of Chaerphon's visit to Delphi and the direct dependence of the Socratic mission on
this oracle may or may not be true. The veracity of the account does not matter, however, for what we have in the Apology, apart from any question of the objective truth of these statements, is a clear striving for a portrait of a man who intends to let the truth speak for itself, and who is determined, for the most part, to avoid arguments based on probability (cf. however, 31c, where Socrates does use the fact of his poverty to convince his auditors of the truth of his assertions). Socrates' behavior in the section of the speech concerned with the antitimesis (35e-38b) is a clear indication of this attitude. For who else but a man portrayed as entirely confident of his innocence could make a claim to lifelong support in the Prytaneum? And who else but a man portrayed as totally indifferent to the outcome of his trial could risk the reaction which such a claim would surely involve? To explain why he could act this way we must turn to the oracle of the god of Delphi.

In any impasse created by two contradictory claims a solution can be effected by the introduction of an objective and truthful witness. Meletus (like Odysseus in the Palamedes) does not do this, a failure which puts him, as plaintiff, in a bad light. Socrates, however, in order to prove the truth of his version of the story, invokes a "worthy" witness, Apollo, the god of Truth (20c).³³

That Socrates should call upon the god of Delphi is appropriate, since he has in Plato's portrayal spent his life in the service of this divinity. At the god's behest he has devoted his energies to propagating the modest but important truth that human wisdom, as compared to the god's, is worth nothing, or almost nothing (23a). His first action as an agent of this truth, it should be noted, was to examine the opinions of those citizens who had a reputation for wisdom (τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, 21b). (Plato here makes full use of the ambiguous δοκεῖν, which can also mean "with a false reputation for wisdom.") At the very beginning, then, of Socrates' account of the real nature of the activities which had gained him so evil a name, the antithesis of doxa and aletheia clearly emerges. And it is this antithesis which occupies a central place in Plato's conception of the benefits which Socrates has bestowed upon Athens.

Socrates' execution of the god's commands is described in many ways. It is called an examination (ἐξέτασις, 22e) of Athenian society. Because the god has ordered (cf. n.30) Socrates to devote his life to propagating the truth, Athens has been granted a great boon (30e-31a). In questioning those who are reputed to be wise, and proving them to be the opposite, Socrates is an ally of Apollo (23b). Apollo is a general whose commands Socrates must follow (28d, 33c). Furthermore, to
disobey the commands of the god is to choose ignominy, and to this any form of danger, even death, should be preferred (28b, d–e). There is the hint, moreover, that the dangers which might prompt one to desert the god’s service are not to be estimated as true dangers by his servants. When Socrates tells the jury that he will not appeal to their emotions, he says (34c), ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δοξαίμη, τὸν ἔχατον κίνδυνον. The same true estimation of the power of earthly dangers is evident in the passage where Socrates declares that he will not change his ways even if he is to die many more times (30b–c).

The reason for these statements is, of course, quite clear: a man who has served the god justly and well is under his protection. As Socrates says, a good man cannot be harmed by the wicked. It is no wonder, then, that Plato makes Socrates say (35d), “I believe in the gods, men of Athens, in a way that none of my accusers does.”

Now that the terms in which Plato conceives of Socrates’ service to the god have been outlined, we are in a better position to analyze the nature of Socratic “persuasion.” First of all, the reasons for Socrates’ attitude toward “present necessity” as a factor to be considered in his defense now became explicable. It is clear that Socrates does not hesitate to base his defense on ἀντὶ ἡ ἀληθεία, and to employ the methods of πειθω διδασκαλία for the reason that his actions, the truth concerning which he endeavors to set before the jury, have always been in accord with the command which Plato’s Socrates came to see as the latent point of the celebrated oracle. The consequence of this is that what he tells the jury about his conduct is not only true in the sense of the Gorgianic formulation ἀντὶ ἡ ἀληθεία; it is also true in a transcendental sense because Socrates’ mission, as it is represented by Plato, is the direct consequence of the oracle of Apollo, the god of Truth. This, I submit, is the reason why Socrates, in his defense, is not governed by his perplexity, and, unlike Palamedes, does not consider ἀντὶ ἡ ἀληθεία a guide more fraught with danger than safety. The truth which he presents in his defense cannot, in fact, be refuted by the plaintiff, or, indeed, be brought into question by the decision of any earthly court. Socrates does not have to fear the outcome. As he says, “Let the trial turn out in a way pleasing to the god” (19a).

It is no matter for wonder, then, that Socrates should feel a fundamental indifference to the outcome of his trial since the truth of his assertion has been borne witness to by the very god of Truth. Unconcerned with the immediate consequences of his words, Socrates relates the history of his activities with no care for how strange the explanation
may appear to the jury. He is aware, however, that this truth will probably not gain immediate credence (19a). His estimation of the power of doxa is therefore in this respect similar to Palamedes'; but unlike Palamedes he is not constrained to seek aid from the other guide to which Palamedes must apply in his perplexity. Such are the lineaments of the Socrates drawn for us in the Apology of Socrates.

As I have observed, the attitude of Socrates towards his defense is reflected in his choice of words to describe this procedure. One consequence of his rigid preference for terms which are in harmony with the tone of rational instruction in accordance with the truth was that terms associated with the activity of πείθω πιστευτική were scrupulously avoided. This obtained, however, only so long as fundamentally ambiguous words such as πείθω were still undefined with respect to their sphere of operation. But, we should note that as soon as it has been made clear that Socrates' efforts to disabuse the Athenians of their illusions was a form of persuasion sanctioned by the god, there is no hesitation in introducing terms such as πείθω to describe such a pursuit (cf. 30a, 31a–b). Before this time its use might have been misunderstood. Now, however, there could be no question of its being anything but a form of πείθω διδασκαλική. We may also compare the passage (35c) in which Socrates describes his intention to persuade, but only after it is indicated to what form of persuasion he is referring (διδάσκεων καὶ πείθεων). The meaning is made even clearer in this passage, since what he intends is in unmistakable contrast to the techniques of emotional pleading.

Apart from this piece of evidence, there are other indications of a quite cogent nature. Early in this study we pointed to several instances in the two works of similarities in phrasing which were all the more striking because they were employed in similar contexts. I shall now turn to what, in my opinion, is the most impressive of the verbal parallels which scholars have discovered in the two works. Palamedes, under the stress of the moment, turned to arguments from probability, as was proper for a man who had little confidence in the power of truth to effect immediate persuasion, and who had no transcendental refuge. The function of the probable is, of course, to create, in the absence of any objective evidence, the impression (doxa) of the truth. What is involved here is pistis in the double sense of that word. The arguments which Palamedes uses must have pistis in the sense that they must have an aura of credibility powerful enough to persuade — to produce, in other words, that subjective impression, or conviction, of truth which the Greeks also called pistis.
The diction of the \textit{Palamedes} gives clear evidence (cf. n.27) of the constraint under which the defendant labors. We may say, without exaggeration, that the \textit{Palamedes} is haunted by the problem which \textit{pistis} brings in its train in a world where truth often comes to light only after it has become useless. In the passage (20) in which Palamedes describes the miseries of exile (on which 37c–d of the \textit{Apology} is perhaps modeled), he raises the hypothetical consideration that since he could not return to the Greeks after his act of treason, he would have to live among the barbarians. But how could he, he says (21), since they more than anyone would know of his treason: “I should not be in a position to be trusted by the barbarians” (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις πιστῶς ἐν διεκείμενοι). In the same passage he says that when a man has lost his \textit{pistis}, he will never regain it. Prompted by these considerations he exclaims (21), “Life is not worth living for a man who is without \textit{pistis}!”

\[\textit{βίος δὲ οὐ βιωτὸς πίστεως ἐστερημένω}\]

The similarity to Socrates’ famous dictum is striking and obvious, and, as I have indicated earlier, several scholars have noted it. But what has \textit{not} been noted up to now, in the absence of a comparative analysis of the \textit{Palamedes} and the \textit{Apology of Socrates} is that the Socratic maxim has not only been modeled on Palamedes’ despairing utterance; \textit{it is also a challenge and an emendation}. It expresses the awareness of Socrates that he has spent his life in the service of the god of Truth precisely in the same manner that Palamedes’ exclamation gives voice to a perplexity which arises from his insight that truth is of so little effect in human life. For Palamedes, if truth is really so tardy in its effects, and if, in addition, a man is deprived of the ability to create an impression of truth in others, \textit{then life is clearly not worth living}.

To turn to Socrates, when he says, \textit{οὐ δὲ ἀνεξάρτατος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ} (38a), he means that a life spent without examining himself and others \textit{in the service of the god} is not worth living. That \textit{ἐξέτάζω} means precisely this is clear from two other passages (28e and 29e, especially the latter). Socrates has been a soldier in the army of the god of Delphi, and since he has never deserted the ranks, or disobeyed the god’s commands, his life has never lost that divine sanction which makes its truth irrefutable. For Socrates standing on the bedrock of certainty, a loss of \textit{pistis} is not to be reckoned a serious matter. And it is this certainty which gives to his speech its tone of confident objectivity and distinguishes it so effectively from the despair of the \textit{Palamedes}.

We may recall here the climax of the dialogue between Socrates and
The Apology of Socrates and Gorgias’ Palamedes

Callicles (Gorgias 522c–e), where Socrates is taunted by Callicles because of the admission that he would be powerless to defend himself before a court on an unjust charge, even though this failure might entail the worst consequences. Callicles asks whether such a man is well off. Socrates replies:

Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death (italics mine). For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong (tr. Jowett).

VII

With these considerations in mind, I should like to turn to the final portion of the Apology. In the valedictory address of Socrates (38c–42a), the first section is addressed to the members of the jury who had voted for his condemnation, the other to those who had voted for his acquittal. By now the implication will be clear that the Apology in an entire stratum of meaning has little or no relation to an actual courtroom speech delivered by Socrates on the day of his trial.34 It seems most improbable that Socrates should have improvised or written a speech which presents a coherent portrait of himself as an exemplar of an anti-Sophistic rhetoric, and then, in addition, have reinforced this portrait by clear verbal reminiscences of a Sophistic work to whose hero he considered himself an antipode.

In accordance with this position, I suggest here that the last section of the speech is best interpreted not as a record of Socrates’ final remarks to the jury, but, rather, as the words of Plato directed to an audience of some years later, for whom the death of Socrates was still a living issue.35 In the portion of the speech where Socrates prophesies the emergence of a new generation who will subject Greek society to even more severe criticisms than he has done, it is hard not to see a prophecy of Plato made after the fact, since it so accurately describes the appearance of the Socratic schools in the first decade after Socrates’ death.
This cannot be proved. But in the second part of this section — that devoted to an address to those who had voted for Socrates’ acquittal — there are grounds for thinking that we can detect the voice of Plato, and not Socrates, in these remarks (39e–42a). The words were addressed to those who had confidence in the innocence of Socrates, despite the fact that he had been judged guilty. And although this confidence was unshaken, his followers surely remembered his condemnation with great bitterness. As we have seen, Socrates, in Plato’s conception was beyond the harm of evil and unjust men such as Meletus and the other accusers, because his life and his activities had been sanctioned by the god of Delphi. It is this consoling truth which Plato wishes to reveal to those who believed in Socrates’ innocence, but who had been aggrieved by the manner of his death. “Since you are my friends, I wish to reveal to you the meaning of what has just now happened to me” (40a).

Toward the end of the speech, in Socrates’ description of the other world, there is the celebrated passage (41a–c) in which he looks forward to the possibility of conversing with the famous heroes of the Greek past. Among these there would be some who, like himself, had been unjustly condemned to death; he mentions Palamedes and Ajax. Scholars who have observed the verbal allusions to Gorgias’ Palamedes have not failed to note that the appearance of Palamedes is no accident. This seems quite reasonable; but, beyond any question, the intention of the passage has been completely misinterpreted by its commentators. The accepted interpretation is that Socrates will be happy to meet Palamedes, because he will find in him a sympathetic fellow-sufferer.

But in the light of our exposition of the great contradictions that exist between the Apology and the Palamedes such an interpretation seems most unlikely. The suspicion, moreover, that this is not so is confirmed to a large degree by an examination of the diction of the passage. Socrates says that conversing with people like Palamedes will be a marvelous pastime (διατριβή). The advocates of the “sympathetic” hypothesis will be somewhat taken aback if they recall at this point that διατριβή or διατριβεῖν has been the characteristic designation for Socrates’ divinely appointed mission of refuting pretenders to wisdom. Moreover, that it is this connotation of the word which is intended here is suggested several lines further on in the same passage where Socrates says that he will continue “to examine and to investigate” — ἐκταξίωντα καὶ ἐρευνώντα. (The significance of ἐκτάζω has been discussed; for ἐρευνῶ, cf. 23b ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν.) Socrates will
discover even in the after-world who is wise, and who is not, all their pretensions to the contrary.

But perhaps this does not apply to Palamedes? I suggest that the phrasing of Socrates' afterthought to his remark concerning Palamedes clearly indicates that it does. He says that he is going to set his experiences (pathē) against Palamedes'. "It would not be unpleasant" (οὐκ ἄν ἀποθέτης εἰη). Let us recall here the passage (33c) in which Socrates is trying to account for the fact that young people like to associate with him and to hear him refute those who think they are wise but are not so. The young people like this, ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀποθέτης. It seems most unlikely that a complex of words which have gained such unmistakable force in the course of the Apology can suggest anything else but that Palamedes, along with the others catalogued here, is a pretender to wisdom whom it will be a pleasure for Socrates to refute.

The connotation of this diction, therefore, and the fact that Socrates in the lineaments of his portrait is conceived of as an antipode to Palamedes, both make it likely that we should not interpret, as has usually been done, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτῶν πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων as meaning "comparing my misfortunes (in mutual sympathy) with theirs." Our conclusions all tend to an interpretation something like the following (interpretation, not literal translation; these words are in themselves simple and without overtone): "I set my life, and my death (πάθη), and what they both mean, as a direct challenge to (ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι), and refutation of, the validity of the philosophical position which is at the basis of Palamedes' defense of his life." It should be noted that this interpretation of ἀντιπαραβάλλω is in agreement with the meaning of this word in its only other occurrence. In Hippias Major 369c it is used of two logoi, and means there to set one argument against another."

VIII

In this study I have sought to investigate only one level of meaning in Plato's Apology. For in this work Plato gives us a deeply complex estimate of Socrates' stature as a man and as a philosopher. I have attempted, more exactly, to elucidate the relationship between this work and Gorgias' Palamedes, and to suggest that, when once this is done, a new dimension of the Apology is revealed. For in this new dimension we perceive Socrates as the philosophical orator who employs a form of persuasion which rests on truth rather than illusion. Why Plato chose to introduce into the Apology this aspect of his total
conception of Socrates it is hard to say with certainty. For one thing, since he had already chosen, for whatever reason, to draw a portrait of Socrates on the day of his trial, there was surely no more appropriate moment than this to show what rhetoric could become in the hands of a man who had devoted himself to the problems of philosophy rather than to the gratification of the ignorant mob. Moreover, at the time of the composition of the *Apology* (surely the decade 399–389 B.C. is a fair span), rhetoric had just emerged from its infancy. The 390's saw the production of the mature works of orators like Lysias and Andocides, and Isocrates was just publishing his first efforts in forensic oratory. For such a time rhetoric was an important matter (as it was always to remain in the Greek world), and it is not surprising that Plato should have engaged in the exchange of ideas which must certainly have characterized this period.

Surely, however, these solutions are in themselves inadequate, and it is in another direction that we must seek an explanation for the tone of earnest passion which is manifest in the *Apology*. It will be remembered that earlier in this study I attempted to demonstrate that Plato, in the *Gorgias*, attributes to Gorgias a system of rhetoric very much like the one set forth in the *Defense of Palamedes*. A natural assumption, strengthened by the presence of verbal parallels in the two speeches we have been discussing, is that the *Palamedes* was one of the sources of Plato's knowledge of Gorgias' rhetorical theories, although it is of course quite possible that such ideas were communicated in some other way. Now the *Gorgias*, as we know, is concerned with rhetoric, a fact which provides a link between it and the *Apology*, on the one hand, and between both these Platonic works and the *Palamedes* on the other. In this case, then, the behavior of Socrates in the *Apology* would be, on one level at any rate, an illustration of the rhetorical counter-position implied by Socrates' criticisms in the *Gorgias*; and both together would answer to the *Palamedes*, which, as should be clear by now, is a mixture of concrete forensic situation and theoretical formulation.

The *Gorgias*, however, as is well known, is concerned with more than rhetoric. It is also Plato's classic statement of the two alternative ways of life, the philosophical and the worldly. To this theme rhetoric is, of course, related, for it is precisely this which provides the worldly man with the means to power. In this context, then, Plato's critique of Gorgianic rhetoric, which, as I have suggested, is embedded in the fabric of the *Apology*, is seen to be more than a mere technical disagreement. For Plato, in the *Gorgias*, moves on, after his discussion of rhetoric, to a confrontation of the two ways of life as they are incarnated
in the figures of Callicles and Socrates. So too in the Apology, which is in one of its aspects a critique of an immoral system of rhetoric, we are shown a man who, by his service to the god and to philosophy, has transcended all need to employ a rhetoric which aims at imparting the semblance rather than the substance of truth.

If this conclusion is true, the connection between the Gorgias and the Apology is a most intimate one, and one may justly call the former a kind of program for the latter. A corollary to this, in the matter of dating the Apology, is that, although we cannot certainly date either the Apology or the Gorgias, we should probably not date them very far apart. For in both we perceive, if I am correct, the same attitude toward the rhetorical position of Gorgias and in both the same search for a philosophically inspired counter-position to the rhetoric of illusion, or, more important, to the moral world from which it springs. For Plato, Socrates’ firm belief in the transcendental rightness of the philosophical life provided the ground from which a new kind of rhetoric could grow, a rhetoric which would not have to take into account the shifting nature of human opinion and the changing relationships of political power.

In conclusion I should like to observe that the manner in which Plato discredited a rhetorical theory whose basis and implications he found unacceptable is a stroke worthy of genius. For by modeling the Apology of Socrates on the Palamedes of Gorgias he brought it about that the reader who was struck by the formal similarities discernible in the Apology of Socrates was also likely to be struck by the profoundly contradictory views of which this work was the expression. If it had been done in another way, the issue might have been ignored by those against whom Plato especially directed the Apology. But as it was, Greek readers, who could not fail to observe this source of the portrait of Plato’s master, could not for this very reason ignore the differences which were so impressively in evidence.

NOTES

The present study is the first chapter, in a much revised form, of my doctoral dissertation, which was written under the direction of Eric A. Havelock. To this scholar I owe a debt of gratitude, both for his help in the initial stages of my research and for his careful reading of this final version. The study has also been read beneficially by Prof. J. H. Finley of Harvard, and by my colleagues at Columbia, William M. Calder III and Charles H. Kahn.

1. I include here a bibliography, chronologically arranged, of all the works known to me in which there is some discussion of this problem.


Of these, Chroust, Schmid, and Freeman merely observe that the Platonic *Apology* was influenced by Gorgias’ work, without, however, instancing verbal similarities. Gomperz draws up an elaborate list of correspondences, but only in order to establish the priority (and so, he argues, the authenticity) of the *Palamedes*. Morr and Calogero, too, catalogue the similarities, but, in addition, attempt a serious interpretation of the evidence, reaching conclusions which I cannot, however, accept. Chroust also seeks to account for the similarities, but he does not engage in a careful examination of the text of the two works.

2. Since we can date neither the *Palamedes* nor the *Apology* with absolute certainty, the possibility exists that the situation is the reverse of that which has been universally assumed. But Schmid (above, n.1) 74, argues strongly for the influence of the *Palamedes* on Antiphon. This means, of course, that the speech cannot be dated later than 411. Eduard Schwartz, too, detects this influence (see *De Thrasymachos Chalcedonia*, Progr. Rostock [1892] 7–13 = *Gesammelte Schriften* 2 [Berlin 1956] 129–129).

3. Morr (above, n.1) 34.


5. Chroust (above, n.1) 218–220. See also hypothesis of Isocrates *Busiris* in *Isocrates Orationes* ², ed. F. Blass (Leipzig 1907) II Ivii. The author of this hypothesis refers to a tradition that Eupides, in his *Palamedes*, castigated the Athenians for their execution of Socrates, using Palamedes as a mask for the philosopher from a fear of censure. This story is of course impossible on chronological grounds, but it may be based on an authentic tradition. Antisthenes, too, Dümmler argues (“Zum Herakles des Antisthenes,” *Philologus* 50 [1890] 295) drew upon this conception in his *Archelaus*.

6. Calogero’s study is the most important examination of this problem and demands careful attention. The foundation of Calogero’s thesis is an analysis of the techniques of argumentation employed in the *Helen* and the *Palamedes*. From this analysis Calogero concludes that Gorgias had already worked out the ethical point of view which is implied in the Socratic formulation *nemo sua sponte peccat* and which later antiquity attributed to Socrates himself (Calogero, [above, n.1] 12–14). Socrates, however, although taking over this doctrine, sought at the same time to avoid certain immoral consequences to which this theory could lead if it were combined with persuasion indifferently used; his “remedy” was persuasion under the discipline of *dialogos* (p. 16). The many reminiscences in the Platonic *Apology* of the *Palamedes* are evidence for this debt, for Socrates, on the day of his trial, was still under the spell of Gorgias’ ethical discovery and therefore worked many allusions to the *Palamedes* into the text of his defense (p. 15). Furthermore, Plato in his *Gorgias* introduces Gorgias into the dialogue, since once he had resolved to portray the philosophical position of his master Socrates, he could not rightly omit a discussion
of “the master of Socrates himself” (pp. 16–17). Lastly, certain indications in Xenophon support the thesis that there was an intimate connection between Socrates and Gorgias (pp. 15–16).

The foundations of Calogero’s position is his analysis of the techniques of argument employed in the Helen and the Palamedes. In this, I think, Calogero has almost certainly overinterpreted the evidence. In the Palamedes, all that Gorgias has Palamedes say (and what is, after all, common sense) is that no one incurs all sorts of dangers and risks the possibility of ignominy without the prospect of some considerable advantage. As there were no conceivable advantages for Palamedes, his treachery is therefore unthinkable. That there should be a reward sufficient to offset dangers incurred is a notion easily understandable, even, as Palamedes says (16), to a man of moderate sense. How foolish, then, to deny this understanding to a man of Palamedes’ wisdom. (It is therefore perverse to identify, as Calogero does (p. 14), προίκα (Pal. 13) with ἐκών of the Socratic formulation; προίκα clearly means here “without profit.”) With regard to the Helen, it is true that Gorgias attempts to show that Helen did what was wrong because she had been compelled by logos to believe that it was right. Yet it seems to me important to keep in mind the chief emphasis of the work. The Helen is clearly more a boastful description of the power of rhetoric than a serious analysis of moral behavior. It is of course possible that Socrates was deeply impressed by the moral implications of the Helen, even if these now seem to us secondary.

There are other considerations which make such a reconstruction unlikely. For even if we grant that Calogero’s interpretation of the sense of these two works of Gorgias is entirely correct, there are certain chronological difficulties in the view that Gorgias is the source of Socrates’ central ethical doctrine. Gorgias, as we know, came to Athens in 427. This consideration would force one to the remarkable conclusion that it was only at some time after 427, rather late in Socrates’ life and at a point when he was already internationally known, that he began for the first time to expound the doctrine which was to be associated so intimately with his name and to bring into being that form of enquiry which later writers deemed so characteristically Socratic. This late date for so important a development seems to me most improbable; although, of course, it is not impossible. The evidence, however, of the Clouds (423), if evidence it is, suggests that already at a time when Socrates could not have long been acquainted with Gorgias, he was known, and well known, for his interest in dialectic.

Moreover, it is one thing to say that Socrates’ defense should show some traces of Gorgias’ ethical thought if Socrates had truly been a pupil of the Sophist. But can one believe that Socrates himself worked into his speech such an elaborate web of verbal allusion and adaptation of topoi of argument? This surely implies an act of homage and respect far beyond what one may deem likely. It is odd, too, that Plato in composing the Gorgias, the very work which was intended to point to Socrates’ debt to Gorgias, should nowhere have portrayed the Sophist as possessing the slightest familiarity with the doctrine which we are to believe is his own discovery. Moreover, and this seems to me conclusive, the clear sense of the whole portion of the dialogue in which Gorgias most prominently figures is that he possesses absolutely no worthwhile knowledge on the subject of right and wrong (vid. especially 462b–466a). If Calogero is correct, the Gorgias is an extraordinarily perverse bow to “the master of Socrates himself.”
Lastly, the evidence of Xenophon is too vague to stand by itself. At any rate, the passage in the Xenophontine Apology (26) might only mean that Xenophon had read Plato's Apology and added, as his own piece of elaboration, the observation that even in his own time there were many δύναμις devoted to the unjust condemnation of Palamedes. Xenophon, moreover, is surely no reliable source for verbatin records of Socrates' remarks on the day of his trial.

7. Different aspects of this question will be touched upon throughout the whole of this study. Two classic works, however, which discuss in great detail and often rather audaciously the matter of Plato's literary satire are F. Dümmler, Antisthenika (Berlin 1882) and G. Teichmüller, Literary Fehden im Vierten Jahrhundert, I (Breslau 1881); II (Breslau 1884).

8. On the political activities of the Sophists, see Schmid-Stählin (above, n. 1) 41 (Sophists in general and Prodicus); 49 (Hippias); 57 (Gorgias). For rhetors and Sophists as panders to popular whim, see Gorgias, 463e–446a. This passage also illustrates how similar to one another these two activities seemed to Plato to be.

9. Morr (above, n. 1) n.129.

10. Gomperz (above, n. 1) 10. Platonic quotation throughout are from Burnet's Oxford Text. Quotations from the Palamedes are from Diels, Frag d Vors?, vol. II.


12. Ibid.

13. Morr (above, n. 1) 32.


15. Morr (above, n. 1) 32.


17. Ibid. 10.

18. Calogero (above, n. 1) is an exception, since he seeks an explanation which takes into account the specific content of the borrowings and not the mere fact of their existence. In this he is unique among the scholars who have studied this problem. See, however, above, n.6.

19. See Schmid-Stählin (above, n. 1) 74 for similarities in the section devoted to an address to the judges. Schmid does not observe that the similarities in topos extend to the interrogation also. With Schmid's 1.a in his tabular analysis of the Palamedes cf. Ap. 24 c–d, 27a; with 2.a cf. 26a.

20. For discussion of early theories of rhetorical dispositio, see P. Hamberger, Die Lehre von der Disposition in der alten ρέχον ρήτορική (Paderborn 1914). Compare Antiphon 1 for a similar deviation from the sequence of prooimion-diegesis-pistis.

21. I.e., that Socrates (1) corrupts the young and (2) corrupts them intentionally.

22. Cf. also Isoc. 15.321.

23. Cf. Dem. 46.10; Lysias 12.25 and 22.5; Andocides 1.14.

24. Although we have only late testimonia for its presence in the Palamedes story, this detail may well go back to the fifth century. See Scholia in Euripidem, ed. E. Schwartz (Berlin 1887) I Orestes 432. The same detail is contained in Hyginus' version (Hyg. 105)

25. See especially Palamedes 3, 22, and 24; Helen 8–14.


27. See 8, 9, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 25, 34, 36 for use of πειθω and words of the same root (πιθος, etc.).
28. Here we should observe that although πείθω is strictly applicable to both forms of persuasion, this term is nevertheless generally associated, unless it is otherwise indicated, with πείθω πιστευτική, whereas διδάσκω is the \( \text{vox propria} \) for the activity of \( \pi \varepsilon \iota \theta \omega \delta i \delta \alpha \kappa \alpha \lambda \varepsilon k \iota \).

29. For parallel elements in the Helen and the Gorgias, see E. R. Dodds, Gorgias (Oxford 1959) on 452e1–8, 456b6, and 456c6. Dodds does not, however, observe the more pervasive parallels, a fact attributable to his skepticism concerning the philosophical positions frequently, and to be sure rather dubiously, assigned to Gorgias (ibid. 7–9). Nevertheless, although it may be true that there is no thoroughgoing exposition of a nihilistic philosophy in the works of Gorgias, it does not follow that the author of the Helen and the Palamedes can justly be accused of a “dazzling insincerity” (ibid. 8). For a more sensible position, see R. S. Bluck, Meno (Cambridge 1961) on 70b4.

30. See 18d (cf. \( \delta \alpha \gamma \epsilon \gamma \kappa \eta \)), 19a, 24a, 37 a–b.

31. If Riddell had conducted a more careful analysis of the thought of the Apology, he might not have been led to the obvious, but wrong, conclusion that the prologue was merely a farrago of rhetorical clichés (The Apology of Plato, ed. J. Riddell [Oxford 1877] xxii).

32. Not only is Apollo considered so, popularly, because of his oracular function (cf. also Ap. 21b), but for Plato a god who is \( \psi \varepsilon \nu \delta \eta \) is inconceivable (cf. Rep. 2.382e).

33. Hackforth (R. Hackforth, The Composition of Plato's Apology [Cambridge 1933] 88–104) sees a problem in reconciling the two stages in Socrates’ attitude toward the oracle. Socrates is first, as Hackforth observes, a critic of the oracle; he is then its servant. Is this really so difficult to understand? Must one spend all the time in the discussion of it that Hackforth does? I think not, for Plato gives us a most natural and convincing account of the evolution of Socrates’ understanding of the real meaning of the oracle. The turning point occurs when Socrates realizes that the god did not intend him specifically; he was chosen rather to be a \( \text{paradeigma} \) (Ap. 238a). After this realization, the interpretation of the oracle as a command, and not a riddle, became inevitable.

34. The notion has been advanced by two scholars that in fact no coherent defense was made by Socrates on the day of his trial. For these two interesting discussions, see H. Gomperz, “Sokrates Haltung vor seinen Richtern,” WS 54 (1936) 32–43, and W. Oldfather, “Socrates in Court,” CW 31 (1938) 203–11.

35. It seems most reasonable to view the Apology in the context of the recent debate on the influence of Socrates which scholars have connected with Polycrates’ Kategoria (ca. 395–390 B.C.). It is also likely that besides the Apology we should understand the Gorgias, Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Apologia, and Aeschines’ Alcibiades as like efforts to defend Socrates against the criticism of the restored democracy. For a discussion of Polycrates’ work, its probable date, and effects, see P. Treves, “Polykrates,” RE 42 (1952) 1729–50. For sceptical position of the relation of Kategoria to Gorgias, see Dodds (above, n.29) 28–29.

36. Morr and Calogero have observed this; see Morr (above, n.1) 34 and Calogero (above, n.1) 15.

37. See, e.g., J. Burnet ad loc. (Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, ed. J. Burnet [Oxford 1924]) for failure to observe the importance of Palamedes’ appearance in what is perhaps the best of the commentaries on the Apology.

38. See 29c, 33e, 37d.