GORGIAS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LOGOS

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I

GORGIAS OF LEONTINI spanned with his long life (108 years, according to most versions) almost the entire fifth century and at least the first decade of the fourth. He was probably born about 490, a date that agrees with the report in pseudo-Plutarch (DK A6) which makes him older than Antiphon of Rhamnus (born ca. 480) and Socrates (born ca. 470), and would put him in his middle or possibly late sixties when he came to Athens on the famous embassy of 427 (Diodorus 12.53). The tradition also makes him a pupil of Empedocles, and receives some independent support from the reports of Plato and of Theophrastus (DK B4-5) on Gorgias’ holding Empedoclean theories of the illumination of the sun and of optics and color. His activity in Sicily may also have brought him in contact with the Eleatic school and its theories about to on and doxa, which are perhaps reflected in his apparently early work, Περί τοῦ μήντος (B3), possibly, though not certainly, identical with the Περί φύσεως (B2) which Olympiodorus (A10, B2) dates to the Olympiad 444-441; and the latter title may also help place Gorgias’ early activity partly in the Eleatic tradition; his own “teacher,” Empedocles, is, of course, himself said to have been a follower of Parmenides. But whatever the influence of Eleatic and Empedoclean philosophy on his early years, his mature work in the later fifth century is not immediately concerned with a systematic philosophy and, if anything, implies a definite denial of such an abstract, systematic approach to problems of being and existence. Whatever early philosophical training he had is thus significant more for the negative impression it left than for the inculcation of any positive doctrine, except for the analytical and critical method of argumentation which Gorgias was to apply to the rhetorical logos. It has even been suggested that in the course of his life he rejected the Eleatic position in favor of a Protagorean practical acceptance of the world of doxa; it is not, however, impossible that he retained some interest in philosophical and physical speculations throughout his life, as Gigon has argued, though his later work is oriented primarily toward practical activity within the framework of the polis.
Gorgias' relevance to the present discussion, however, lies chiefly in his rhetorical works and their psychological implications. This discussion will be concerned with the assumptions behind his technical rhetorical innovations,\(^8\) rather than with the linguistic or purely rhetorical nature of those innovations themselves, and hence it will be necessary to pass over rapidly such much-disputed problems as his relation to the Sicilian school of Tisias and Corax and his treatment of _eikos_, problems which belong more properly to the history of rhetoric than to psychology.\(^9\)

Any study of Gorgias must depend primarily upon the two original compositions which have been preserved, the _Helen_ and _Palamedes_, both mythological showpieces of rhetoric, one an epideictic encomium, the other a speech of defense intended for a hypothetical court of law. Blass strongly championed their genuineness in the second edition of his _Die attische Beredsamkeit_ (1887), and they are generally accepted as Gorgias' work by most modern scholars.\(^10\) The dating of the _Helen_ depends in part upon its relation, if any, to the _Troades_ of Euripides (415 B.C.) and the _Helena_ (412 B.C.);\(^11\) it belongs, at any rate, in the last quarter of the fifth century. On the date of the _Palamedes_ there is perhaps less agreement. It has been placed as early as the 430's and as late as the first decade of the fourth century, the latter date on the assumption that parts of it imitate the speech of Socrates at his trial in 399.\(^12\) It is probable, however, that Plato's _Apology_ has been influenced by Gorgias rather than the reverse; and in general the stylistic criteria (such as the increasing avoidance of hiatus) favor a date at the very end of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century, in any event after the _Helen_.\(^13\)

A further problem encountered in an interpretation of Gorgias is the question of the seriousness with which the views expressed especially in the _Helen_ and to a lesser extent in the _Palamedes_ are to be taken. Gorgias himself admits at the very end of the _Helen_ that it is a _paignion_, "a plaything" or "trifle." Heinrich Gomperz, following in part Blass, has seized upon this term and combined it with the negative dialectic of the work "On Non-being" (B3) to assert that Gorgias had no positive theories at all,\(^14\) that the work "On Non-being" was not even intended as an ironical parody of the Eleatics (as Windelband had held),\(^15\) but was aimed simply at demonstrating the power of his rhetorical-dialectical method; and Gomperz thus characterizes Gorgias as a "philosophical nihilist."\(^16\) Such a view appears extreme, for although it perhaps correctly takes account of the purely linguistic and rhetorical virtuosity of Gorgias, it omits much else in the tradition:
it looks back upon Gorgias from the point of view of the strictly rhetorical interests of the Isocratean school of the fourth century, and neglects Gorgias' links with the past.\textsuperscript{17} It is doubtless true that it was the verbal and argumentative facility of Gorgias, more than any other feature of his work, that chiefly impressed his contemporaries, especially with the increase of rhetorical activity in the later fifth century. His use of Empedoclean theories, however, suggests that at least early in his life he was genuinely interested in the physical and ontological problems of the Sicilian and South Italian philosophical schools.\textsuperscript{18} Even Isocrates, moreover, refers to Gorgias as having said that "Nothing of the things that are (ta onta) exist," and in his Helen (3) speaks of him immediately after Zeno and Melissus, while in the Antidosis (268) he includes him at the end of a list of philosophoi including Empedocles, Ion, Alcmeon, Parmenides, and Melissus, as if the association between Gorgias and the earlier fifth-century Eleatic and Sicilian physical and philosophical speculation was well-known and generally accepted.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, as already mentioned, there exist two well-attested reports of his physical interests (B4–5), that on color and optics (B4) being especially interesting because of the attention devoted to opsis in the concluding part of the Helen.\textsuperscript{20} Here at least is evidence of a positive "scientific" speculation of Gorgias which touches upon a theme in his epideictic writing. A combination of interests, moreover — in physics, ethics, and practical morality — is not unusual even for the later fifth century, as is attested for Prodicus, Protagoras, Thrasymachus, Hippias, Antiphon the Sophist, and Critias, and is thus equally plausible for Gorgias, especially because he is among the older sophists and hence was brought up in a period of intense speculation on ta physika.\textsuperscript{21} The description of the grave-monument of Isocrates, which contained a representation of Gorgias looking at an "astrological sphere" (A17), perhaps provides a further instance of his physical speculations.\textsuperscript{22} Plato too, scornful as he is of Gorgias' conception of rhetoric, treats him with respect and gravity as a man holding serious — if Platonically unacceptable — views.\textsuperscript{23} And it has further been suggested that his treatment of the Helen story, even though a paignion, bears some resemblance to the later Euripidean technique of treating mythological material in a "modern," rationalistic and psychological manner, for the discussion of theoretical ethical or social problems.\textsuperscript{24}

It would, of course, be incorrect to go so far to the other extreme as to make Gorgias a great moral theorist. Obviously he is primarily a rhetorician, but one with broad interests — practical rather than theoretical — and a grounding in some of the ontological and physical
conceptions current in his day. The absence of a systematic ontological theory in Gorgias does not preclude the presence of a real rhetorical-aesthetic theory with some psychological basis. Gorgias' denial of the existence or communicability of true "Being" would not necessarily have hampered his practical activity, for, as Gigon has well noted, the sophistes of the fifth century is not so strictly committed to an ethic resting upon theoretical foundations as the philosophos of the fourth, nor is he likely to have isolated himself from practical life because he could demonstrate syllogistically that nothing exists.\(^25\) Thus W. C. Greene has adopted a balanced view which probably comes close to the truth: while admitting the practicality of Gorgias, he takes note of his physical interests and his attention to "the psychological analysis of motives and ... the plausible or sufficient appeal to the feelings."\(^26\) Hence, as will appear presently, Gorgias' interest in doxa and the problem of Being, while admittedly not to be construed as a sign of a systematic metaphysics, may be relevant to a theory of communication and persuasion, with which he was, for purely practical reasons, deeply concerned; and there are, as will be shown, elements of an aesthetic theory in the Helen. The speech itself, in fact, is as much an encomium on the power of the logos as on Helen herself (Isocrates himself noted that it was not really the latter);\(^27\) and thus the Helen expresses a view of literature and oratory which touches closely Gorgias' own practice and probably his own beliefs. Hence the speech may even have served as a kind of formal profession of the aims and methods of his art, a kind of advertisement like the επάγγελμα of Protagoras or the sample pieces which Plato attributes to Hippias and Prodicus.\(^28\)

There are, moreover, other elements among the preserved fragments of Gorgias which reveal a more positive cast of mind than that of an absolute sceptic. He seems to have had a political idealism of sorts in his belief in the unity of Greece against the barbarians, in this anticipating his pupil Isocrates. He deprecates victories over fellow Greeks (B5b) and is said to have made homonoia the main topic of his Olympikos (B8a);\(^29\) and the topic of good will (eunoria) to Greece as a praiseworthy virtue appears prominently even in the Palamedes (3; cf. 30), where the whole setting and the subject itself sharply oppose Greeks and barbarians. Plato, it is true, charges Gorgias with an amoral attitude toward his art, and chides him (Meno 95c, DK A21) for laughing at those who claim to teach arete and limiting himself to making men "clever (deinous) at speaking." He also criticizes his supposition of a plurality of special aretai, the peculiar excellences of individual persons or pragmata (Hel. 1); and Aristotle continues this criticism, numbering
Gorgias among those ἐξαρμούντες τὰς ἀρετὰς.30 Practicality, however, need not imply amorality or immorality, and Gorgias is hardly to be censured from the point of view of the linguistic or moral generalizing tendency of fourth-century Platonism. Gorgias' usage of arete simply follows the common practice of the fifth century before the redefinition of the word by Plato; and the closely parallel phrase γνωσικεῖα ἀρετή is in fact used by Pericles in the Funeral Oration (2.45.2; see DK B19). Yet Gorgias may have given more consideration to educational matters, for his funeral epigram speaks of him as best at ἀσκήσαι πνευμ ἀρετῆς εἰς ἀγώνας. Such evidence, of course, is of doubtful value and may be simply a case of de mortuis nil nisi bonum; and the language of the epigram itself is highly conventional.31 It is more significant that in the Apology (19e) Socrates joins Gorgias with Prodicus and Hippias as aiming at παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους (DK A8a). But although Gorgias did not perhaps regard the teacher as entirely free from all moral responsibility, as Plato has claimed,32 he did probably concentrate upon the purely technical aspects of his art rather than its moral implications.33 Such a procedure is evident from the treatment of peitho in the Helen. Plato himself, however, directs his attack upon the potentially immoral consequences of such an attitude and not at Gorgias himself, who soon disappears from the scene of the Gorgias; and Gorgias' own reputation remained unsullied after his death (DK A8).34 Like his colleagues, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, Gorgias seems simply to have accepted the institutions of society as the necessary framework in which the civilized man can live and work.35 Thus in the Helen (16) to kalon is defined by nomos, and nomos itself is a kind of "habit" or "accustomation" (συνήθεια). He would seem, moreover, to have shared in some of the more idealistic and rationalistic speculations on nomos, for in the Epitaphios (B6) he opposes νόμον ἀγκρίβεια to λόγων ὀρθότητις in the spirit of Democritus B181, and speaks of doing and saying to deon as the θειότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον. Finally, his admonition on the duty of a good woman, that her reputation, not her figure, should be known to many (B22), falls within the conventional attitudes of Greek morality, such as that expressed by Pericles (Thuc. 2.45.2); and in the same vein is the statement about the arete of man, woman, and child in B19: a man's arete is "to engage in the affairs of the city and so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and take care that he himself does not suffer anything similar." All that Gorgias could be reproached with here is the traditional Greek attitude toward arete.

A perhaps more profitable and relevant approach to Gorgias lies in an examination of his preserved fragments rather than a re-evaluation
of Plato's judgment. Gorgias, it will appear, reflects the continued interest of the late fifth century in the internal processes of the psyche, and the application of this awareness of the area of psychic phenomena to rhetoric and a techne of persuasion. The Helen in particular is based largely upon an analysis of human action in terms of emotional causality, and eros is a recurrent theme throughout the work. Eros and epithymia have great motive power, and through the agency of Helen's beauty even cause such large-scale undertakings as the bringing together of the host for the Trojan War (Hel. 4). Eros is the real cause of Helen's action (15); it is a disease (nosema) and has the power of anankai (19).

The nosema image is especially interesting, for it implies an equation of the psychic-emotional activity with tangible physiological processes. The psyche is thus elevated to the place of physical reality. Gorgias elaborates on this equation with great explicitness in an important passage, Helen 14, the section which summarizes his little encomium on the power of the logos:

\[ \text{τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἃ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναμις} \\
\text{πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἢ τε τῶν φαρμάκων} \\
\text{τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν.} \]

Here the term used of the psyche, taxis, is deliberately concrete; and the psyche is equated immediately with the equally tangible physis of the soma. The next sentence elaborates this physical equation still further and draws out the parallel between the effect of the pharmakon on the disease (nosos) and life of the body and the effect of logoi on the psyche and the emotions. The equation has, in fact, proceeded so far that by the end of the section Gorgias fuses the physiological and psychological senses of the term pharmakon, for he returns to this word in the phrase ψυχῆν ἐφορμάκευσαν, but now in a metaphorical sense and in coordination with the term ἐξεγοήτευσαν, which previously occurred in a strictly literary-psychological context (Hel. 10). Thus the physiological meaning of pharmakon at the beginning of section 14 is equated with its psychological significance at its end; and similarly the nosos of 14 recurs with an extended metaphorical and emotional significance in 19. The processes of the psyche are thus treated as having a quasi-physical reality and, perhaps more significant, as being susceptible to the same kind of control and manipulation by a rational agent as the body by the drugs of the doctor. This equation is, of course, already familiar from Democritus B31, "Medicine (iatrike) cures the diseases (nosous) of the body, but wisdom (sophie) takes away the psyche from sufferings (pathe)." It need not be argued that Gorgias is influenced by
Democritus (or vice versa); both men rather reflect, from different points of view, the interest in the extension of a measure of descriptive analysis and control to the life of the psyche. In another important passage of the Helen, Gorgias, like Democritus above,\(^{38}\) speaks of the *pathē* of the psyche: in describing the effects of pity and fear produced on the psyche by the tale of another’s woes or successes, he concludes that in such cases, ἵδιον τι πάθημα διὰ λόγων ἐπαθεν ἢ ψυχή (9). The repetition of the idea in both the verb and the cognate accusative heightens the emphasis on *pathos*. In this emphatic repetition, moreover, there is perhaps a further association with the passage discussing the *bia* in Helen’s departure shortly before (7), where also the *topos* of pity (*eleos, oikthirai*) is connected with the here physical *pathos* of Helen: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἐπαθε. “It is just, therefore,” he continues, “to pity the one, but to hate the other.” Section 7, in other words, presents a purely physical *pathos*, an objective act, which arouses pity; in section 9, however, the psyche and its emotions are discussed, and the application of the same term, *pathos*, to the psyche in a different context thus helps to give to this subjective emotion an objective, physical reality. This reapplication of *pathos* to psychic activity is analogous to the metaphorical reuse of *pharmakon* at the end of 14; and the association of *logoi* with *pathos* in 9 prepares the terminological ground for the more systematic equation of *logoi* with the medical *pharmaka* throughout 14.

The force of the *logoi* thus works directly upon the psyche; they have an immediate, almost physical impact upon it. Hence, in 13, Gorgias speaks of *peitho* as an almost active force, coming into the *logos* and forming or molding the psyche as it wishes.\(^{39}\) In 12, *logos* is said to persuade the psyche directly (λόγος γὰρ ψυχήν ὁ πείσας), and in 10 the *dynamis* of ἐπιθέτη is described as συγγενομένη τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς and thus persuading and “changing it to another state” (μετέστησε), the last being another quasi-physical term, like the *taxis* of 14, applied to the psyche; and the same physical term *dynamis* is used in 14 of the action of the *logos* on the psyche. Plato in his Gorgias, furthermore, describes the aim of Gorgianic rhetoric as “putting persuasion in the psyche of the audience” (452e).\(^{40}\) It is thus apparent that Gorgias regarded his rhetoric as having more than a superficial effect on the ear, as actually reaching and “impressing” the psyche of the hearer. All persuasion is thus action upon and manipulation of the psyche of the audience; and the *dynamis* of the *logos* (Hel. 14) acts like a real drug in affecting the state of the psyche. Thus the *techne* of Gorgias rests upon a “psychological” foundation: it is at least assumed that the psyche has an
independent life and area of activity of which the rhetor must learn and which to some extent he must be able to control.\footnote{41}

There is, moreover, even a closer relation between the emotional life of the psyche and the physiological phenomena with which these psychic processes are made analogous, for not only does the psyche have a quasi-physical reality, but it also manifests its affects in physical signs, the "shudder" (φρίκη) and "weeping" (πολυδακρός) alluded to in 9, where Gorgias shows his interest too in the physiological form by which movements within the psyche are indicated.\footnote{42} The psyche is thus not yet the completely spiritualized or dematerialized entity which it is to become for Plato, though, on the other hand, Gorgias probably did not think in terms of such a consistent materialism as Democritus. His psyche, nevertheless, is in contact with physical phenomena and operates in ways analogous to theirs. In thus treating the emotions as real, almost physiological entities, Gorgias indicates a kinship with the scientific rationalism of Greek medicine, which, as has recently been shown, was soon to apply the physical humor-theory (see Helen 14) to a systematic explanation of emotional affects.\footnote{43}

This interaction between the psychic-subjective and physical-objective spheres of activity appears with especial clarity from Gorgias' treatment of opsis in the last part of the Helen. By its very nature, opsis is in immediate contact with the physical world, and, as fragment B4 shows, Gorgias perhaps regarded vision as itself a physical and material process. And yet he treats it in a fashion analogous to the psyche and peitho: it is through opsis that the psyche is "impressed" or "molded" (τυποῦται, 15), just as peitho "forms" or "molds" the psyche as it wishes (13);\footnote{44} but the opsis is also subject to emotions of pain and desire, like the psyche itself: οὐτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν <ποεῖν> πέφυκε τὴν δῆμι (18). It is this same λύπη and pothos which are associated with the psyche in 8–10 and 14. Thus just as the affects of the psyche are described in physiological terms, so those of the more immediately physical opsis are described in emotional and psychological language (see also eros and pothos, 18 ad fin.).\footnote{45} There is thus no strict demarcation between "subjective" and "objective." The psyche exists on an equal level with the physical world and is closely related to it. Its processes are explicable in terms of physical analogies, and it may undergo a change of state (Hel. 10) through the almost physical dynamis of logos and persuasion.

There thus exists a reciprocal relationship between the psychic and physical worlds, and such a relationship in fact constitutes a basic and necessary assumption of Gorgianic rhetorical practice, which aims at
changing the condition of the psyche by the impingement of an outside force (peitho). As has been shown above, peitho is usually described as acting directly upon the psyche — it “forms the psyche as it wishes” (13); but, as appears from the discussion of opsis in 15, this “forming” does not occur in isolation. It is rather by contact with the physical stimulus transmitted through opsis (in this case) that the psyche is moved: διὰ δὲ τῆς ὀψεως ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν ὀρεινῶν τυποῦσι. Here the physical stimulus affects even the internal “character,” the tropoi, of the psyche, a term which may itself have physical connotations like the taxis of the psyche in 14. The tropoi probably refer more immediately to the ordinary ethical values upon which the stability of the psyche in society rests, but these values are forgotten under the impact of a powerful opsis, just as phobos at the end of 16 “drives out” nomos. Opsi thus serves as the intermediary which transmits the purely physical stimulus to the emotional life of the psyche. This process is described more explicitly at the beginning of this same section (Hel. 16): if the opsis discerns a fearful sight like the approaching of armored troops, “it is itself disturbed and disturbs the psyche (ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν), so that though the danger is in the future, they flee struck out of their wits (ἐκπλαγώνειτες) as if it were already present.” The tarache which the physical stimulus creates in the opsis is transmitted to the psyche, sets that too into a state of tarache, and thus causes a total ekplexis, a sudden yielding to an emotional and nonrational response. The action of an external stimulus on the psyche is thus not a simple mechanical process, and is perhaps not so systematically physical or material as in the Democritean system; rather the emotional process begins from without, from the objective sense-datum of the advancing host, and then widens in increasing rings to the organ of perception and feeling, the opsis, which is itself subject to an emotional movement, and from there extends to the psyche itself and results in total ekplexis and the consequent physical manifestation of flight (φεύγουσιν). The pattern is a cyclical one, from physical stimulus to emotional reaction and back to physical manifestation, the last being analogous to the “shudder” and “weeping” described in 9. This cyclical process, moreover, is important for Gorgias’ conception of peitho and for the whole basis of his defense of Helen: an external sense-datum — a visual one acting upon the opsis, or logos having metron upon the hearing (9) — creates an impression upon the psyche which in turn results in a physical action. It is thus implied that the psyche itself responds to the physical structure of the word or vision with emotional impulses which, if strong enough, result in a total ekplexis and a concrete action of an unexpected, nonrational
type. The *logos*, therefore, if properly calculated, can through its "impression" on the psyche lead the hearer into lines of action hitherto not considered and beyond or in violation of its "habituation" to *nomos* (16). The psyche thus stands in a middle position as the impressionable receiver of new emotions and the initiator of fresh actions resulting from these emotions; and *peitho*, as the art of awakening these emotions, is thus a powerful tool for directing and aiming human action. In Helen's case the tool is perhaps misapplied (πειθο ἀπαίτησιν, 14), but it may also be used for good, for instance, to "persuade" a reluctant patient to undergo the proper treatment.48

It is interesting to note in connection with the *tarache* and *ekplexis* of *Helen* 15–16 the ease with which these emotional phenomena are applied both to collective groups (the army, 16) and separate individuals. The individual psyche seems to be discussed at the end of 15 and again in 17, while section 16 is concerned primarily with group phenomena. Similarly, while most of the section on the *logos* is concerned with the individual psyche and the specific case of Helen (especially 8–10), section 13 speaks of the "contests of words in which one *logos* persuaded and delighted a great mass (ochlos)"; and here the juxtaposition εἰς...πολύς emphasizes the collective emotion involved. Gorgias' awareness of the collective implications of *peitho*, used to create a mob effect on a fickle *ochlos*, appears also from *Palamedes* 33, where the defendant says that he will abstain from using the emotional devices of *oiktos*, *litai*, and φίλων παραίτησιν, which would be suitable in an *ochlos* but unfitting before the small and select jury of aristocratic peers, where his defense is to be strictly rational, based upon to *saphes* and *didaskein*. This *topos* occurs significantly at the beginning of the Melian debate in Thucydides (5.85–86), where it is stressed that the argument will not be πρὸς τὸ πλήθος (5.85) and hence the emphasis is to be upon *didaskin* and not *apate* (see Pal. 33, οὐκ ἀπαίτησιν ἀπαίτησιν).49 Elsewhere too Thucydides shows a vivid appreciation of collective panics, *ekplexeis* or *tarachai*, similar to that described in *Helen* 16 (e.g., 4.125.1; 7.80.3).50 Thrasymachus also seems to have a special awareness of collective persuasion, for Plato describes him as skillful at ὑγιείας τε αὐτοῦ πολλοῖς...καὶ πάλιν ὑγιείας ἐπάδων κηλεύν (Phaedr. 267c, DK 85 B6); here the special effectiveness of the rhetor seems to lie in his appealing to the group emotions of the *polloi*.51 For Gorgias, however, the psyche is the common denominator in both the collective and individual situations (the psyche is mentioned in neither of the two Thucydidean passages just cited), while Thucydides seems to have an appreciation of group emotions as a separate category of psychic
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phenomena, not as merely the multiplication of the reactions of a number of individual psychai. For Gorgias the processes of individual and group persuasion belong to a unified theory, and in both cases the rhetor is working on the individual psychai of his audience, whether in a group or individually. The emotional life and the sensitivity of the psyche to external impressions form a constant whether one or many are involved. There is, to be sure, in Helen 16 and Palamedes 33 an awareness of the greater susceptibility of an ochlos to irrational emotional impulses, but these are essentially of the same type, if of a different magnitude, as individual emotions, and are similarly created by means of peitho or opsis.52 Group persuasion is thus merely an extension of the persuasion of an individual, and operates on the same psychological principles.

Any further investigation of what these principles are can most conveniently begin with a recognition of the importance of doxa and the problems of knowledge and communication in Gorgias’ attitude toward his craft. It is again not necessary to assume that Gorgias ever wrote a full-blown treatise systematizing ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics into a unified theory; but the Helen, after all, contains an encomium on the logos which seems to present at least the basis of a theory of poiesis, and other fragments too seem to fit into a framework consistent with that theory so as to elucidate the psychological assumptions underlying his rhetoric.53

Of these assumptions perhaps the most basic concerns the nature of communication. According to Sextus’ report of the treatise “On Non-being” (B3), Gorgias maintained not only that nothing exists, but that if it did, it could not be communicated. Gorgias, however, does not draw the conclusion that communication is impossible, but rather defines more precisely the nature of this communication and its limitations. It occurs primarily through the logos, the word or language. Through language men communicate not the reality of things, but only words: “For that by which we impart information (μηνύόμεν) is logos, but logos is not the things that are or that exist; we do not then impart to others the things that exist, but only logos, which is other than the things that exist” (B3, Sext., Adv. Math. 7.84). Gorgias, in other words, is aware of the peculiar nature of the communicatory medium qua medium. Communication itself, therefore, is a special area of human activity, an invention of society based upon prearranged conventions, and must inevitably involve distortions and rearrangements of the message.54 There is no such thing as a purely objective transmission of reality. This isolation of the special nature of the
medium in the communicative process is perhaps analogous to Democritus' emphasis upon the distorting effect of the physical medium in his theory of perception (e.g., A122). In both cases the essentially subjective nature of the processes involved is detached for critical analysis. For Gorgias the significance of this step lies partly in the fact that it frees the *logos* from any ontological implications, such as it has in the Eleatic abstraction of the predicate, *to on* and *to me on*, as a part of the world of metaphysical existence; and Gorgias, as several scholars have suggested, seems to be combatting this Eleatic view directly in B3. Instead, the *logos* is restricted to its proper area, verbal communication, with full awareness of its limitations. Gorgias' sense of the special mediating function of the *logos* in communication appears from *Palamedes* 6–7, where the defendant points out the necessity for *logos* to be the beginning (*arche*) of the conspiracy, and the difficulty of an exchange of *logoi* between Hellene and barbarian. Hence the *logos*, free from a metaphysical correspondence with a higher "reality," can be treated as an art, a *techne*, where its distortive nature is, if anything, an asset to be exploited in the interests of *peitho*, a tool for persuasion, without any necessary correlations with the world of Being. Gorgias, then, as Rosenmeyer has well remarked, has discovered "the autonomy of speech"; for him "speech is not a reflection of things, not a mere tool or slave of description, but... it is its own master." The *logos* is thus as free from the exigencies of mimetic adherence to physical reality (*apate* is, in fact, an important part of the art of the *logos*) as from an instrumental function in a philosophical schematization of a metaphysical reality. The opposite of these assumptions, of course, underlies the Platonic criticism of Gorgias' rhetoric (as of all rhetoric), for the entire Platonic dialectic supposes as a working premise that the structure of *logos* corresponds or provides access to the structure of true Being. Gorgias, however, early rejected any such presuppositions, and his art consists in the practical utilization of the communicatory medium, with a full awareness of its imperfections and fallibility, to effect concrete changes in the external world through changes in human attitudes. "Reality" for him lies in the human psyche and its malleability and susceptibility to the effects of linguistic corruscation. Thus his rhetoric, though concerned primarily with a technique of verbal elaboration, rests ultimately upon a psychology of literary experience. These two, psyche and *logos*, lie both within the realm of tangible experience and become for Gorgias the new reality.

Corresponding to this awareness of distortion in the area of linguistic experience is the role of *doxa* in the area of psychic experience. Here
the psyche, like the *logos*, is a distorting receptacle. The most elaborate
discussion of *doxa* is in *Helen* 11, and this passage lays the foundation
for the treatment of *peitho* as a delusive *pharmakon* and a form of
“enchantment” in the following sections, 12–14.\(^{58}\) Because the
majority have no adequate knowledge of past, present, or future, they
are dependent on *doxa*, and they must receive it as the “counselor for
their psyche.” It is admitted that *doxa* is deceptive and unstable
(σφαλερὰ καὶ ἀβέβαιος), but the human psyche has no better guide. It is
noteworthy that nothing is suggested as a practical alternative to
*doxa*;\(^{59}\) *doxa*, rather, is simply and realistically accepted as the ordinary
state of human communicable knowledge. Again, the rhetor is not con-
cerned with absolute knowledge, but only with creating “impressions”
upon the psyche of his audience and thus somehow directing their
actions. In *Helen* 13, therefore, in discussing this “impressing” or
“forming” of the psyche, Gorgias describes the *logoi* of the *meteorologoi*,
who, putting one *doxa* in place of another, “make appear to the
eyes of *doxa* what is untrustworthy and unclear.” The play on the
meaning of *doxa* — both as an external “opinion” which the speakers
bandy about and an internal state of mind, a subjective “condition of
opinion” — points up the dependence of the psyche upon sources not
always disinterested, and reinforces the possibility of the manipulation
of the psyche which the flexibility of *doxa* (in both the above senses)
makes possible. Gorgias repeats this idea at the end of 13 in discussing
the *logon hamillai* of the *philosophoi* “in which rapidity of wit is shown
as making the trust (or belief) in *doxa* subject to easy change” (ὡς ἐνεμέταβολαν ποιοῦν τῷν τῆς δόξης πίστιν). In the *Palamedes*, where the
process of persuasion is seen rather from the point of view of a defend-
dant undoing slander than of a rhetor praising the powers of *peitho*,
the state of *doxa*, now opposed to *aletheia* (24, 35), is again almost
assumed to be the normal condition of the dicaeastic mind and, indeed,
the cause of the whole trial, which otherwise would be an “easy
decision” (35).

This state of *doxa*, however, is the psychological medium in which
the rhetor works, the condition of ease of change (ἐνεμέταβολαν, *Hel.* 13)
which makes possible decisive persuasion, “for it is necessary to
demonstrate to the audience by *doxa*” (*Hel.* 9). But the close relation
between *doxa* and the psyche and the changing of the latter by per-
suasion and deception appears with special clarity from *Helen* 10:
“For the power of the magical spell (ἐπωδή) joining together with the
opinion of the psyche (συγγενομένη . . . τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς) charmed it and
persuaded it and changed it (μετέστησε) by enchantment (*goeteia*).”
Gorgias then proceeds to speak of the twin technai of enchantment and magic (mageia), namely the errors (ἀμαρτήματα) of the psyche and the deceptions (ἀπερήματα) of doxa. The deceptive aspect of persuasion appears also in the following sentence, on the necessity for all persuasion, past and present, to take place through the forming of false words (ψευδὴ λόγον πλάσωντες, Hel. 11); and the end of section 11 brings in still more terminology for deceit (sphalera kai abebaios). The instability of doxa thus makes possible the deception on which all persuasion must rest. But Gorgias does not regard such persuasion and its concomitant “enchantments” as an immoral deception, but rather as a necessary and practical corollary to his conception of the normal state of the human psyche. It is thus important to note that the basis of rhetorical deception lies within the psyche and is already a potential result of the hamartemata and apatemata attendant on every doxa of the psyche; man’s bent is toward error and not, as ultimately in the Platonic view, toward truth. The rhetor is simply adapting to practical use a given psychological fact, just as he accepts the conditions of human communication as the material on which to apply his linguistic tools. His “art” is thus deliberately and explicitly opposed to “truth” and produces a logos which is τέχνη γραφείς, οὐκ ἄλθεια λεξθείς (Hel.13); but the rhetor uses the deception of techne not because he necessarily spurns truth, but because most men (οἱ πλεῖστοι) themselves possess and communicate only doxa and would not know truth if they had it (see B3). This techne, however, is not entirely negative, for it provides terpsis (13); and the apate of tragedy brings perhaps through its terpsis a wisdom of its own (B23 and infra).

The “deception” which the Gorganic rhetor practices is thus also connected with the apate or pseudos of the poetic tradition (e.g., Hesiod, Theog. 27–28) and is a natural consequence of the above-mentioned autonomy of the logos as a separate artistic medium: the logos demands the complete suspension of “rational” belief, for it has a pistis all its own; it works through “magic” and “enchantment” rather than the objective factuality of aletheia, and its results correspondingly are a poetic terpsis as well as the sophia of B23. The art of the logos for Gorgias in other words belongs more properly to the poet of the sixth and fifth centuries (with the significant difference that Gorgias is aware of logos as a communicatory tool that will transmit what the rhetor desires for a specific purpose) than to the philosophic logician of the fourth.

Pistis, the state of conviction which results from successful persuasion, is thus dependent on doxa. In a slightly broader sense, pistis
is used of the prevalent conception which the poets have conveyed of Helen and is coordinate with the φήμη of her name (Hel. 2). In Helen 13, logoi are said to make appear before the eyes of doxa even what is without pistis (ἀπιστος), and the arguments of the philosophoi work upon the changeability of the pistis of doxa. The rhetor must use doxa as one of his primary instruments: δει δε και δόξη με δειξις τοις ἀκούονοι (Hel. 9); doxa is both the presupposed psychological state of the audience upon which the rhetor must work and also one of the tools by which he molds that state to his own purposes. Pistis also plays a large part in the Palamedes, but again from a different point of view, for the defense of Palamedes relies in part upon an attack on the rhetorical conception of pistis and doxa, which are embodied in Odysseus, who is here, as in the roughly contemporary Philoctetes of Sophocles, the type of the crafty orator. Palamedes thus criticizes the factual weakness of the pistis of Odysseus (22), contrasts his “trust” (pistis) in doxa with “truth,” and even calls doxa itself an ἀπιστος τατον πρᾶγμα (24). Doxa and pistis are still associated, though from a hostile point of view; but this negative approach of the Palamedes only serves to confirm the importance of doxa and pistis in the rhetorical theory which the Helen adumbrates. There is, further, the epistemological ground for the rhetorical use of doxa, that is, the inaccessibility and incommunicability of true Being for men (B3, Sext. 7.65). Hence the rhetor, who is concerned immediately with communication, and that of a specialized kind, namely persuasion, must use doxa. “Truth” for men is itself a complex phenomenon which consists in the proper combination of Seeming and Being: “Being is invisible (aphanes) if it happen not upon Seeming (dokein) and Seeming is weak if it happen not upon Being” (B26). The discovery of “reality” for men involves a necessary subjective element of “seeming”; and here Gorgias indicates his awareness of the importance of the medium of perception in the area of epistemology, parallel to the intermediate function of the logos in communication. In neither case do men transcend the medium and reach “pure” Being, but their knowledge of the world inevitably contains an admixture of their own perceptual energies and psychological and linguistic patterns. It is on this basis that the rhetor tries to change their view of reality by manipulating these variable patterns of appearance and language.

There is still no definitive equation of doxa with emotion or of reason with aletheia requiring a split within the psyche and a corresponding value judgment ranking the former below the latter, although the contrasts between doxa and aletheia in the Palamedes and, to a lesser degree, the conception of rhetoric as “enchantment” in the
Helen, are perhaps steps along the road to the systematic division made by Plato. Gorgias, however, still frankly regards literature as resting upon deception, *apate*. *Apate* is not necessarily immoral, but simply the means which men must use to visualize and communicate τὸ ἀφανὲς. The Platonic criterion of mimesis for art separates, as Rosenmeier has claimed for tragedy, the effect of literature from the means which it employs (among them *apate*), whereas Gorgias in the fifth century still regards *logos* as a whole, as an entity complete within itself, independent of and in a sense above a literal correspondence with the *aletheia* of the phenomenal world. Thus the deceptive *ἐπωδαί* of *logoi* must be present if *logos* is to have its therapeutic effect of "bringing on pleasure (hedone) and carrying off pain" (*Hel. 10*). Gorgias, of course, was not primarily a theorist, and he saw clearly the possibilities of applying this principle of deception to practical service in the law court, of utilizing his psychological premises for nonliterary purposes. It is important to emphasize, however, that these theoretical premisses do exist and, as passages like B23 and Helen 9–10 indicate, may have formed part of at least a rudimentary psychological theory of literature. The existence of such a theory is perhaps supported also by the use of *apate* in a literary context in Aristophanes and the *Dissoi Logoi*, as we shall see; from here it has a long history through Plato’s opposition and into later antiquity.

Gorgias’ early work in the Eleatic and Empedoclean traditions (even if his approach was hostile and critical) on the problems of Being and of perception (B3–4) may thus have been significant in the later course of his development. He would thus have early been made aware of the element of subjectivity in human perceptive and aesthetic processes. Such an awareness is implicit in the definition of color attributed to him in the *Meno* (76a, DK B4): χρόναι ἀπωροθή χρημάτων ὁφει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. The perception of color is not a purely mechanistic process, but depends upon a corresponding perceptive act in the organ of sight, *opsis*, and there is perhaps a two-way interaction implied in the word *symmetros*. Gorgias’ interest in illusion and in the illusive aspect of perception may thus plausibly be dated in the earlier part of his life. It is thus perhaps significant that Sextus assigns a considerable portion of his discussion of the treatise “On Non-being” to the problem of illusion and reality (B3, Sext. 7.79ff). Still more interesting is the fact that visual illusion plays a large part in Gorgias’ discussion of *opsis* at the end of the Helen; in 17 he speaks of the μάταιοι πόνοι and δυσίατοι μανίαι which result from the impression which the εἰκόνες τῶν ὀραμένων have left upon the mind. These visions, of course, are not
strictly speaking illusions, but they do produce an emotional effect on the psyche which is akin to illusion — vain fears, madness, sudden frights (δειματούντα). There would thus seem to be some continuity between the early physical and philosophical work of Gorgias and his later rhetorical-literary interests. In his later life, however, he seems to have become primarily concerned with the possibility of utilizing and directing this illusion for practical ends, of manipulating by *techne* the subjective uncertainty of the human psyche. He thus shares the emerging interest of the later fifth century generally in the hidden processes of the psyche and in perception as a subjective restructuring of the world. In his development of a *techne* to exploit this illusional process he shares too in the rationalistic spirit of the later fifth century, and his work is thus related to that of Democritus (B191) in the assumption that the psyche is an independent entity which, by the proper rational means, can be moved and directed. For Democritus, however, following Leucippan materialism, the problem of illusion was not so crucial as for Gorgias, whose mind was formed in the Eleatic and Empedoclean tradition of the West, where the relationship of *doxa* and *to on* was a paramount issue. Gorgias seems to have combined this interest in subjectivity, perception, and *doxa* with the Sicilian *technai*, such as those of Tisias and Corax, and in the course of his adaptations to have arrived, perhaps without full consciousness or intent, at a kind of psychology of literature.

The sort of emotional *peitho* which the *Helen* describes is therefore also a product of *techne*. It is interesting to note that Plato attributes to Gorgias the definition of the rhetor as πειθοῦς δημουργός, that is, as a craftsman applying a systematic technique. The *Helen* too, despite the strong emotional effect attributed to the *logos*, proceeds in terms of rational argumentation, the enumeration and exclusion of a series of alternatives, in a manner not dissimilar to that of Sextus’ outline of the treatise “On Non-being” (B3); and this use of systematic, logical argument is even more marked in the *Palamedes*. This same rationalistic approach is implicit in the pharmakon simile of Helen 14, where the image is borrowed from medicine, the one exact and empirical science which had in the later fifth century achieved striking and verifiable practical results in the Greek world. Yet along with these newer usages of words like *dynamis*, *taxis*, and *physis*, which suggest the “scientific” precision of Democritean formulations (e.g., B31, 191), occurs the language of magic and superstition, of *thelgein*, *goeteia*, and *mageia*, which can be traced back to more archaic strata in Greek thought. As will appear, however, the *Helen* does not set against one
another these two methods of creating *peitho*; rather the two are part of a single aesthetic process, a rational and emotional tool, wherein the *pharmakon* and *goeteia* are combined to move the psyche. Thus at the end of the section on the *logos*, Helen 14, Gorgias combines the two terms: τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν. Here he speaks of their application to evil *peitho* (πειθοὶ των κακῶν); but the use of the term *pharmakon* in a medical or “scientific” context earlier in this paragraph, as pointed out above, makes it likely that the combination *pharmakon* and *goeteia* is not meant to be restricted to “evil persuasion” alone. Their combination is simply the tool of the rhetorical-aesthetic process, and may be applied to the more salutary awakening of *terpsis* and *tharsos* just as well as to the creation of *lype* or *phobos*. And similarly even the literally medical *pharmaka* may be used for evil ends, some to put an end to disease, others to end life itself (*Hel. 14*). Gorgias is here concerned with the methodology and psychological-physiological basis of his *techne*; and in establishing the parallel with the *pharmaka* of medicine, he does not conceal the fact that the art of persuasion, like its medical counterpart, can be dangerous as well as beneficial, for anything that extends rational control over an area of human life has negative possibilities. Thus Gorgias cannot be charged with complete moral naivete; he is aware of the consequences of his *techne* and implies some moral valuation in his choice of the adjective *kakή*. He does not say that this is the sort of *peitho* which he practices, and perhaps leaves it to the audience to infer that it is this *kake peitho*, the application of a powerful *techne* to socially reprehensible ends, of which Helen is the victim.

A similar combination of the use of emotion with a rationalistic *techne* is attested for Thrasymachus, whose rhetorical activity at Athens perhaps precedes that of Gorgias75 and whose work left a strong impression on the fourth century and the later rhetorical tradition. Plato (*Phaedr. 267c*, DK 85 B6) describes him as having based his *techne* upon appeals to pity and lamentations on old age and poverty, as a man able to excite many and then to charm and enchant them when excited (ἀργισμένοις ἐπιθέουν κηλεύων). This last phrase, of course, implies essentially the same conception or rhetoric as the *goeteia* terminology of the *Helen*, the use of natural emotion, artificially created, for a specific purpose; and the techniques of arousing and controlling these emotions are now elaborated and formulated into a *techne* of what Plato calls elsewhere in the *Phaedrus* (272a) ἐλευνολογία a rhetorical “Pathologic.”76 Thrasymachus is also said to have written a work *Eleoi* in which he treated the emotive effects of delivery (ὑποκριτική
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DK B5); and the list of his works includes a rhetorike techne (DK A1) and, on better authority, a Megale Techne. The precise content or form of these works is, of course, most obscure, but the titles alone suffice to indicate that the tradition placed his work in the same category of technical systematization as that of Gorgias. Thus, as in Gorgias, the rhetor has a double aspect: he is both a rationalistic linguistic technician with some knowledge of human emotion and a magicianlike charmer; but again the practical nature of his activity fuses these two aspects into a functional unity; he exploits simultaneously, as the Helen illustrates, "not only the emotional force of poetry... (but) also the power which we would call the persuasive force of reason."

If the Helen develops the emotional aspect of peitho, it is the Palamedes which emphasizes the purely rationalistic side of the techne. Some of this difference, of course, can be attributed to the difference in genre, the Helen being an encomium (21), the Palamedes an apologia (1), delivered before a select group of judges (33), with an explicit rejection of an attempt to appeal to the emotions. The Palamedes presents some of the same awareness of the emotional forces as the Helen, but with a significant difference in emphasis. Thus ekplexis occurs in the Helen (16) as the natural result of a terrifying opsis and is offered as an excuse for Helen's action. In the Palamedes, ekplexis is also a natural result of a groundless accusation, an αἰτία ἀνεπίδεικτος; but the resultant state of aporia is to be overcome by aletheia and by the quickness of wits necessitated by the ananke of the present situation. The emphasis in Helen 17 is rather upon the complete vanquishing of the rational powers by the emotive force of the present phobos: οὕτως ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξῆλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα. Similarly, while pity and the emotional excitement and even deception (apate) of the ochlos have a positive value throughout the Helen (esp. 9–10, 13), such methods are strictly rejected in the Palamedes (33), where τὸ σαφέστατον δίκαιον and the didache of "truth" (alethes) is to replace oiktos and apate.

The treatment of human motivation, which occupies a significant part in both works and essentially forms the basis of the defense, differs in corresponding fashion. The emphasis in the Helen is upon the bia, the almost physical violence exercised by various external forces upon Helen, against which she is practically helpless. The Palamedes, however, exploits the rational and pragmatic, not the emotional potentialities of the logos; thus it assumes that reason is in control, that the motivation for an action lies entirely within the powers of the individual will operating through logical choice. Hence of the two parts into which
Palamedes divides his defense, one is that he would not have wished to betray Greece (5), and he assumes that only some rational motive could create such a will, the hope of honor, wealth, safety, benefit to friends (13–18), or the desire to avoid “some fear or toil or danger” (19). He summarizes his belief in the essential rationality of the human will as follows: “For it is for the sake of two things that any man commits any action, either in pursuit of gain (kerdos) or in avoidance of harm (zemía).” Kerdos especially has from early times an association of rational, even excessively wily, planning. The assumption of conflicting motives or the Euripidean formulation of acting against one’s recognized interests, the famous video meliora proboque deteriora sequor (see Hippol. 38off), is not even admitted as a possibility; and the coexistence of the opposites mania and sophia is explicitly denied: “You accuse me . . . of two completely opposed things, wisdom and madness, which it is not possible for the same man to have” (25). In the Helen, on the contrary, mania is a recognized emotional state which sometimes does in fact motivate human action (Hel. 17). Palamedes, however, carries on his rationalistic process of excluding opposites from motivation in the almost Socratic formulation of the following section (26): “But if you consider wise men (sophoi) to be intelligent (φρονιμοίς), surely it is not fitting for the intelligent (φρονοντας) to make the greatest errors (ἐξαιρέται) and to choose evils rather than present goods. If then I am wise, I did not err; but if I erred, I am not wise.” The disjunctive proposition of the last sentence contains perhaps some intentional “sophistry” which is not to be taken too seriously; but the whole passage assumes a rational view of human motivation which may be more akin to Socrates than to Euripides.80 And it is perhaps possible that the Palamedes too contains a masked and paradoxical defense of the rhetorical art by utilizing for the purpose of a rhetorical defensive speech those very arguments which might be brought against the conception of rhetoric in the Helen as the deceptive manipulation of logoi, not erga (Pal. 34–35); but it is perhaps significant that this opposition of logos-ergon is clearly felt as a locus communis, a topos which must be mentioned, but which, by an act of technical virtuosity, is made to serve just the opposite of its intention, the supposed denigration and undermining of logos. Is not Palamedes himself, after all, using logos and, in the refusal to appeal to pity, employing a topos doubtless already canonized in the practice of the law courts, as Aristophanes satirically attests in the Wasps (967ff)? The Palamedes, nevertheless, does agree essentially with the Helen, at least in the formal method of confronting and analyzing the motivation of the act as the
primary problem of the rhetor; and both works assume the possibility of a classification of this motivation into set categories, each covered by its particular topos. In the assumption about the rational nature of this motivation, however, the Palamedes contrasts sharply with the Helen. The division of human action into inner motivation (boulesthai) and external capability (dynasthai) still implies, of course, the analytical approach to the psyche which begins in the later fifth century; the area of will is seen as existing in a reality coordinate with the objective factuality of physical power (dynamis). But something of the early excitement at the discovery of this realm of psychic activity has disappeared. Instead of being regarded as a fully dynamic unity to which at last analysis can be applied, the psyche is seen as an already completely rational organism, operating with prim logic and providing a certain number of convenient topoi about truth and appearance, will and power. The development of intellectual tools for its analysis, the problem which occupied Democritus to a certain extent, now has crystallized into a set of formal, pre-established categories. It is at this point that the completely logical and analytical methods of Plato can take over, infusing new life into the rhetorical conception of the Palamedes, yet also reducing the psyche to a problem in analytical and logical diaeresis; the independent existence of the psyche is established and taken for granted and its parts are then carefully distinguished and their functions clearly delineated. But their interaction, by being reduced to such analytical explicability, becomes almost mechanical: the sense of wonder and the feeling for the organic complexity of the psyche which accompanied the speculations of Democritus and are even to some degree present in Gorgias' Helen have been lost.

II

The difference between the rationalistic approach to persuasion in the Palamedes and the emotional approach in the Helen can, of course, also be attributed in part to the form and expressed function of each work. The Palamedes is concerned with a practical situation which has rather grim consequences; hence the possibilities for theoretical discussion are severely limited and the work concentrates upon the exploitation of the rational possibilities of the logos. The Helen, on the other hand, is freer. Here appears the full significance of the term paignion in the concluding portion (21): the work is not bound to a practical purpose or to an imaginary situation of a trial, like the Palamedes. It is a free imaginative creation, with no life-and-death alternative present. The mythical framework of the Helen is thus consciously
literary and artificial, without the sense of reality and immediacy which is introduced into the *Palamedes* and is present, for example, in the *topos* of the *aporia* of the speaker (*Pal. 4*). The *Helen*, moreover, is an encomium, and the personality of the speaker does not obtrude upon or even appear significantly in the work: it has no definite location in place or time; its setting is from the first the literary, poetic tradition: ἦ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἦ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη (2). Thus the work is concerned with literature and aesthetics in a broader sense than would be possible in the *Palamedes*; and it is significant that the generalizing term *poiesis* occurs twice in the work (9, 18), first of literature and then of sculpture. It is thus not unnatural to seek the outlines of an aesthetic theory in the *Helen*, for its nonpractical character makes it a suitable vehicle for such theories; and the author’s identification of himself with his work at the end (ἐμὸν παλέγνων) renders it still more likely that the encomium on the *logos* does represent Gorgias’ own belief in the psychological basis of persuasion and, indeed, of all poetic expression. The *Helen* thus treats the *logos* not only as a practical tool of persuasion — though this too is implicit in the work — but also as an aesthetic medium for emotional release, since the stimulation of pity, fear, pleasure, and pain is the immediate aim of the *logos*. The rationalistic implications of arousing and directing these emotions by a rhetorical-psychological *techne* are, of course, still present; but at the same time appears an element of the unpredictable in the divine power of the *logos* and its control over the psyche. The psyche in the aesthetic process adumbrated in the *Helen* is freer and more impressionable and sensitive than its more rational and fact-bound equivalent in the *Palamedes*.

The emotive aspect of the *logos*, consequently, as a powerful force in its own right — an aspect which the *Palamedes* admits but explicitly avoids (e.g., 33) — is fully elaborated in the *Helen*. Through its compelling power over the emotions the *logos* becomes a δυνάστης μέγας (8) which accomplishes “divine deeds” (θειότατα ἐργα) in arousing pity and fear, pleasure and pain. The association of the *logos* with the divine occurs again in 9, also in connection with the emotive affects of pleasure and pain produced by the ἐνθεον διὰ λόγων ἐπωδαι. The significance of the attribution of divine qualities to the *logos* is twofold. First, it continues the line of poetic tradition (e.g., *Iliad* 2.385ff) which regarded the power of artistic utterance as a divine gift and therefore mysterious and, like all such psychic powers, incomprehensible to ordinary mortals. Gorgias has already drawn upon this poetic tradition, as Norden has brilliantly demonstrated, in the phrase ἦ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων...
πιστις at the beginning of the work (Hel. 2); and this allusion to the poetic tradition again suits the more detached, literary character of the Helen, as opposed to the impression of factuality aimed at in the Pala-medes. The range of the logos is thus expanded and its emotive force given more flexibility when an element of the unknowable and divine is added. The second significance of the divine attribute of the logos is the power thus assigned to it and the emotions it creates. The association of to theion with sheer physical force of irresistible intensity appears in the three other places in the Helen where Gorgias refers to the divine. In section 6, he suggests an excuse for Helen in her being overcome by the bia of the god, and establishes this helplessness before such power as an absolute law of physis: “For it is not a natural occurrence (πέφυκε) for the stronger to be checked by the weaker, but rather for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger, and for the stronger to lead, but the weaker to follow. And a god is stronger than a man in force (bia) and wisdom and the rest.” Later in the work, in the discussion of the power of opsis and eros, Gorgias excuses Helen’s succumbing to the latter on the grounds that “being a god he has godly power” (theian dynamin) (19). Finally, near the end of the work, theios is associated with invincible ananke, for if Helen acted ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαιοθείσαι, then her crime is excusable. Thus logos is almost an independent external power which forces the hearer to do its will. The logos works through ananke and is itself an active force impinging on the psyche from without; and thus peitho and ananke are strongly associated in Helen 12.

Yet it is perhaps suggested that the rhetor, though he directs and utilizes this force by techne, still does not fully comprehend its nature and control it, for the logos is also associated, as shown above, with the incomprehensibility of divine phenomena. The rhetor applies it to a given situation, as he would a drug (14), but without fully understanding the nature of the emotions involved; they remain in the shadow of divine obscurity. There is never an attempt to analyze “pity” or “fear” in the abstract and to relate them to the nature of the psyche or to human nature in general, as Aristotle is later to do. The logos releases powerful emotional energies — pleasure, pain, pity, fear — and can channel them into certain desired directions; but the question of where these forces come from, whether they pre-exist in the psyche or not, is only barely raised in the vague analogy with the “humors” of the body (14). There remains an awareness of a great reservoir of these emotional forces which the rhetor can draw upon with his techne, and, as will appear below, some conception of the practical
mechanism by which the *logos* finally persuades; but there is no real theoretical speculation on emotional forces as abstract entities. What the rhetor is interested in is the practical application of this linguistic *pharmakon*, the external physiological effects (*phrike, polydakros,*) and the final emotional state resulting which will dispose the audience favorably to the matter at hand. Gorgias, of course, still makes significant assumptions about the independence of the psyche as a unified sensitive organism in its own right, but these assumptions serve an ultimately practical aim and lack the theoretical foundation and investigation into the nature of the psychic processes that characterize Democritus’ materialistic psychology and the far more developed speculations of the fourth century.

There is, however, the suggestion of greater complexity in Gorgias’ conception of *peitho*, that the process is not simply the conquest of a weaker subject by a stronger force, but that the persuaded is himself an accomplice to the act of persuasion, that he *allows* himself to be persuaded, and that persuasion is thus inseparably connected with the emotions aroused by the aesthetic process. The suggestion that *peitho* does operate by such a process appears in Plato’s *Philebus* (58a, DK A26), in which Gorgias is said to have distinguished the art of persuasion from the other *technai* by the fact that it made everything its slaves, not by force, but by voluntary action:92 πάντα γὰρ ὑφ’ αὐτῆς δούλα δι’ ἐκόντων, ἀλλ’ ὄρ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο. This concept of voluntary persuasion seems at first to contradict the connection made between *peitho* and *ananke* in the *Helen*. Plato is doubtless exaggerating here, but the statement need not be absolutely false or in such patent conflict with Gorgias’ own words in the *Helen* as at first appears. The connection is made through *Helen* 13, where *terpsis* and *peitho* are combined as the total effects of a single *logos* upon a great *ochlos.*93 Successful persuasion, in other words, works through the aesthetic process of *terpsis* and the emotions connected with it. Here again, in distinction to the *Palamedes*, mere rational demonstration is insufficient, but the fully effective impact of *peitho* involves the emotional participation of the audience, which is made possible by and takes place through the aesthetic pleasure of *terpsis*. Thus in the passage under consideration (*Hel.* 13), *aletheia* (the word associated with logical and factual demonstration in the *Palamedes*) is to be replaced by *techne*. The same combination of *peitho* and *terpsis*, with a similar exclusion of a factual-ratiocinative element, occurs in negative form in *Helen* 5: τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἴδοσιν ἡ ἵσσοι λέγειν πίστιν μὲν ἐχεῖν, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει. Again what is desired is the combination of *terpsis* and *pistis*; simply *pistis* alone, in the sense of a factual
rehearsing of what men already know (or can be made to know by simple demonstration) is insufficient.94 It is, however, perhaps possible to go a step farther in determining the source of this terpsis. It would seem to lie at least partly in the deception, the apate, of the psyche. Thus not only are peitho and terpsis contrasted with “truth” or “knowing” in the above two passages (5, 13), but peitho is positively associated with apate as the correlate of terpsis at the beginning of section 8 and with the “invention of false logos” at the beginning of 11 (πείθουσι δὲ 
ψευδὴ λόγον πλάσοντες).95 The importance of apate in Gorgias’ aesthetic theory is known from his remark on tragedy (B23) referred to above; and in this context too perhaps belongs fragment B26 on the need for the combination of einai and dokein, which may perhaps correspond to the aletheia and techne of Hel. 13 or, broadly, to the pistis of what men know and terpsis in Hel. 5. These passages, at any rate, combined with the remarks on terpsis and apate would again perhaps indicate Gorgias’ awareness of the need for freeing the logos from the bonds of pragmatic demonstration if it is to have its full emotional, and hence persuasive power. The cold logic of the Palamedes brings the pistis which appears fleetingly in Helen 5 (and on which such a high value is placed by Palamedes himself, Pal. 20–21), but not the emotional release of aesthetic terpsis, at which tragedy presumably aims (B23). And again, it is fitting for such an emotional theory of terpsis to be adumbrated in an epideictic work which is itself a paignion and hence free from the exigencies of the practical demonstration of a cause. Gorgias thus claims for his peitho some of the magical charm which belongs to poetry, and, like poetry, his logos achieves its effect through terpsis.96

There is thus a unity between the aesthetic-deceptive elements in a work of art, as Gorgias defines it, and its persuasive-emotive effect; and it is through the latter that this aesthetic theory can be applied to the practical situations in which persuasion is needed, the dicastery or the bema. The allusion to the ochlos in Hel. 13 already implies some practical application of terpsis. A still more practical implication appears indirectly in the treatment of opsis in Hel. 18–19: here the aesthetic terpsis and hedone (θέων ἡδεῖα) which result from the successful composition (poiesis) of a painting or sculpture creates the emotive λυπη and παθος in the beholder and ultimately eros (18). Similarly, Gorgias continues (19), Helen’s hedone (πο ... διμιμί ηδονή) at the sight of Paris created the eros in her psyche with its divine, invincible power. Hence the emotions aroused by a given work of art can lead the subject ultimately to a real course of action, analogous to the effects of Helen’s eros. Extrapolating backward now from the opsis of Hel. 18–19 to the

5+H.S.C.P.
painting and sculpture and then to its linguistic analogue, the rhetorical and poetic *logos*, it is possible to see how the verbal artist could create a *logos* which, through its *terpsis*, can arouse in the hearer the desired emotions and hence lead him by a "divine *dynamis*," as it were, to the requisite action. In this connection it is worth re-emphasizing that *poiesis*, the word used for the artistry of both language (9) and painting or sculpture (18), is thus the instrument of an aesthetic pleasure which leads, as Gorgias stresses in both places, to an emotional *bia* or *ananke*.

The basis for Gorgias' aesthetic and rhetorical theory is thus the awareness of the emotional effects which the *poiesis* of the arts, guided by the particular *techne* involved, creates in the psyche. It would appear that he conceived of a process in which the psyche moves from the pure aesthetic state of *terpsis* to a more active condition of fear or pity, love or persuasion. A work of art, in other words, creates a passive aesthetic reaction (*terpsis*, *hedone*, or their opposite, *lype*); and under the proper conditions this may develop into a stronger, *motivational* response (fear, pity, and ultimately persuasion). Gorgias seems to distinguish between these two stages in the aesthetic process, a passive, emotional disposition and a more active response, a total "conquest" of the psyche by pity, fear, or love. Thus in section 8 he enumerates both the passive and active states together as the results of a *logos dynastes*: fear (*phobos*) and pain (*lype*) and "joy" (*χαρά*) and pity (*eleos*). The order is perhaps deliberately varied,97 for joy and pain belong together as the passive effects, Fear and pity as the active ones. "Joy" is here substituted for *terpsis* or *hedone*. The association of *eleos* and *phobos* together and of *lype* and *terpsis* in other passages makes clear this division of the emotional response into a "passive" or purely aesthetic and an "active" or motivational stage. Thus in *Hel.* 9, Gorgias describes the active response: *poiesis* engenders in the *psychai* of the audience "fearful (*periphobos*) shuddering," "much-weeping pity," and "desire that is fond of grief" (*pothos philopenthes*).98 Here in speaking of the physiological results of a powerful *logos* and of the total *pathema* of the whole psyche (*9, ad fin.*), Gorgias naturally emphasizes the final active stage which subsumes and takes for granted the prior aesthetic reaction of *terpsis*. In typical Gorgianic fashion, of course, the repetition from section 8 is varied with the addition of *pothos*, a word which occupies a position midway between the passive and active states and takes its definitive coloring from its qualifiers. Here the verbal force of *philopenthes* and the whole active context associate it clearly with the motivational part of the process. At the beginning of section 10, *hedone* and *lype* are joined as representative of
the first stage produced by the *epodai* through *logoi*; the more active phase is described in the following sentence: “The power of the enchantment (*epode*) charmed and *persuaded* and changed (*μετέστησε*) the psyche by witchery (*goeteia*)” In section 14, a more complex reformulation of the same terms recur: “Of *logoi* some give pain (*lype*), some pleasure (*terpsis*), some cause fear (*phobos*), some create boldness in the hearers (*θέρας*) and some drug and bewitch the psyche by a kind of evil persuasion.” The grouping of both the passive and active effects enumerated at the beginning of the discussion of the *logos* (8) recurs as a kind of summary here at its end. *Terpsis* and *lype* are immediately paired by their proximity; *phobos* and *tharsos* go together as the two opposite forms of the active emotional state; and the description of the witchery of the *kake peitho* seems added as a summary of the final stage of the whole process, performing the same function as the *pathema*-language at the end of section 9 and repeating and rounding off the *pharmakon-goeteia* image from the beginning of 14 and 10.

The same division of terminology recurs, as is to be expected, in the discussion of *opsis* in 18–19. The parallel between the aesthetic processes of *opsis* and the *logos* is, of course, emphasized by the application of *poiesis* (9, 18) and the *τυμπάναθαι* image (13, 15) to both areas of artistic activity; and there is perhaps a further connection in that in section 13 persuasion is described as acting upon “the eyes of opinion” (*τοίς τῆς δόξῆς δύμασι*) where the visual terminology of the later sections is anticipated and metaphorically transferred to language. In *Helen* 18 then, the *poiesis* of sculpture is said to create *hedone* for the eyes. This is the passive, purely aesthetic reaction, which is further described by the following sentence: *ὁστὸς ὁδὲ μὲν λυπεῖν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἀπολύειν* ἐπέφυκε τὴν ὀψιν. Here the *pothos* takes its coloring from the *lypein* with which it is associated and is a passive “longing” akin perhaps to the *terpsis* elsewhere juxtaposed with *lype*. The next sentence, however, describes the further, active stage in the process: “But many things create in many men love and desire (*eros* and *pothos*) for many things and bodies.” Here *pothos* is associated with the active, motivational *eros* and is not the static “longing” that alternates with *lype* in the purely aesthetic reaction to *opsis*. This active force of *eros* resulting from the *opsis* is described further in 19, where the “eye of Helen, pleased (ἡθέν) at the body of Paris, inspired in her psyche an eager contest of love (*προθυμίαν καὶ ἄμμοιλαν ἐρωτος*). Thus the purely aesthetic reaction of *hedone* leads to a powerful motivational response which immediately and strongly moves the psyche and produces direct action. Gorgias, of course, doubtless did not distinguish abstractly between static and
active, aesthetic and motivational response; but his recurrent grouping of terminology, as has been shown, indicates a twofold process, a movement from a vague mood of aesthetic stimulation, pleasure or pain, to a powerful urge to action out of fear or pity, love or desire. Because the aesthetic response works so directly upon the psyche (as in the effect of hedone in Hel. 19), it can be used to produce a certain desired train of action. Again, Gorgias leaves somewhat vague the process by which the transfer from mere aesthetic response to a total pathema of the psyche occurs; all that is important for him is that such a process does empirically occur and can therefore be utilized by a directive techne of the logos.

The process of persuasion is thus for Gorgias more complex than a simple conquest of reason by the irrational powers of the logos. There is rather a psychic complicity in the emotive action of the logos: the psyche participates in and reacts to the artistic composition of the logos and thus experiences terpsis; it is hence regarded as a perceptive, aesthetically sensitive organ upon which the work of art acts. When the aesthetic stimulus is strong enough, however, as in the case of a pleasing vision or a moving speech, the passive aesthetic terpsis becomes a powerful impulse which directs the whole course of action of the psyche. This is the condition of ekplexis (Hel. 17), which overpowers men’s usual sense of duty and consciousness of social obligations.99 It is, however, also implied that the potential and capacity for such powerful reactions lie already latent within the psyche, for in Helen 8 one of the effects of logos is “to increase pity” (ἐπαυξῆσαι ἑλεοῦ), that is, it is presumed that some eleos is already present in the psyche and the logos intensifies this;100 but again Gorgias does not elaborate much further on the process. Similarly the τυποῦσαι image of Hel. 13 and 15 implies a pre-existent psychic material upon which the “impression” or the “molding” works. In the power of these emotional forces, nevertheless, and the ability to release them lie the theiotata erga of the logos dynastes (Hel. 8); the logos acts like a divine agent, mysteriously but powerfully, upon a subject which somehow also interacts with it. The difference in point of view from Democritus, who also speculated upon the relation between the divine and poetry (B18, 21) is noteworthy: Democritus’ interest focuses upon the creative activity, the work of the poet himself; Gorgias is more concerned with the process of reception by the audience;101 and even in describing the poiesis of painting and sculpture (Hel. 18) Gorgias rapidly passes over the process of “creation” itself in order to dwell upon the aesthetic and emotional effect upon the opsis of the viewer. This difference is thus perhaps characteristic
of the practical orientation of Gorgias’ literary and psychological “theories.”

The discovery, nevertheless, that the emotive process of persuasion occurs through a series of aesthetic moods and impressions evoked by the work of art is especially important for Gorgias and is, in fact, the keystone of his rhetorical techne, for it implies that through the artistic elaboration of the *logos* as a form of *poiesis* a chain of emotional reactions will occur leading from the aesthetic *terpsis* to the final *ananke* of *peitho*. The aesthetically satisfying *logos*, in other words, does not exist for its own sake alone, but has great practical implications which lie within the form itself. Every artist is thus a potential persuader through the emotive forces which the art-form has the power to evoke.

Gorgias is probably among the first to seize upon the practical implications of such a theory and work out a *techne* in which the persuasiveness of a *logos* derives from its poetic composition. Thus there is seen to be a relation between the formal structure of the *logos* and the aesthetic-emotional effect which it produces. Such a direct relationship between literary form and psychological effect appears in *Helen* 9, where Gorgias defines “all *poiesis*” as *λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον* this definition is followed immediately by an account of the emotions of *phobos*, *eleos*, and *pothos* with their physiological manifestations.

Thus the *metron*, the formal aspect of the *logos*, seems to play a significant part in causing the emotive reactions upon which persuasion rests; and it is, therefore, natural that conscious formalism is so important in the carefully balanced antitheses, rhyming cola, calculated sound-effects, and metrical patterns in Gorgias’ own style. 102 Gorgias, in fact, transfers the emotive devices and effects of poetry to his own prose, and in so doing he brings within the competence of the rhetor the power to move the psyche by those suprarational forces which Damon is said to have discerned in the rhythm and harmony of the formal structure of music. 103 Perhaps following the work of Damon, then, Gorgias presupposes for his technical figures and tropes the responsiveness of the psyche to the formal qualities of the *logos*. Damon too seems to have speculated on a reciprocal interaction between the psyche and music, the movement of the rhythm causing a corresponding physical and psychological *kinesis* in the psyche of the hearer. 104 Damon, moreover, as H. Ryffel has recently re-emphasized, was acutely interested in the practical ethical and educative values of the psychological effect of music, and seems to have exercised considerable influence on Plato’s views of education (*Rep.* 3.400a ff, 4.424c ff, DK
Damon’s work represents another, perhaps earlier, phase of the rational systematization and control of obscure psychic processes. Gorgias continues this kind of approach in the area of rhetoric and poetry.

Thus, while admitting the place of emotional and aesthetic factors in persuasion, Gorgias also makes it possible to direct and control these emotions through the tie between the formal aspect of the work and the particular feeling evoked. The rhetor is truly the counterpart of the doctor (Hel. 14) in applying a rationalistic techne to his subject. It is not possible here, of course, to discuss these technical means which put into practice the theory outlined above. It is, however, worth noting that Gorgias himself stresses that the creative process, the poiesis of the rhetor, is based upon techne; and he refers to the arousing of terpsis by the logos as a techne (13), while the “enchantment” or “bewitching” of the psyche is also a techne (10). The divine inspiration of the poet, though perhaps obliquely alluded to in Helen 2, plays little part in the actual poiesis for Gorgias, unlike Democritus and later Plato’s Ion and Phaedrus; instead the association of poetry (or poetic prose) with the divine is transferred entirely from the poet or process of creation to the emotive-persuasive effects of the finished logos. To Gorgias’ development of practical techniques for the attainment of these effects, like the topic of the kairos (B13) and the communes loci (e.g., B19) only passing reference can here be made. What is significant, however, is the rational principle involved, that the manipulation of the formal aspect of the logos can produce a desired emotional effect on the audience; and hence the linguistic techne of rhetoric becomes also a technique for directing human motivation.

Because the rhetor conceives of his art as a techne, he is concerned not so much with its moral implications as with the development of more successful techniques of terpsis. There is, of course, a moral problem raised if the responsibility for all action is attributed to some external force, like the four categories enumerated in Helen 6: tyche and ananke, bia, peitho, and eros. Yet the question of who is responsible for the use or exertion of these forces is dismissed in the following sentence: “For it is established by physis not for the stronger to be checked by the weaker, but for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger.” Peitho and the aesthetic and emotional forces which accompany it are, of course, among these almost physical anankai. It is the function of the rhetor to apply and direct them to arouse the emotions of pity and fear at the appropriate kairos; he uses his rhetorical technique to create a defense, by means of phobos and eleos, of those who,
like Helen, have been caught in one of the trains of ananke which are regarded as controlling human life. But of these controlling forces no moral quality is predicated, and it is not the function of the rhetor to raise the question.

Gorgias would seem to have regarded himself as in the poetic tradition, as a creator of terpsis,\textsuperscript{108} not a moral philosopher; he is an artist concerned with poiesis and the techniques of peitho rather than an ethical theorist. As has already been shown, moreover, this terpsis is an integral part of the emotional process of persuasion. From a Platonic point of view, this concentration upon the purely aesthetic reaction was morally reprehensible; and the Gorganic emphasis upon hedone and terpsis is thus subject to the same strictures as that of the poets, while Plato explicitly rejects the whole assumption about the "enchantment" or goeteia of poetry and the concept of an emotional release through hedone in grief, which applies as much to the Homeric ἀμερός γόος as to the Gorganic pothos philopenthes (Hel. 9).\textsuperscript{109} There are the further complications of the avowed opposition of techne to aletheia (Hel. 13), the reliance upon apate, and the agonistic setting, all of which were repugnant to Platonic aesthetics and morality, while the agonistic neglect of akribeia is one count in Thucydides' famous criticism of Herodotus (1.22.). Thus the antiemotional elements of the late fifth and the fourth centuries, striving to replace fluid emotional views of human action with precise scientific or ideally moralistic ones, were obviously hostile to Gorgias as in his double aspect as a rhetorician and a poet, and tended to depict him as an immoral artist lacking any earnestness or seriousness.\textsuperscript{110}

The Palamedes, however, as has been noted, shows another side of Gorgias, an approach to a more logical and rationalistic definition of peitho in which a more severe, traditional morality can appear in statements like, "For those who spend much need much money, but not those who are superior to the pleasures of nature (physeos hedonai), but those who are slaves to pleasures . . ." (Pal. 15). There is, moreover, no reason to believe that Gorgias thought of his techne of persuasion as being used for bad ends. Plato, in fact, represents him as pointing out the positive utility of an art of peitho in persuading reluctant patients to follow doctors' orders (Gorg. 456b, DK A22). Even the emotional function of peitho, moreover, has its practical side in the preservation of the values of the polis, as appears from the illustration which Aristophanes gives in the Frogs (1040ff), where the martial themes of Aeschylus, in contrast to the erotic subjects of Euripides, create in his hearers "many aretai" and arouse (ἐπαλίπει) the citizen
(ἀνάρρεα πολλαῖς) to military valor in behalf of the state. Aristophanes is here thinking probably of Aeschylus' *Septem*, which Gorgias is attested to have admired as μεστὸν Ἀρεως (B24), perhaps for this very reason; and it has thus been plausibly suggested that this positive valuation of epairein in the *Frogs* is Gorganic in origin;111 it would not, at any rate, contradict any of Gorgias' theories. Such a use of the emotional capabilities of the logos within the framework of the polis is, in fact, attested for Pericles' use of rhetoric. Thucydides describes how Pericles, when the populace was ὑβρεῖ θαρσοῦντες, would κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖναι, and conversely how, when the citizens were δεινοὶ ἄλογοι, he would encourage them ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν (Thuc. 2.65.8). The terminology here is essentially the same as that of Gorgias, who similarly combines phobos and tharsos in the effects of the logos in *Helen* 14. It is not, of course, necessary to suggest that Gorgias directly influenced Pericles (or even Thucydides) or vice versa; but it is important to note that the emotional potentials inherent in the logos were clearly visible to political thinkers in the later fifth century, and that these emotional forces could be regarded as valuable tools for the creation of political arete (*Frogs* 1040) and for the uniting of the members of the polis in a common cause for its preservation; the recognition of this fact serves to blunt in part the sharpness of the Platonic strictures against the Gorganic conception of rhetoric and to lessen somewhat the distance between Gorgias and his sophistic contemporaries, Protagoras and Prodicus.112

It is, of course, true that "deception," apate, plays a large part in Gorgias' theories of rhetoric (*Hel.* 10) and tragedy (B23); and in this emphasis upon apate he seems to have been followed by Aristophanes in the *Frogs* (909–10), who has Euripides charge Aeschylus with apate, and by the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* (3.10ff).113 That Gorgias, however, did not conceive of such deception as immoral appears from the language of B23, where the artistic deceiver is described as "more just" (dikaioteros) than the nondeceiver, and the deceived audience is "wiser" (sophoteros) than the not deceived. In the passage from the *Dissoi Logoi* too, moral considerations do not enter, but "in the composition of tragedy and in painting he is best who deceives in the most things, making them like to what is true." Here it is interesting that the author cites tragedy and painting, two of the arts which Gorgias explicitly names in *Helen* 18 and fragment B23. In the *Frogs*, moreover, it is primarily Aeschylus who is associated with the use of apate and ekplexis (909–10, 961–62), and it is precisely he who represents the moral-educational value of tragedy throughout the second part of the
play.\textsuperscript{114} Gorgias lives in an age when there is still a coherence between the aesthetic and moral spheres of human life, when the arts can still be felt as reinforcing the communal and moral aims of the \textit{polis}; and even Euripides, whom Aristophanes charges with disrupting this coherence, claims to make men better (\textit{Frogs} 1009f) and to teach them, in almost Protagorean fashion, how to \textit{oikei\v{w} \v{e}mei\v{n}ov} (976–77).\textsuperscript{115} This communal function of the arts appears in the idealizing view of Pericles in the Funeral Speech (2.38.1), where the need for the relaxation of the mind from toil is fulfilled by the \textit{\v{e}gy\v{e}ves} and \textit{thv\v{a}i\v{c}u}, the former probably referring at least in part to tragic and comic performances.\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Hedone} and the arts are thus accepted as an integral part of communal life and as serving a valuable communal function through their restitutive effects. It is only in the fourth century and with Plato that morality and the arts are finally divorced and \textit{mimesis} is to replace \textit{apate} as the artistic aim.\textsuperscript{117} Aristotle, however, characteristically modifies the extreme Platonic position in admitting the cathartic function of tragedy as providing a \textit{\v{e}kap\v{e}v \v{e}pl\v{o}y\v{e}n}.\textsuperscript{118} Aristotle thus reverts in part to the fifth-century position, but in confining the area of artistic expression to the category of \textit{paidia}, "entertainment," he definitively separates the educational and aesthetic activity of art and thus widens the gap between it and the moral functions of the community; he splits apart even further, consequently, the unity of the communal-educative and restitutive-entertaining functions of the arts which Pericles and, it would seem, Gorgias too had assumed.\textsuperscript{119}

The \textit{terpsi} or \textit{hedone} which plays such a large part in Gorgias' theories as the proper end of the aesthetic process thus need have no immoral coloring. It forms part of a unified, if not systematically elaborated, aesthetic theory which includes under the heading of \textit{poiesis} (\textit{Hel.} 9, 18) both literature and the visual arts, and regards \textit{opsis} as a coordinate area with language for the stimulation of aesthetic pleasure and the stronger emotions of \textit{ekplexis} or \textit{eros}. The association of \textit{ekplexis} or \textit{kataplexis} with powerful literature appears also in Euripides' characterization of Aeschylus in the \textit{Frogs} (961–62) and thus may possibly derive from Gorgias himself;\textsuperscript{120} at least Gorgias' description of Aeschylus' \textit{Septem} as "full of Ares" (B24) occurs in the \textit{Frogs} (1021).\textsuperscript{121} But, significantly, Gorgias uses \textit{ekplexis} as one of the emotional affects resulting from a powerful \textit{opsis} (\textit{Hel.} 17), and thus seems to have expanded his awareness of the emotional force of artistic creation and response to include visual as well as linguistic sensitivity. In so doing he suggests the possibility of generalizing his emotional theory of literature to the arts and thus reaches a breadth of view
toward the emotional basis of all aesthetic sensitivity that is usually said to originate with Plato.\footnote{122}

It has been suggested, first by Süss and later (and more moderately) by Pohlenz, that the language of Helen 9, \textit{eleos, phobos, pothos philopenthes, ἔπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίων πραγμάτων . . . εὐτυχίας}, combined with the medical terminology of section 14, anticipates the later catharsis-theory of tragedy, with the notion of a pleasurable sense of relief from the emotions of pity and fear.\footnote{123} The parallels in language are striking; and the likelihood of Gorgias’ having tragedy in mind in Helen 9 is perhaps confirmed by the interest in tragedy attested in B23–24. The \textit{Frogs} (1028) also presents an idea similar to that of the \textit{pothos philopenthes} of Helen 9, which shows at least that the awareness of the dramatic “framing” and artistic remoteness of others’ sufferings as a source of pleasure was current in the late fifth century: Dionysus says of Aeschylus’ \textit{Persae, ἐχάρην γοῦν τὸν θρήνον ἀκούσας περὶ Δαιφείου τεθνεῶτος} [Rogers’ text].\footnote{124} Gorgias’ own fondness for the Aeschylean type of tragedy appears in his admiration of the \textit{Septem} (B24) and perhaps in his interest in \textit{ekplexis} (Hel. 17), with which Aristophanes and the subsequent literary tradition associate Aeschylus (Frogs 961–62, \textit{Vit. Aesch.} 7 and 14). This interest in Aeschylean tragedy and the powerful emotions it excites may make it possible to arrive at a closer interpretation of what Gorgias means by \textit{apate}: the spectators must be “deceived” by the dramatic, presentational framework to a sufficient degree to associate themselves with the action of the drama so that they feel real pity or fear “at the good fortunes or the mischances of others’ deeds and bodies” (Hel. 9); but at the same time pleasure results from these emotions precisely because the whole process is one of \textit{apate}, “deception,” in which the fictional element of the dramatic framework distances the action enough to make the emotional affects awakened by the performance pleasurable rather than painful.\footnote{125} And it is perhaps possible that in Helen 14, where Gorgias repeats some of the emotional terminology of section 9, he wishes to connect the action of a drug (\textit{pharmakon}) in leading off the humors of the body with the emotional “purgation” of pity and fear effected by the tragic \textit{logos}.

While there is thus some likelihood of a fairly well-developed aesthetic theory of Gorgias based upon the direction and release of emotional energies, it is not entirely certain to what extent Gorgias systematized and elaborated it and how much he merely suggested for the future elaboration of later thinkers, primarily Aristotle. He may never have conceived of the process outlined in the preceding paragraph anywhere nearly so systematically as it is there presented;\footnote{126}
and yet the medical imagery and the reference to "humors" in the context of the emotional-aesthetic language of Helen 14 certainly suggest that the idea was in some form present in his mind. Gorgias remained, of course, a practitioner rather than a theorist, and hence he was more interested in empirical results than in an elaborate psychology. He indicates the emotional character of the aesthetic process, but probably was not interested in a deeper investigation of the precise nature of the emotions involved; his logos functions as the emotional catalyst, the drug that produces certain desired affective results, but its chemistry is still obscure. In the contemporary state of Greek psychological theory, it might have been impossible for Gorgias to have pursued the matter further without anticipating the analytical division of the psyche which Plato introduces. Hence from the point of view of fourth-century developments, Plato's criticism of Gorgias, that he practices rhetoric as an art of persuasion without the requisite systematic episteme of the psychic processes involved, is perhaps justified; but such a criticism distorts historical perspective. It is Gorgias' achievement to have perceived and formulated as a techne that the formal structuring of the logos (in qualities such as metron) evokes emotional forces, and to have generalized this formulation (at least in terms of the emotional effects, if not of formal analysis) to include both the linguistic and the visual arts. At the same time he attempts a scientific definition of the process by seeking an analogy in the most exact empirical science which the late fifth century could offer, medicine. In so doing, he treats the psyche as a tangible reality and places its functions on a level of reasonable explicable coordinate with other physical phenomena. The rhetor, then, aware of the artificial nature of the logos as a mere medium, capable of distortion, and aware of the flexibility of human doxa, commands a techne which can directly touch the psyche through a process of aesthetic and emotional excitation, and hence guide or control human action. Reason is thus ultimately made the master of emotion, but not, as Socrates taught, by completely overpowering it, but rather by channeling and directing emotive energies to preconceived ends. It is now the emotional potentialities of the logos which are exploited, and not the intellectual, though the methods of exploitation are still rational.

The logos is no longer only the directive tool of the whole society, the indispensable instrument of communication of the Periclean statesman, but a means of reaching the individual psyche. The emotional conception of the logos in Gorgias, moreover, stands in the greatest contrast to the rationalist reaction of Socrates; and the whole
system of Plato rests upon the rational force of the *logos* as the anti-thesis of emotion. The consequent division of the psyche, with a hierarchical ranking of its parts, represents in a sense a narrowing in the attitude toward the psyche and a relinquishing of the sense of the organic relationship and balance between rational and emotional capabilities that characterized the fifth century and especially the decade before the Peloponnesian war.127

Thus although Gorgias may not himself have worked out the systematic consequences, psychological and ethical, of his *techne*, nevertheless his rationalistic approach to an area of human activity that did not admit of easy systematization, namely the emotional reaction to art, suggested and stimulated a line of development which proves highly fruitful in the fourth century and culminates as a full-blown “scientific” theory in the *Poetics* of Aristotle.

The restriction of the directive power of reason and *techne* to the phenomenon of the psyche represents, perhaps, a certain retrenchment from the position of Protagoras in the two or three decades before the Peloponnesian war, for Protagoras conceived of directing and planning whole societies and regarded the social form of the *polis* as the effective organizer of men’s emotive energies. There has been, consequently, a loss in the fullness of the integration between the rational and emotional conceptions of the psyche which distinguishes the age of Protagoras and Pericles from the later fifth century. Pericles uses the emotive powers of the *logos* and *ekplexis* solely within a civic context (Thuc. 2.65.9). Damon too, though working over psychological material in a way similar to Gorgias’, treated the *kinesis* of the psyche from the point of view of education within a civic framework and perhaps anticipated Plato in equating the *kinesis* of the psyche with the *kinesis* of the *polis*.128 Similarly the *antilogiai* of Protagoras were conceived as a tool for discussing and manipulating man’s social environment, but they later harden into a set of rhetorical *topoi* like those in the *Palamedes* or even like the rigid categorization of human motivation in the *Helen*. It was perhaps still possible for the elderly Gorgias to conceive of his *techne* in a communal and ethical context, but at least the implications of the opposite, individual-emotional point of view are present. Yet Gorgias’ analysis, though it may be more limited in extent, at the same time penetrates deeper into the psyche than was perhaps possible for Protagoras. Gorgias’ approach thus presupposes a degree of individuality characteristic of the late fifth century, but regards it as capable of rational direction and control. The seeds of this rational approach to human experience are, of course, already present in
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Protagoras, but its transference to the area of personal emotional and aesthetic sensitivity is a substantial achievement which left its mark on the fourth-century theories of Plato and Aristotle and hence on the entire course of Western aesthetic theory.

NOTES

In the following notes DK = Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. 6 (Berlin 1952). Gorgias is number 82.

1. For the length of Gorgias' life, from 100 to 108 years, see DK A1–2, A10–14; also W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich 1940) III 57 n. 1. That he lived into the fourth century is attested by his association with Jason of Pherae (ca. 380–370) in Pausanias (A7); and see the accounts of his journeys in Thessaly in Isocrates (A18) and Plato (A19). The funeral inscription, dated to the beginning of the fourth century (A8) was presumably set up shortly after his death.

2. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, ed. 2 (Leipzig 1887) I 47–48, sets the birth of Gorgias about 490, making him roughly contemporary with Protagoras. Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893) I 172 n. 75, following Porphyry's ascription of his *floruit* to the Olympiad 460–457 (DK A2 and the note ad loc.), puts him slightly earlier, 500/497–391/388; he also accepts the tradition of his living to 109 years.

3. For Gorgias as Empedocles' pupil, see DK A2 (Suidas), A3 (Diogenes), A14 (Quintilian). See also H. Diels, "Gorgias und Empedokles," *SBBerl* (1884) 343ff, who, however, admits that there may be not so much "direkten Schülerverhältnisse" with a man only ten years older than Gorgias himself, but maintains at least "ein bestimmender Einfluss," pp. 344–45.

4. For the relation of the "optical" fragments (B4–5) to Empedoclean theory, see ibid. 345–51 on B4 (Plato *Meno* 76a); Diels (above, n. 3) finds independent confirmation of Empedoclean influence here in the doxographical tradition (*Theophrast. De Sens.* 7; Aetius *Plac.* 1.15.3), while the mixture of the poetic with the prosaic style of the fragment seems to support Plato's attribution of such a remark to Gorgias. For B5 (*Theophrast. De Igne*) see Diels 353ff. Olof Gigon, "Gorgias über das Nichtsein," *Hermes* 71 (1936) 209–10 and esp. 210 n. 2, accepts Diels' evidence for Empedoclean influence on Gorgias. E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes* (Neuchâtel, 1948) 107ff, while accepting the attribution of the fragments, doubts that Gorgias is serious here and thinks that he is simply ridiculing these ideas, that his attitude toward the natural sciences is entirely negative and critical. The mass of evidence cited by Diels, however, tells against such an extreme view.

5. For the association of Empedocles with Parmenides, see DK 31 A7 (Simplicius quoting Theophrastus); also Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) 320–21.

6. Diels (above, n. 3) 359f accepts the tradition of the early physical activity of Gorgias and divides his work into three periods: (1) an initial period of physical speculation (DK B4–5) into the 450's; (2) a renunciation of physics for eristics in the treatise "On Non-being" (B3) in the 440's; and (3) his rhetorical activity proper, from the 430's on. Diels argues strongly for a succession of
activities, not a simultaneous divergence of interests and remarks, "Es erscheint daher richtiger, die drei verschiedenen Gestalten, in denen uns Gorgias erscheint, als Physiker, als Eristikern, als Rhetor, nicht als ein Nebeneinander, sondern als ein Nacheinander seiner geistiger Entwicklung aufzufassen, welche mit der Umwälzung der gesamten Denkweise in der Sophistenzeit parallel geht" (p. 359); and he finds the division of these three categories in the meteorologoi, logon agones, and philosophoi of Helen 13. Diels, however, does admit the possibility of Gorgias' having drawn on these two earlier activities even later in the "rhetorical" period of his life (p. 368). O. Gigon, however (above, n. 4), accepts Diels' presentation of the scientific interests of Gorgias, but rejects the division of Gorgias' life into the three stages; he regards it as not impossible that Gorgias might have continued his philosophical interests along with his rhetorical work: "Weshalb soll er nicht gleichzeitig über eleatische Philosophie geschrieben und rhetorischen Unterricht erteilt haben können?" (p. 187). He would replace Diels' "Nacheinander" with a "Nebeneinander" of philosophical, scientific, and rhetorical activity (see p. 213). Gigon's view fits the tendency of the Sophists to be engaged in multiple activities — Hippias is an extreme example — but it should be stressed that these multiple activities, even those in philosophy, now contribute to the practical training of the politeis (see Plato Protag. 318d–319a).

7. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 58. There is almost universal agreement that the treatise "On Non-being" belongs early in Gorgias' career, and there is no adequate reason to question Olympiodorus' date of 444–441 (DK B2). W. Nestle, in fact, "Die Schriften des Gorgias über die Natur oder über das Nichtseine," Hermes 57 (1922) 50ff, did argue for an earlier date, ca. 480–470, or perhaps as "late" as 462; but, although his arguments were accepted by Rosenmeyr, "Gorgias, Aeschylus, and Apathe," AJP 76 (1955) 231 with n. 21, they rest upon the supposed priority of Gorgias to Zeno and have been convincingly refuted by Gigon (above, n. 4) 186–213, esp. 204–5. For Gigon's rejection of Diels' rigid schematization of Gorgias' periods of activity, see the preceding note.

8. For a reappraisal of the influence of the "innovations" of Gorgias on the Athenians in 427, see J. H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," HSCP 49 (1938) 23–68, and "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," HSCP 50 (1939) 35–84; he demonstrates that many of the so-called Gorgianic techniques of argumentation and antithesis were actually current throughout the 430's.

9. D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," CQ 34 (1940) 66, suggests that Tisias and Corax had a developed system of rhetoric based upon eikos, whereas Gorgias offered only examples for imitation. None of his evidence, however, is very strong, and the remainder of this chapter attempts to show the systematic basis of Gorgias' literary-rhetorical practice.

10. Blass (above, n. 2) I 71–72, 75 n. 2, 75–79. In his first edition he inclined toward the spuriousness of the two works. See also his edition of Antiphon, Orationes et Fragmenta, ed. 2 (Leipzig 1908) xxviii: Gorgiae utraque mihi genuina videtur, quoque saepius relego, eo firmius id apud me iudicium stat. Heinrich Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik (Leipzig 1912) 3ff, also attempts to prove the genuineness of the two Gorgianic works by parallels with Hippocrates and Antiphon the orator, and calls attention to the similarity in their style of argumentation with the work "On Non-being" (B3) (see esp. pp. 24–25).
Pohlenz, "Die Anfänge der griechischen Poetik," Göttinger Nachrichten (1920) 166–67, accepts the Helen as definitively genuine. See also the further references in DK II 288.

11. For a summary of the views of Gorgias' Helen to Euripides' plays, see DK II 288; Schmid (above, n. 1) 72 with n. 7 (who prefers Preuss' date between the Troades and the Helen, i.e., 414 B.C.); Otto Immisch, Gorgias Helena, Litzmann's Kleine Texte f. Vorlesungen u. Übungen 158 (1927) 53, prefers a date after Euripides' Helena of 412 B.C. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 167 would date Gorgias' Helen before the Troades of 415 B.C., and this view has been again taken up by Maria Orsini, "La cronologia dell' Encomio di Elena di Gorgia e le Troiane di Euripide," Dioniso 19 (1956) 82ff, who sees in the Troades "una caricatura dell' encomio del sofista" (p. 86), and argues that Tro. 981ff is a reply to the treatment of Eros as a violent, irresistible force (bia) in Gorgias' Helen.

12. F. Schupp, "Zur Gesch. der Beweistopik, II," WS 45 (1926–27) 173ff, attempts to date the Palamedes in 440–430 on the grounds of its similarity of argumentation with the work "On Non-being" and the developed use of the topoi of the kairós (τόπος, χρόνος, πράγμα) and the πράσματον; but none of these arguments are convincing, for these techniques could have been applied at any time after their "invention," and Schupp rests much of his "proof" on the rather uncertain assumption that Gorgias is continuing the work of Tissias. Schmid (above, n. 1) 74 argues for the influence of the Palamedes on the rhetorical technique of Antiphon and hence would date it considerably before Antiphon's death in 411. But, as Finley has shown (above, n. 8), these rhetorical techniques were probably current in Athens even before the arrival of Gorgias in 427. The soundest dating seems to rest, then, on the stylistic arguments of Blass (above, n. 2) 80–81, i.e., the decrease in hiatus, in poetic words, and in compound formations as compared with the Helen, and the increasing use of Attic forms; only some, but not all, of these differences could be attributed to a difference in genre (i.e., dicaeastic versus epideictic oratory). These stylistic arguments were also presented by E. Maass, "Untersuchungen zur Gesch. der gr. Prosa: (1) über die erhaltenen Reden des Gorgias," Hermes 22 (1887) 57ff, esp. 578–79, and are fully accepted in the recent study by Orsini (above, n. 11) 82. For a convenient summary of the arguments about the chronology of the two works see Orsini, 82–83, 87 n. 1.

13. Blass (above, n. 2) I 80 suggests that the Palamedes is Gorgias' last work.

14. Blass, ibid. 81, doubtless from the point of view of later rhetorical development, stresses the importance and seriousness of the Palamedes over the Helen: "Im Inhalt endlich sind die Vorzüge vor der Helena ausserordentlich gross. Diese ist ein Kunststück der Worte, hinsichtlich der Gedanken nicht als leichte Spielerei; den Palamedes dagegen hat J. J. Reiske nicht ganz unverdient einen Katechismus der griechischen Dialektik und Rhetorik genannt." H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 12 speaks of the "absolute Unsachlichkeit" and "rein scherzhafte" character of the Helen; and for the attempt to substantiate this by reference to B3, see pp. 22ff.

15. Ibid. 28–29: "Er wollte Zenon weder fortbilden noch widerlegen, er wollte ihn höchstens rednerisch überbieten"; also pp. 32–35. On p. 2, Gomperz cites the views of Windelband and F. C. S. Schiller, who regarded "On Non-being" as a parody of the Eleatics. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 62ff seems to be
reviving to a certain extent the views of Windelband in suggesting that Gorgias is using the arguments of the Eleatics against themselves, perhaps with a deliberate parody or exaggeration implied; Dupréel, however, stresses, unlike Gomperz, the real seriousness of Gorgias’ underlying motives.


17. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 30–31; he accepts as a reliable portrait of Gorgias that presented by Isocrates in the proem to his own Helena. He also (p. 29) suggests that Gorgias is referring to himself under the meteorologoi of Helen 13 who substitute one doxa for another in the minds of their hearers. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 80, however, has perhaps with greater acumen warned against the danger of fourth-century polemics against contemporaries hidden in references to older fifth-century figures; in the case of Gorgias’ it is, of course, necessary to recall Plato’s controversy with Isocratean rhetoric and to consider the extent to which this colors his view of Gorgias, especially in the Gorgias and Phaedrus, as a convenient whipping-post for a contemporary controversy.

18. Gigon (above, n. 4) 209–10 finds also in the exposition of Gorgias’ “On Non-being” in the pseudo-Aristotelian De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia evidence for the influence of Empedocles upon Gorgias which supports in part Diels’ earlier work (above, n. 3). Blass (above, n. 2) 78 also accepts the tradition of Gorgias’ philosophical interests and notes the relatively slight use of eikos in the two speeches, an indication, he thinks, of training in the Eleatic tradition rather than in the rhetorical school of Tisias and Corax; and he finds in the two works “genau das, was wir von dem philosophisch gebildeten, der Prozess-technik des Teisias aber fernstehenden Gorgias erwarten.” W. Süss, Ethos (Leipzig and Berlin 1910) shares essentially this view and suggests that Gorgias’ position is closer to the philosophical “scepticism” of Protagoras than Sicilian rhetoric, pp. 59–61 (and so too Dupréel [above, n. 4] 63–64 on his approximation to the “relativisme psychologique” of Protagoras). Similarly, Diels (above, n. 3) 362ff suggests that the influence of Tisias and Corax upon the rhetorical formation of Gorgias was negligible in comparison with that of the stylistic influence of Empedocles. See, however, Hinks (above, n. 9), who doubts the tradition that makes Empedocles the “founder of rhetoric” (Sext Emp. Adv. Math. 1.6; Quintil. 3.1.8) in favor of Tisias and Corax. E. Bux, “Gorgias u. Parmenides,” Hermes 76 (1941), however, has gone further still and, while doubting Gorgias’ relation to Empedocles (p. 407), stresses the similarity between the methods of logical proof in the Eleatics (e.g., semetia, Melissus B10; semata, Parmen. B8.55) and in Gorgias (pp. 390ff). He regards the treatise “On Non-being” as a youthful exercise in the Eleatic school, with the consequences that it is not to be taken as a statement of utter scepticism (pp. 403–4). He regards Gorgias’ chief contribution as the application of the Eleatic logical method to rhetorical themes, so that the two speeches are cast in the form of “philosophischen Abhandlungen” on nonphilosophical subjects (p. 404). The argument in favor of the influence of Tisias and Corax upon Gorgias’ rhetorical and argumentative procedures had been taken up also by Nestle (above, n. 7) 558ff, who correspondingly rejects the possibility of Eleatic influence. His arguments, however, are vitiated in part by his chronological assumptions of the priority of Gorgias B3 to Zeno; thus he dates B3 to 480–470.
and uses the supposed association with Tisias and Corax to provide a source for Gorgias’ techniques of argument independent of the Eleatics. Nestle’s view has been rejected by Gigon, 186, and Bux (above), and most recently by Calogero, “Gorgias and the Socratic Principle, ‘Nemo Suo Sponte Peccat,’” *JHS* 77 (1957) 16, who firmly denies any connection with Tisias and Corax and regards the work “On Non-being” as neither “a joke nor an exercise, but a highly ironical *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic philosophy (especially of Zeno)” (p. 16 n. 22).

19. For Isocrates’ association of Gorgias with physical and philosophical speculation, see in general Diels (above, n. 3) 358, 367–68, and Nestle (above, n. 7) 551–52.

20. For the *Helen* as containing elements of an actual theory of vision, see S. Melikova-Tolstoi, “Une Théorie de la vision chez Gorgias,” *Archives de l’Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques* (Leningrad 1935) VII 367–74. This article, in Russian, was unfortunately inaccessible, but see the summary in Marouzeau, *L’Année Philologique* 11 (1937) 48: “Le paragraphe 17 de l’Éloge d’Hélène contient une véritable explication scientifique du processus de la vision.”

21. For the associations of the older sophists with physical speculations, see DK 85 A9 (Cicero *De Orat.* 3.32.128 on Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Protagoras); Prodicus in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* is also a “meteorosophist” (vs. 360, DK 84 A10). See also DK on 84 A10 (II 310, *ad* vs. 24) and in general Schmid (above, n. 1) 186. Diels (above, n. 3) 358 here cites Dionys. Hal. *Isocr.* 1, to the effect that Isocrates was the first to abandon eristic debate and physical speculation entirely to concentrate upon political subjects only: “Having received the practice of speaking mixed up by the sophists around Gorgias and Protagoras, he was the first to proceed from eristic and physical to political discourses and he continually devoted his studies to that discipline” (Dionys. Hal. *Opuscula*, ed. Usener and Radermacher [Leipzig 1899] 1.55.1ff; Reiske, 5.536).

22. Finley, *HSCP* 50 (1939) 77, however, doubts the tradition that Gorgias wrote on scientific subjects and accepts the view of H. Gomperz that the treatise “On Non-being” is not to be taken seriously. See, however, Diels (above, n. 3) 357 who notes that the tradition reports the interest of some of Gorgias’ pupils in *physika* (e.g., Polus, Alcidamas, Critias); and he suggests that some of this interest may be due to Gorgias himself. For Gorgias’ acquaintance with current physical and philosophical theories, see also Dodds (supra, n. 16) 7.


24. Sykutris (above, n. 23) 17: “Rationalistisch in seinem Prinzip, psychologisch motivierend in seiner Methode, erinnert Gorgias stark an die euripideische Weise, von der er wieder mit seiner ethischen Indifferenz abweicht. . . . Als Stoff ist er (der Mythos) ihm ein *paignion* . . . , aber ein Gefäss bleibt er doch zur Erörterung theoretischer Probleme.” Such a view, perhaps itself a bit extreme, would at least credit Gorgias with insight enough to see an ethical problem (regardless of its solution) in the case of Helen, contrary to the view of H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 25, who thinks that the arguments of the *Helen* demonstrate that adultery is not possible and those of the *Palamedes* that
treatment in war is not possible. Such an interpretation goes too far beyond what Gorgias himself says in the two works; he could still regard adultery or treason as quite possible while defending the particular cases of the accused. Süss (above, n. 18) 55 also speaks of the paignion as "nicht Witze, sondern Studien"; and for a similar positive view of the Helen as a paignion, see Nestle (above, n. 7) 553, who admits that the Helen, though called a paignion, can still "trotz ihres ausgesprochenen rhetorischen Charakters ernsthafte Gedanke ihres Verfassers enthalten."

25. Gigon (above, n. 4) 212 thus warns, "Bloss darf man seinen 'Ernst' dem Ernst eines Socrates nicht gleich zustellen," and points out that the fifth-century Sophist was not accustomed "mit dem wirklichen Leben im Einklang zu bleiben." For the development of this conflict between theoria and praxis into the fourth century and beyond, see Werner Jaeger, "Ueber Ursprung u. Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideal," SBBerl (1928) 390-421.

27. Isocrates Helena 14. For Gorgias' Helen 8-14 as providing in fact an encomium on logos and thus glorifying Gorgias' own art, see T. S. Duncan, "Gorgias' Theories of Art," CJ 33 (1937-1938) 404-5.
28. For the epangelma of Protagoras, see Plato Protag. 319a (DK 80 A5); for that of Prodicus and Hippias, Protag. 337c-338b (DK 84 A13, 86C1). It is perhaps noteworthy too that Plato has Socrates speak in one breath of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Apol. 196 (DK 82 A8a).
29. For the panhellenic sentiment of the Olympikos, see also Phiolostratus Vit. Soph. 1.9.4 (DK A1); for Gorgias' panhellenism in general, see H. Gomperz (above, n. 10) 35-36, Dupréel (above, n. 4) 61.
30. Aristotle Pol. 1.13, 1260a28. See Süss (above, n. 18) 101-2 and A. Rostagni, "Un nuovo capitello nella storia della retorica e della sofistica," StItal n.s. 2 (1922) 193, who closely follows Süss in the citation and interpretation of these passages in the direction of "un significato affatto relativo." See also Dupréel (above, n. 4) 81-82 for the multiplicity of arete in Gorgias and his "pluralismo moral"; see also below, n. 74.
31. On the conventionality of the language of the expression in A8, see Blass (above, n. 2) I 52, n. 5: "Die Ausdrücke sind von der Gymnastik entlehnt und erinnern an die Parallele, welche Isokrates (Antid. 180ff) zwischen dieser und der 'Philosophie' durchführt."
32. For this view of the amorality of Gorgias, see also Rostagni (above, n. 29) 155-57. With regard to the kairois-theory, however, he does seem to admit a more positive element: "La retorica, così concepita, diventa per Gorgia e per i suoi discepoli arte del ben vivere, centro dell' educazione" (157-58).
33. See Greene (above, n. 26) 257 on Plato's judgment of Gorgias: "Vain, shallow, incompetent in dialectic, but not immoral he paints him; not immoral, but incapable of seeing the potentialities of his art, which was indeed a high explosive, and in the wrong hands a vicious thing." For Plato's criticisms of Gorgias, see also Dodds (above, n. 16) 8-10.
34. For the continued good repute of Gorgias, see Greene (above, n. 26) 253.
35. For a somewhat cynical view of Gorgias' practical acceptance of the values of society, see Süss (above, n. 18) 58: "Die Relativität dieser Wertbegriffe war gewiss niemanden bewusster als gerade dem feinen Skeptiker Gorgias. Man darf annehmen, dass er mit Bewusstsein sie gleichwohl in die Rhetorik eingestellt hat, in der richtigen Erkenntnis, dass eine rednerische
Wirkung so wenig wie überhaupt eine Wirkung mit einer restlos alle Werturteile skeptisch auflösenden Weltanschauung zu erzielen ist... , sondern einzig und allein durch eine überzeugte und selbstverständliche Geltendmachung der allgemein bürgerlichen Moral, die es ja gewöhnt ist, je nach Bedarf gewendet zu werden und so im Grunde jedem Handelnden genügt.”

36. For eros in the Helen, see 4 (bis), 5, 6, 15, 18, 19 (bis), 20. See also the Epitaphios (B6) nomimoi erotes.

37. Immisch (above, n. 11) 34 notes the strangeness of the repetition psyches taxis (in the sense of habitus, status, condicio) and pharmakon taxis, which he construes as ἐπιτάγη, “verordnen,” i.e., “prescribe” (this usage of taxis does, of course, occur: see esp. Plato, Politicus 294e). Immisch does well to reject the emendations proposed, but not without some hesitation, and he is still unsatisfied with the passage: ... Hebescit et dormitat hoc loco bonus Gorgias.

There is another possible interpretation for taxis, suggested by LSJ, s.v., v (where read “Hel. 14” for “Pal. 14”), i.e., the “power” or “effectiveness” of the pharmaka. This interpretation would suit the context of the passage and would bring out better the purpose of the repetition of taxis, to emphasize the physical analogy between the psyche and the pharmaka. The repetition is thus not a careless jingle (as Immisch implies), but a deliberate and meaningful exploitation of language to reinforce the content.

38. For the pathe of the psyche in Democritus, see also B176 and 191.

39. The active verbal force of προσωποῦσα was sufficiently striking to Blass to cause him to emend it to a tame προσοὴσα. For these active associations of peitho and logos, see the list in Immisch (above, n. 11) 23. The parallel εἰσήλθε in Hel. 9 is decisive. For the τύπος-image see also below, n. 44.

40. See Dodds (above, n. 16) 202 on Gorgias 452e1–8, citing also Phaedrus 261a–c. Süss (above, n. 18) 21 well describes the Gorgianic rhetorical aim as “die psychische Beeinflussung des Hörers.” Rostagni (above, n. 30) 200 stresses the irrational basis of Gorgias’ psychology of rhetoric, founded “non... su elementi razionali, ma sul principio, irrazionale, dell’ incanto e della suggestione (psychagogia).” Following in part E. Howald, “Eine vorplatoni sche Kunsttheorie,” Hermes 54 (1919) 187ff, esp. 198ff, Rostagni attempts to trace this psychological approach back to Pythagorean sources, citing Diog. Laert. 8.32 on Pythagoras, who regarded the greatest achievement to “persuade the psyche towards the good or towards the bad” (p. 170, with n. 2); but despite the similarity of the citation to the phrases in the Helen discussed in the text, Rostagni’s hypothesis is rather unlikely and hardly capable of adequate demonstration. Immisch (above, n. 11) 30 dismisses the whole theory as somnia. See also H. Flashar, “Die medizinische Grundlage der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der gr. Poetik,” Hermes 84 (1956) 16.

41. Rostagni (above, n. 30) 149 (also “Aristotele e Aristotelismo nell’ estetica antica,” ibid. 73) plausibly suggests the influence of Damon for this Gorgianic idea of affecting the psyche through logos (see esp. Helen 9) and remarks, “Gorgia... e insega e spiega dove il retore scientificamente conosce le vie dell’anima onde scendono i discorsi capaci d’incanto e di persuasione.” For the possible influence of Damon, see also W. Kroll, RhM N.S. 66 (1911) 168–69, who describes Damon as the man “der in den Rhythmen und Tonarten Nachahmungen menschlicher Ethische gefunden und ihnen dementsprechend ethische Wirkungen zugeschrieben hat.” He further suggests that Gorgias was the first to transfer this musical-ethical theory to the logos; and he notes
the musical association of λόγον ἐχοντα μέτρων in Hel. 9. See also below, n. 73.

42. See especially M. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 168, who points out that Gorgias’ emphasis in Hel. 9 lies “nicht nur auf die psychische Seite des Affektes, sondern auch auf die physiologische Form, in der er sich äußert.” He explains pothos philopenthes by reference to the Homeric ἵμερος γύος, and cites passages on the hedone or terpsis of the release of tears from the fragments of Euripides (nos. 563, 573 in Nauck, TGF²).

43. See especially H. Flashar (above, n. 40) who shows how the developed Hippocratic humor-theories explained the shivering of phobos by an excess of cold and the weeping of eleos by excessive moisture (see pp. 47–48 for his summary); he connects this theory, of course, with the quasi-medical sense of katharsis in Aristotle’s Poetics and Politics (but see below, n. 122). Some of the same material was treated independently ⇒ Pohlenz, “Furcht und Mitleid? Ein Nachwort,” Hermes 84 (1956) 49–74, who re-emphasizes the parallel of phrrike in Hel. 9 with Aristotle, Poet. 1453b5, and remarks that even in Pindar or Sophocles phobos is “nicht bloss ein äusseres ‘Symptom,’ sondern ein körperliches Phänomen, das mit dem seelischen Vorgang wesenhaft zusammengehört” (p. 49). Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 239, on the other hand, stresses the non-scientific attitude toward literature in connection with Gorgias’ attitude toward tragedy, i.e., that the usual definition of tragedy makes it “an art rather than a science,” and he is certainly correct in asserting that “Platonically speaking, it is the special glory of tragedy that it is analogous to cookery rather than to medicine.” It is, however, also the special glory of Gorgias’ age that men begin to regard the psychological effects produced by tragedy in a “scientific” way (even though the process of its creation was less susceptible to such analysis) until Aristotle applies the explicitly medical term katharsis (following the interpretations of Flashar and Pohlenz) to its chief effects. The work of Aristotle would thus be seen as part of a continuously developing “scientific” attitude toward the psyche and the psychic aspects of literature rather than as an isolated phenomenon.

44. The verb τυπάω can perhaps refer here as much to “molding” as to “stamping” or “impressing.” In support of the latter meaning, it is to be noted that the noun typos early occurs in the sense of a “die” for stamping (Aesch. Suppl. 282) and later of the impression made by a seal (Eurip. Hippol. 862). At the same time the word can refer to a carved form or image (Hdt. 2.86.7, 3.88.3) and becomes, then, almost synonymous with ξύλον (Eurip. Tro. 1074). The meaning “mold” or “form” occurs frequently with the verb τυπάω, though LSJ cite no early instances of a metaphorical usage of this sense. Plato and subsequent authors use the verb in its physical sense with reference to sculpture. One indication of the fifth-century usage of the verb (which is far less common than the noun) is afforded by the myth of the Protagoras (320d) where the gods “mold” (τυποῦσι) the mortal races. The noun, however, occurs in Democritus B228 with a metaphorical, ethical sense approaching “character”: τὸν πατρικὸν τύπον; the metaphor here would probably be adequately conveyed by the English “stamp.” The association of the verb with τρόποις in Hel. 15 places the word in an ethical context similar to this fragment of Democritus. The predominant concrete use of the word, however, both as verb and noun, suggests that even if it is metaphorical in Gorgias, the metaphor is still a vivid one and confirms the association of peitho with words of move-
ment and action as an almost physical impingement upon the psyche (see above, n. 39).

45. For the association of *opsis* with emotive affects in fourth-century psychological theory, see ps.-Aristotle *Problemata* 886b0ff, where “the signs of the *pathe* through *opsis* create in us the *pathe* themselves”; and see too Aristotle *Poet.* 1453b1ff, and, in general, Flashar (above, n. 40) 41 with n. 4. *Opsis* in these later passages has become more specifically defined as the strictly physical aspect of vision—or even the concrete objects visually perceived: see G. F. Else, Aristotle’s *Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) 233–34, 277–79, 408–10—whereas in Gorgias *opsis* still includes the emotional processes and subjective reactions attached to the physical act of perception; in the *Problemata* passage, on the other hand, *opsis* is much more simply the medium through which a stimulus is received.

46. Immisch (above, n. 11) 42–43, however, rejects τρόποις as corrupt: *Non enim perpetuum morum habitum, sed singularem actus animo ingerere dicit G. τὴν δὲν. He goes on, *Exspectamus potius visus potestatem dici maxunam, eum pro suo arbitratu formare amimum non leviter aut ut facile resistatur, sed penitus atque funditus (quod non est idem atque in perpetuum).* But this is too extreme an interpretation of *tropoi*, and Immisch's own emendation (τροποδείσοι) is, as often, far-fetched; the text of the MSS is not even questioned by Blass and DK.

47. For the element of subjective sensitivity in *opsis* and its intermediate role in determining human action, see Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15: “Sie (*opsis*) ist nicht blos ein Sinn, sie erlebt selbst das Gesehene; neben den Vorstellungen vermittelt sie der Seele ihre eigene Erlebnisse und bedingt dadurch des Menschen Handeln.”

48. See Plato *Gorg.* 456b (DK A22). For a “good” and “bad” *peitho*, see also Calogero (above, n. 18) 16.

49. There are, of course, some significant differences between the Thucydides passage and the *Palamedes*. There is no question of a dialogue in the *Pal.*, and the topic of the disadvantages of a ξυνεχὴς ἰδίος where the argument is heard but once (ἐνπάντως) does not occur; on these two points, see Finley, *HSCP* 49 (1938) 55–56 (above, n. 8), who suggests the influence of the *antilogiai* of Protagoras.

50. These passages in Thucydides and the topic of panic are discussed by W. Schmid, *RhM* 50 (1885) 310ff and E. Harrison, *CR* 40 (1926) 6ff. See also Immisch (above, n. 11) 47. Schmid suggests that Thucydides gives a rationalistic, as opposed to a supernatural, explanation; but Harrison combated this view by arguing that the superstitious associations of the god Pan with a panic first occur in Aeneas Tacticus in the fourth century. But aside from Pan, the idea of supernatural agency in the sudden emotional outbreaks in a large army is probably at least as early as Homer. Even Euripides (Bach. 302–5; cf. Gorg. *Hel.* 16) attributes such “panics” to Dionysus.

51. DK translate the πολλοῖς of Thrasymachus by "eine Masse." See also E. Schwartz, *Commentarius de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio* (Rostock 1892) 6, who speaks of the utility of the emotions (affectus) to the rhetor qui ad populum, *ad multitudinem loquitur*. J. Smerenka, "De Dinosi, I," *Eos* 30 (1927) 233, suggests that Aristotle *Rhetoric* 3.19 (1419b24) also refers to Thrasmachus where the various *pathe* of the psyche (diabole, eleos, orge) are said to be directed πρὸς τὸν δικαστὴν. *Dikastes* here, however, is doubtless to be understood in a
collective sense, like Hermias' paraphrase of the πολλοὶς in the Phaedrus passage, by τὸν δικαστήν (cited by DK on Thrasym. B6).

52. On the group emotion of Hel. 17, see in general Immisch (above, n. 11) 46–47. Immisch, while probably correct in emphasizing the greater importance of the psyche in Gorgias' treatment of ekplexis as opposed to that of Thucydides, tends to overlook Gorgias' own awareness of the application of peitho to the group (see Hel. 13, Pal. 33): Non iam loqui Gorgiam de eis, qui intersunt in exercitu rebus bellicis, sed de singulis hominibus (p. 46). He doubts that Gorgias has in mind at all the kind of collective panics which occur in Thucydides 4.125.1 and 7.80.3: Removenda igitur ab hoc loco ea sunt πανέια, quibus non singuli, sed hominum multitudines bello periclitantes saepe excitabantur, velut agmina castra civitates (p. 46).

53. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 73ff rightly insists upon the connection between "On Non-being" and the rest of Gorgias' work, and the consequent possibility of arriving at a coherent picture of both the philosophical and rhetorical bases of his activity.

54. For the inability of the logos to transcend itself and communicate anything beyond the verbal aspects of reality, see also ps.-Aristotle, De Meliss. Xenoph. Gorg. 980b1ff: "For just as neither vision (opsis) knows sounds, so neither does hearing hear colors, but sounds; and he who speaks (legei), speaks, but not color or a thing (pragma) ..." See also the excellent remarks of Dupréel (above, n. 4) 68–69: "Le discours n'est pas un transport de son objet, il est une élaboration à partir d'un acquis préalable et il ne prend sa valeur que pour ceux qui ont, de leur côté, un acquis de même sorte, suffisant pour comprendre le sens des mots."

55. For the problems of logos and its relation to the Eleatics in Gorgias' work "On Non-being," see Nestle (above, n. 7) 551ff, esp. 555ff. He regards the work as a direct attack on Parmenides, citing, for instance, Parmen. B8.38ff. Gigon, however (above, n. 4) 204–5, while accepting the Eleatic framework for Gorgias' "On Non-being," suggests that Gorgias is not using Parmenides himself, but rather a later, more "advanced" pupil, like Melissus or Zeno. See also Dupréel (above, n. 4) 73, who supports the view that the Gorganic treatment of logos is directed against the Eleatics to demonstrate the value of the logos is not founded "sur l'impérieuse nécessité de l'Etre" and hence is free for purely rhetorical-aesthetic functions as the instrument of art rather than of an ontological philosophy.

56. See Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 231–32, who also traces this sense of the duplicity of logos and epea back to the archaic poetic tradition.

57. It is apparently from this Platonic point of view that Süss (above, n. 18) 51ff and Rostagni (above, n. 30) 174ff (in general following Süss) connect the attitude of Gorgias to the logos with his kairos-theory and "relativism." For a more correct appraisal of Gorgias' historical position, see L. Stefanini, "L'estetismo di Gorgia," AttiVen 109 (1950–1951) 138.

58. Thus the arbitrary transposition of Hel. 13–14 after section 10 which Immisch (above, n. 11) introduces into his text (and see his commentary, p. 30) should be rejected and is, in fact, by his reviewer Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15. Section 14, furthermore, makes an especially fitting close to this whole portion on the logos and summarizes many of the preceding points, a tendency to which the Helen is prone (see, e.g., 20, 21). Hence it should be retained in its MSS position. Ending with section 12, it is true, does emphasize the defense of Helen
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herself more clearly; but, as pointed out above, this part of the work is as much an encomium on the techne of persuasion as on Helen, and Gorgias is probably more interested in his techne at this point than in his proposed subject and adopted heroine.

59. The opposition αφώσ ἐπιστάμενος... δοξάζων does, however, occur in Pal. 3. See also Pal. 24 and 35 for the contrast doxa-aletheia; Hel. 13 contrasts aletheia and techne (not doxa) from the point of view of practical peitho. See also Schmid (above, n. 1) 66, n. 9.

60. For the autonomy of the Gorgianic logos as an independent artistic creation, see L. Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138: “La retorica posteriore sarà indifferenza formale verso il contenuto; la retorica gorgiana consuma ogni contenuto, non lasciando fuori di sè nessun altro interesse o valore.” Dupréél (above, n. 4) 110 also describes Gorgias as “soucieux bien moins des problèmes de la vérité que des problèmes artistiques.”

61. Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 232 emphasizes the need for a willing suspension of belief in the Gorgianic persuasive and aesthetic process for the sake of a broader truth (which, of course, will not necessarily be identical with the literal truth implied in the aletheia of Hel. 13). Rosenmeyer affirms “All peitho, therefore, is apatelos, and that is its great glory.”

62. Rosenmeyer, loc cit., remarks, “Apatē signals the supersession of the world of the logos in place of the epic world of things.”

63. The meaning of the phrase Ἡ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκοουσάντων πίστις is settled by the explanation of E. Norden, Aeneis, Buch VI (Leipzig 1903) 203-4 (ad vss. 264ff). He speaks of a “transzendente Offenbarungspoesie” where the poet “hears” the material of his song from a divine source and this provides the pitis for his tale. The tradition can be traced from the poet as Μονάσων ἄποφήτης in Iliad 2.418 and the invocation in Iliad 2.485f, through Plato (Gorg. 524b, 493a; Meno 81a) to Apollonius (4.1379f), Vergil, the Hermetic corpus, and the medieval apocalyptic writings. For the pitis and pheme of Gorgias Hel. 2, Norden compares Verg. Aen. 9.79, Dicite, priscas fides facto, sed fama perennis. Thus all the suggested emendations of Immisch (above, n. 11) 9-10 are unnecessary, nor is it necessary to construe ποιητῶν as genitive of source with ἀκοουσάντων as Reiske suggested.

64. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 66: “Die psychologische Voraussetzung ist, dass die Seele durch die Sinneswahrnehmungen zunächst in den unsicheren Zustand der doxa versetzt ist, aus der sie mit Hilfe der teils logischen, teils sinnlichen Beeinflussung durch den Redner zu der Überzeugung geführt, ja gezwungen wird, in dem vom Redner als richtig Dargestellten die Wahrheit, das Wissen zu besitzen,” and see also the passages from Gorgias cited in his n. 9.

65. See ibid. 65 with n. 1, emphasizing Gorgias’ use of apate for the effect of peitho alone, without consideration of the moral implications. This view is perhaps correct as far as it goes, but fragment B23 does indicate a wider view of apate in a literary theory of sorts.

66. See Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233-35.

67. For the possibility of a Gorgian literary theory, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 142-78, passim; F. Wehrli, “Der erhobene u. der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike,” Phyllobolia f. Peter von der Mühll (Basel 1946) 13-15, 20-21. Immisch (above, n. 11) 28ff was sceptical about Pohlenz’ ideas of a literary theory in Gorgias, but his reluctance to accept
Pohlenz’ arguments is criticized by his reviewer Sykutris (above, n. 23) 17. L. Radermacher, in another review of Immisch, BPhW 48 (1928) 5–9, supports Immisch’ position against Pohlenz’ view that the synkrisis of the Frogs represent a fifth-century literary theory derived in part from Gorgias; his arguments, however, though set out with great forcefulness, are not really detrimental to Pohlenz’ view. They are chiefly (pp. 7–9) that (1) a man of Aristophanes’ personal genius would not be likely to copy a sophistic model and (2) that Aristophanes lumps all the sophists together without distinction and treats them with scorn. With regard to (1), great personal genius does not exclude the possibility of incorporating or adapting current theories; and, similarly for argument (2), Aristophanes is certainly familiar with sophistic themes and rhetoric (see below, n. 120) and with Euripidean avant-garde intellectualism; and he can use these materials for ridicule (the agon of the Frogs is, after all, only a parody of a synkrisis) without signifying his approval of them, just as traces of the doctrines of Prodicus, Protagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and perhaps Damon appear in the Clouds (for specific references see the “Stellenregister” in DK III 578, and below, n. 114) without any implication that Aristophanes believes them. See also E. Skard, SymbOslo 27 (1949) 15.

68. For apate, see Aristoph. Frogs 910; Diss. Logoi 3.10ff; Plato Rep. 3.414b ff, Laws 2.663d–e; Polyb. 2.56.11, 4.20.5. See in general Schmid (above, n. 1) 65 with n. 1; Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160–62; Rostagni (above, n. 30) 156; Dupréel (above, n. 4) 89ff; and especially Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233ff. Rosenmeyer classes the passage from the Diss. Log. with the fourth century examples (p. 234, with n. 33); Dupréel rather uncritically regards the Diss. Log. as “daté sans contestation de la fin du Ve siècle” (p. 94).

69. The ps.-Aristotelian De Meliss. Xenoph. Gorg. treats the topics of illusion and pseudos less extensively than the summary of Sextus (given in DK B3), but still assigns them significant recognition (980a8 ff).

70. Such a continuity is advocated by Gigon: see above, n. 6.

71. Plato Gorg. 453a, 455a (DK A28). This definition is also later attributed to Corax (see Blass [above, n. 2] I 19, with n. 2; and H. Rabe, “Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften,” RhM 64 [1909] 580–81); but this attribution probably derives from the Platonic passages in the Gorgias: see the note of DK ad loc.

72. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 61–62: Gorgias practised “eine glänzende Virtuosität apagogischer Wahrscheinlichkeitsbeweisführung, wobei mit Vorliebe eine mehrgliedrige Alternative, die alle Möglichkeiten zu erschöpfen scheint, vorangestellt und dann eine Möglichkeit nach der anderen ausgeschlossen wird bis zum Übriggbleiben der letzten und unwiderleglichen.” See also Bux (above, n. 18) 397, with reference primarily to the Palamedes: “Der Redner will seine Hörer nicht oberflächlich überreden, er appelliert nicht an ihr Gefühl, er wendet sich an den Verstand, in dem er sie veranlasst, mit ihm in allgemeinen logischen Überlegungen die Situation des Angeklagten immer von neuem durchzudenken.”

73. For the divine associations of poetry, see in gene Alice Sperduti, “The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity . . .” TAPA 81 (1950) 209ff; for the thelkeria of poetry she cites (pp. 227–28) Odys. 1.337. For the Homeric view of the aim of poetry as thelxis, see also J. W. H. Atkin, Literary Criticism in Antiquity (Cambridge 1934) I 12. For Gorgias’ association of the divine, poetic thelxis with his own prose, see too Duncan (above, n. 27) 405. For peitho as acting by thelegein, Immisch (above, n. 11) 37 cites Aeschyl. Suppl.
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1039, ἀθλητής πέθοι and Eumen. 885, where peitho is called γλώσσας ἐμῆς μελετήματι καὶ ἀθλητήριον; add also PV172–73 (μελετήμον πέθος ἐπαινεῖαν θέλειν).

Schmid (above, n. 1) 62 speaks also of this emotional element as the “sinnlich-akustischen Reiz der Sprachmusik” and suggests the possible influence of Damon for the notion of the emotive effects of music (see above, n. 41 and below, nn. 103ff).

74. For Gorgias’ supposed inadequate morality, see below, n. 110, and Greene’s defense, above, nn. 25–26. Dupréél (above, n. 4) 81ff emphasizes the kairos in Gorgias’ morality and regards Gorgias as the first defender of “la morale de l’occasion.”

75. The date of Thrasymanchus’ rhetorical activity is to be placed before 427 on the evidence of the Daitales of Aristophanes of that year (frag. 198.5ff, DK 85 A4) which alludes to him. See Schwartz (above, n. 51) 4, who remarks, Fuit igitur ante Gorgiam qui sermonem Atticum artis legibus subiceret. See ibid. 8Iff.

76. See Schmid (above, n. 1) 191 who, however, regards Thrasymanchus, after the Platonic portrait of the Republic, as using this “Pathologie” for immoral ends, pp. 188–89). For the psychological assumptions of Thrasymanchus, see also Smerenka (above, n. 51) 233: Observationum enim psychologicarum olim a sophistis-rhetoribus perfectae fructum tulerunt uberrimum et in omnia litterarum genera sensim sine sensu irreperunt. For the passage in the Phaedrus (267c, DK 85 B6) see also Klaus Oppenheimer, “Thrasymanchus,” REA 11 (1936) 589–90, who connects the idea of persuading epi to enation (Phaedr. 261c ff, esp. 262a) with Thrasymanchus and Thucyd. 2.65.9, which he then takes to be written after 404 B.C. (but see n. 75 above). For the orge and oiketos of Phaedr. 267c, Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5 cites the discussion of the orator in Eurip. Orest. (esp. 702) and argues that orge means not simply “passion,” but real “anger.”

77. For Thrasymanchus and the techne of hypokrisis (delivery) see Schmid (above, n. 1) 191 with nn. 2–3; Quintilian, however (3.3.4), speaks of actio as belonging to the sphere of natura, not ars. See also DK 85 B7 for the association of the work on hypokrisis with the title Hyperballontes.

78. For the Megale Techne see DK 85 B3 and Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5, who suggests that it comprised the Eleoi, Hyperballontes, and Prooimia.

79. Calogero (above, n. 18) 13.

80. For the parallels between the Pal. and Socrates, esp. the Apology, see ibid. 15–16, with special reference to the theme of ta enantia. Calogero concludes decisively in favor of the priority of the Pal., which he would date before 410 B.C.

81. For emotional and rational persuasion in Gorgias, see ibid. 16. The emotional sense of the logos and peitho is stressed also by Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138: the magical effects of the logos in Hel. 10 lead to “l’adension piena ed emotiva che è persuasione.” This emotional definition of logos and peitho contrasts sharply with Democritus’ confidence in λόγος πειθόμενος as the rationalistic antithesis to nomos and ananke (B181). Thus Calogero (p. 16, n. 24) well observes, “So peitho, which was the essential instrument of any democratical opposition to a tyrannical bia, becomes the instrument of a new sort of tyranny (βία δὲ ἐκόντων) until it is checked by dialogos.”

82. For this interpretation of paignion, see Gigon (above, n. 4) 190, who suggests that the work is a paignion, “weil dem Verfasser am Gegenstand, der Unschuld Helenas wirklich nicht das geringste liegt.” So too Stefanini (above, n. 57) 138 on the self-contained independence of the Helen: “L’Encomio di
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_Élena è ‘gioco’ . . . perché possiede la lieve agilità dell’ opera che si regge su sè medesima e basta a sè stessa . . .”_ His claim for the seriousness of the work, however, “perché l’innocenza di Elena vuol essere per Gorgia il simbolo dell’ innocenza della retorica,” is highly dubious and rests in part upon a conjectural reading of the hopelessly corrupt passage at the beginning of _Hel._ 12. It is perhaps worth noting that Suidas attributes a _paignion_ to Thrasymachus also (DK 85 A1), which Schwartz (above, n. 51) 5 takes to be an _exemplum_ similar to the _Helen_. For a more sceptical interpretation of _paignion_, see Duncan (above, n. 27) 404.

83. Dupréel (above, n. 4) 110ff stresses the importance of the aesthetic sensitivity to beauty in Gorgias’ thought with special reference to the _Helen_, and notes that Isocrates also uses the theme of Helen to praise the value of beauty (Isocr. _Helen_ 54). He thus emphasizes the purely artistic or aesthetic component in Gorgias’ work and attitudes, and suggests that “Gorgias pourrait avoir été l’un des premiers à porter une réflexion systématique sur l’idée du beau” (p. 111).

84. For the associations of poetry and the divine in Gorgias, see above, n. 73.

85. See above, n. 63.

86. For a later application of the image of the psyche being led (ἄγεσθαι), see ps.-Longinus _De Sublim._ 26.2.

87. For the later images of the divine power of the _logos_, see Isocrates _Nicocles_ 9; Alcidamas _Soph._ 9; Süss (above, n. 18) 51. For _peitho_ as a tyrant, see Euripides _Hecuba_ 814ff and Immisch (above, n. 11) 23–24. Süss, 22, speaks of Gorgias’ treatment of the _logos_ as if of “eines lebenskräftigen Organismusses, als eines gewaltigen Tyrannen, als eines in Ebbe und Flut gleich der Menschenseele hin und her bewegten Lebewesens.”

88. Orsini (above, n. 11) 83ff suggests that it is precisely Gorgias’ treatment of the _peitho_ of Helen as an external force, an irresistible, compulsive _bia_, to which Euripides replies in Hecuba’s denunciation, _Tro._ 969ff. Orsini contrasts especially the “externalized” treatment of Helen’s action in Gorgias with the internal emphasis of _Tro._ 988, ὃ ἀγώ δ’ ἰδὼν μν νοῦς ἠποιήθη Κύπρις (p. 84), and compares also the argument of Gorgias founded upon _bia_ with Hecuba’s accusation, 998–1001. Orsini’s contention that Euripides is replying to Gorgias is attractive when the passages are compared; and yet Hecuba’s arguments about _kypris_ and _bia_ may be simply a reply to Helen’s previous defense (see 928ff, 959ff) rather than to a preceding work of Gorgias. The chronological relationship must then remain unsettled, though the parallels certainly indicate that the moral implications of persuasion and impulsive action were under consideration in contemporary intellectual circles.

89. See Immisch (above, n. 11) 37, who describes the forces of _eros_ and _peitho_ as follows: _Extrinsicus enim et machinae adventiciae instar operantur apud Gorgiam magicae quam Amoris potestates in animum se insinuare cupientes._ For the association of _peitho_ and _ananke_, see Immisch, 39, who cites Hdt. 8.111, where the two appear together as the two greatest gods of the Athenians. It is possible too that the ἀναγκαῖοι ἄγνωστοι refer to this power of _ananke_ which _peitho_ exercises over the psyche. Such, at least, is the interpretation of S. Melikova-Tolstoi, _BPhW_ 49 (1912) 29, against the interpretation of Diels that the phrase refers to the time-limit set by the clepsydra. The parallel which she draws with _Thucyd._ 4.60.1 is not, however, very close, for _ananke_ there has the almost
purely physical sense of bia. See, however, W. Schmid (above, n. 1) 61, who notes that the word πειθανάγκη actually appears as a rhetorical term in the third and second centuries B.C.

90. For Aristotle’s analysis of pity and fear with regard to human action in general, see Rhet. 2.5 (1382a20 ff) and 2.8 (1385b11 ff); Poetics 1449b27, 1452a2 ff, 1453a1 ff, etc.; also Else (above, n. 45) 228ff, 371ff, with n. 22; G. K. Gresseth, “The System of Aristotle’s Poetics,” TAPA 89 (1958) 321–23.

91. For the power of the logos over the hidden emotional forces of men, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 174: “Er (Gorgias) fühlte, dass das gesprochene Wort als solches eine gewaltige Macht sei, dass in dem Logos unabhängig vom Stoffe Kräfte beschlossen wären, die man nur zu wecken brauchte, um die Menschen wie mit Zaubermacht zu beherrschen und durch göttliche Überredung dem eignen Willen untertan zu machen. Diese Kunst der Psychagogia zu erreichen und zu lehren, das war sein eigentliches Ziel.” For psychagogia and its relation to the terpsis of Gorgias, see Wehrli (above, n. 67) 20–21. It is to be noted, however, that the term psychagogia is not attested for Gorgias; its earliest occurrence would seem to be in Plato Phaedr. 261a, 271c–d, and Xenophon Mem. 3.10.6. The verb does occur in Aristoph. Birds 1555, but it is doubtful if it has there any more than its literal meaning of “leading souls,” though LSJ s.v. (ii, ad fin.) suggest that a play upon the metaphorical meaning is intended. A striking fourth-century example occurs also in Timocles, frag. 6, cited by Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 168–69 and Süss (above, n. 18) 97, n. 1.

92. See Calogero (above, n. 18) 16 with n. 24.

93. The reading of the MSS έτρεψε και έπεσε is certainly correct. Immisch (above, n. 11) “emended” the text to read έτρεψε και έτρεψε on the basis of the form έτρεψε (sic) in A1 (corrected to έτρεψε in A2). He then regarded έπεσε as a gloss on the “original” έτρεψε. Such a supposition is purely hypothetical, and his explanation of the “restored” text, i.e., delectaret et movere, non concedit docere (p. 32) does not seem to bring any worthwhile improvement. The reading of the MSS is successfully defended by Melikova-Tolstoi (above, n. 89) 29–30; and Immisch’s conjecture is not accepted by his reviewer, Sykturis (above, n. 23) 13–14, who, however, would read έτρεψε και έπεσε (p. 14 n. 3). Melikova-Tolstoi’s parallels, however, esp. Hel. 5, seem decisive for έτρεψε (the reading of A2 and, presumably, of X), which is printed both by Blass and DK.

94. For the topos of Hel. 5, see Pericles’ Funeral Speech, Thuc. 2.36.4.

95. For peitho and apate, see Melikova-Tolstoi (above, n. 89) 30.

96. See Stefanini (above, n. 57) 139, who emphasizes the poetic-aesthetic quality of Gorgias’ logos: “È un mondo di poesia che resiste alla riflessione e diventa per un istante filosofia, prima che gli strali di una più matura riflessione intervengano a rompere l’incanto, svelando agli uomini un’altra verità oltre la verità dell’ arte.” For the association of apate and the poetic tradition, see also Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 225ff. For Gorgias’ association with poetic technique, see the famous statement by Aristotle, Rhet. 3.1 (1404a24), and Blass (above, n. 2) I 63, with n. 1, cited more fully below, n. 103.

97. For a similar instance of an artificial interlocking word-order, see also Hel. 19 ad fin.: (1) τύχης αφέγνησε, (2) οὐ γνώμης θεωλέμασι, (3) καὶ έρωτος ἀνάγκαις, (4) οὐ τέχνης παρασκευάζει, where items (1) and (3) and (2) and (4) correspond in meaning, but are linked to their opposites by the double homoeoteleuton and the antithetical balancing. For this kind of “false parallelism,” see
the discussion and instructive examples in J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford 1952) 130–31.

98. Immisch, however, (above, n. 11) 26–27, has a rather artificial interpretation of the categories of emotion referred to in *Hel.* 8–9. He thinks that Gorgias means two categories of poetry (*duo...genera poeseos*), one arousing pity and fear, the other pleasure and joy; Immisch refers the first category to heroic poetry, i.e., tragedy and epic, but can find no satisfactory explanation for the second (*Quale sit ex Gorgiae mente intellegendum certe scire non licet*, p. 26), though he hesitantly suggests didactic poetry. The difficulty of such an interpretation is evident from the hesitation which Immisch himself feels for his second classification; and the whole suggested is rejected by Sykutris (above, n. 23) 15. Gorgias doubtless conceives of poetry here as a unity, as the expression *την ποίησιν ἀπασω* in *Hel.* 9 testifies. Thus it is more likely that the emotional classification in 8–9 refer to stages in the emotive-aesthetic act for all poetry (or for all artistic forms of the *logos*, which is Gorgias’ definition of *poiesis*) than to separate kinds of poetry.

99. For *ekplexis*, see also Aristoph. *Frogs* 962. Gorgias may thus be one of the founders of the *ekplexis*-theory of later rhetoric. See Wehrli (above, n. 67) 13–15. For the rhetorical use of the related term *kataplexis*, see Thrasyvachus A4 (Aristoph. *Daitales*, frag. 198).

100. For the “increasing of pity” in *Hel.* 8, see Immisch (above, n. 11) 24, *ad loc.*: *Exspectas enim excitari, non augeri commiserationem.*

101. Immisch, however, loc. cit., refers the *theiota erga* of Gorgias to the creative rather than the receptive process, and regards the *logos* as producing divine *erga*, *quia ea non tam mentis quam animi sensusque arca agitat divini instinctus sedem*. Such an interpretation is difficult if not impossible in the context, where the entire discussion of the *logos* deals with its effect upon the audience, and seems to result from an indiscriminate use of parallels from Democritus.

102. The term *metron* in *Helen* 9 probably does mean “meter,” as the parallel usage of the word in Aristoph. *Clouds* 638ff attests. See also the passages from Xenophon and Plato cited in LSJ s.v., II. It is equally possible, however, that the word in the *Helen* has a wider range of meaning, referring to all the measured formal qualities of which Greek poetic expression, which Gorgias develops for prose, is capable.

103. For the relation between poetry and prose for Gorgias, see the remark of Wehrli (above, n. 67) 15: “Das Interesse für die Dichtung, welches Gorgias durch seine Poetik beweist, ist vollauf gerechtfertigt durch seinen rhetorischen Prosastil, da dieser ja nach Form und Wirkung neben die hohe Dichtung treten sollte.” See also Blass (above, n. 2) I 63: “Gorgias wollte der Prosa einen ähnlichen Reiz verleihen, wie ihn die Werke der Dichter hatten, und da er das Gesetz noch nicht anerkannte, welches Isokrates für jene aufstellte, dass sie sich nur der gewöhnlichen Worte bedienen dürfte, und nur das Metrum als ihr nicht zukommend betrachtete, so schmückte er seine Rede mit poetischen Worten und ferner, als Ersatz für das Metrum, mit künstlichen Figuren.” For Damon, see n. 73 above and DK 37 B6, 9–10 (I 383–84). Damon has been the subject of several recent studies. A. E. Raubitschek, “Damon,” *Classica et Mediaevalia* 16 (1955) 78–83, re-evaluates the evidence for the date of his ostracism and suggests a later date for his activity, in the last third of the fifth century; he notes, for instance, that Damon is apparently thought of as living
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in ps-Plato Axiochus 364a, i.e., about 405 B.C. Such a redating would make Damon Gorgias’ contemporary rather than his predecessor. There is a further link between the two men in the metron-terminology of Hel. 9 and Aristoph. Clouds 636ff, which C. Del Grande, “Damone Metrico,” Giornale Italiano di Filologia 1 (1948) 3ff, thinks refers to Damon. For the earlier dating and association with Pericles and Ephialtes, see Wilamowitz, Hermes 14 (1879) 318–20. There may be still another link, admittedly weak, in the possible medical interests of Damon, for Aristotle at least associated music with a quasi-medical katharsis (Pol. 8, 1341a23; 1341b38 ff; 1342a1 ff: see H. Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der gr. Musik [Leipzig 1899] 13ff and W. Vetter, “Musik (Ethik)” RE 31 (1933) 839). How far back this therapeutic attitude goes, however, is difficult to determine, but it is not impossible that it formed a part of Damon’s teaching. Rostagni, on the other hand (above, n. 39), 72 and 200, perhaps goes too far in attempting to trace a connection from the supposed “epideictic” logos of the Pythagoreans to Damon, Gorgias, and the katharsis of Aristotle. For the Pythagorean katharsis, however, see J. A. Cramer, Anecdota . . . Paris. (Oxford 1839–1841) I 172; Kirk and Raven (above, n. 5) 229, n. 4.

104. For the effect of musical kinesis upon the psyche, see Damon B6 and Karl von Jan, “Damon” (no. 17), RE 4 (1901) 2072, who describes as Damon’s contribution “die Bewegungen des Rhythmus und der Melodie in Zusammenhang zu bringen mit entsprechenden Regungen in der Seele des Hörers.” See also Abert 48–49, 128–30 and the passages cited there from Proclus, and Vetter 841 (both cited above, n. 103). In addition, see H. Ryffel, “Eukosmia, ein Beitrag zur Wiederherstellung des Areopagitikos des Damon,” Musik 4 (1947) 27–28.

105. For the ethical and educational applications of Damon’s musical theories, see Ryffel, ibid. 23–38 passim, esp. pp. 25ff. Ryffel finds in the Areopagiticus of Isocrates the concern for eukosmia and sophrosyne, the ethical well-being of the state, which he thinks characterized the like-named work of Damon; this view would fit Damon into the context of the sophistic concern for the values and coherence of the polis. The “Polis-Ethik” or “Polis-Erziehung,” as Ryffel calls it, which occupied Protagoras and his contemporaries in Periclean Athens. It would be this very sympathy with Pericles which caused his exile; see Raubitschek (above, n. 103) 83. Vetter, however, (above, n. 103) 839, suggests that this ethical interest in music characterized the Greeks of all periods and derives it from the Pythagoreans; see also Abert (above, n. 103) 2ff and Ryffel 24. Regardless of the source of this ethical view of music or its place in the nature of the Greek mind, it would naturally receive stress and elaboration at a time of increased educational speculation and social consciousness such as the mid-fifth century.

106. For the technical rhetorical aspects of Gorgias’ work, see the recent article by F. Zucker, “Der Stil des G. nach seiner inneren Form,” SBBerl, 1956, no. 1 (dealing largely with the problem of the periodic style); see also, of course, E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa (Berlin-Leipzig 1915) I 15ff; and F. Blass (above, n. 2) I 63ff. See also the brief remarks of Denniston (above, n. 97, 10ff.

107. For Gorgias’ conception of the rhetorical art as a techne, subject to rational rules and improvements, see Süss (above, n. 18) 21ff, esp. p. 30: “...Es habe Gorgias die Redekunst als eine δοξαστική καὶ στοχαστική (sc. τῶν καυρῶν) τέχνη bezeichnet.” Whether, however, he actually used the term
γνωμάξεωθαι for his art, as Süss, 24–25, tries to show from fourth-century parallels, is unlikely. Kroll (above, n. 41) 165ff, while rejecting much of Süss's theorizing, does agree on the importance of rhetoric as a techne for Gorgias, as part of the general sophistic movement: “Daraus ist vielleicht so viel richtig, dass erst die sophistischen Technai Regeln auch für den sprachlichen Ausdruck und die Erregung der Pathé zu geben begonnen” (p. 166). Blass (above, n. 2) I 57 doubts, perhaps rightly, that Gorgias ever wrote out a systematic account of a “vollständige Techne,” but such an argument, if demonstrable, would still not vitiate the possibility of the embodiment of a psychological theory of rhetoric in the Helen, which perhaps (esp. in 8–14) is the closest Gorgias may have come to setting down in writing the assumptions and bases of his techne. Zucker too (above, n. 106) has stressed the kinship of Gorgias' rhetoric with the logical and rational spirit of the other sophists:

"Es ist ‘alles durchdacht.’ Die reflektierende Betrachtung und das konsequente Durchdenken, von den Sophisten erstmalig der Sprache zugewendet, haben sie nach verschiedenen Seiten betätigt: sie haben die Ausdrucksformen der Sprache festzustellen begonnen (Protagoras), sie haben die lautlichen Mittel...vollends in Bewusstsein erhoben und ihre Anwendung gewissermassen systematisiert (Gorgieia schemata) und...die logischen Beziehungen durch sprachliche Formung heraustreten zu lassen und bewusst zu machen” (p. 8).

108. For the association of the poet and terpsis, see Homer Od. 8.44; also Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 150; W. Schadewaldt, “Furcht und Mitleid?” Hermes 83 (1955) 159, who emphasizes that Homer never connects the effect of poetry with moral ideas, but only terpsis, i.e., “das kräftige, den ganzen Menschen ergreifende, von Dichtung u. Gesang hervorgerufene Ergötzen.” See also Schmid (above, n. 1) 68 with n. 9 for the significance of terpsis in Gorgias.

109. For Plato's criticism of poetic goeteia, see Rep. 10.602d, and for his criticism of pleasure in allotria pathe, Rep. 10.605a and Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 169, who points out that Plato’s rejection of “die gorgianische Lehre von der affekterregenden Wirkung der Tragödie” rests upon the division of the psyche and the superiority of its rational part, τὸ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν. See also below, n. 118.

110. For this view of Gorgias as the frivolous, morally irresponsible artist, see Schmid (above, n. 1) 70, who regards him as opening the way to “einem je nach Umständen schwächlich ästhetenhaften oder skrupellos gewalttätigen Individualismus,” and regards him as morally inferior to Protagoras or Prodicus, in whose outlook and teachings “noch weit mehr Kraft und sittlich-politischer Ernst liegt.” See also above, nn. 32–35.

111. For the possibility of the Gorgianic affiliation of the epairein of Aeschylus in the Frogs, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 150ff. For Plato's negative attitude to this idea of an emotional epairein through poetry, see, e.g., Rep. 10.608b: οὕτε τιμῆ ἐπαρθέντα οὕτε χρῆμασι οὕτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾶς, οὔδε γε ποιητικῆ.

112. For the attempt to separate Gorgias from the moral “earnestness” of the other Sophists, see above, n. 110.

113. For the place of apate in a late fifth-century aesthetic theory, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160ff; Schmid (above, n. 1) 65 with n. 1; Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 233ff.

114. For the association of Aeschylus with the moral values of the polis in the Frogs, see the author's essay, “The Character and Cults of Dionysus and
the Unity of the Frogs," HSCP 65 (1961) 207–42. On the value of psychagogia as bringing both hedone and paideia, see Timocrates, frag. 6 (above, n. 91) with the discussion by Pohlenz and Süss. This combination, however, belongs perhaps more properly to Plato and the fourth century than Gorgias and the fifth; see, e.g., Plato, Rep. 10.602b for the paideia-spoude dichotomy and Aristotle Pol. 8.1339b10 ff.

115. For oikein ameinon see Plato Protag. 318a. See in general L. Radermacher, "Aristophanes' Frösche," SBWien 198 (1922) 284, ad loc. For the sophistic associations of the idea of teaching men to oikein ameinon, he cites in addition Xenoph. Mem. 2.1.19 and Oec. 9.15.

116. So Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 162. See also Pohlenz, Hermes 84 (1956) 71ff (above, n. 43) on the incorporation of the aesthetic ideal into the polis as part of the democratization of to philokalein.

117. For mimesis, see Aristotle Poet. 4.1448b4 ff and Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 160–61, who argues that the apate-theory continues in the Isocratean school, e.g., in the historian Euphorus (apud Polyb. 4.20.5). For this much-discussed question of the Isocratean blending of history and tragedy, see the review article by B. L. Ullman, "History and Tragedy," TAPA 73 (1942) 27ff.

118. See Aristotle, Pol. 8.1342a14 ff and 1339b15 f and in general Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 157ff, 162–63. For Aristotle's answers to the Platonic objections against the emotional in tragedy, see also Else (above, n. 45) 374–75 with n. 37, and 433ff.

119. For Aristotle's relegation of the arts to the sphere of παύδα, see Schadewaldt, 165–68, and also Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 177–78, who cites as belonging to the spirit of the fifth-century view of literature Lessing, Hamburgische Dramaturgie, LXXVII ad fin.: "Bessern sollen uns alle Gattungen der Poesie: es ist kläglich, wenn man dieses erst beweisen muss; noch kläglich ist es, wenn es Dichter gibt, die selbst daran zweifeln."

120. For the Gorianic influence on the ekplexis of the Frogs, see Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 161, who also cites Vit. Aesch. 7 and 14, which interestingly connect the opsis of Aeschylean stage-production with his ekplexis; see here Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 234–35 and Else (above, n. 45) 410 nn. 9–11. For ekplexis in visual phenomena, see also Aristotle Poet. 17.1455a22 ff and ps.-Longinus De Sublim. 15.4 and 26.2. In Poet. 1453b8 ff, Aristotle even attempts to separate the effects of "the fearful through vision (opsis) from the proper hedone which tragedy should produce": see Else 410–11, and A. Gudeman's commentary (Berlin-Leipzig 1934) ad loc. (p. 254): "Endlich beweist die Vorschrift ὧ...οικεῖαν, dass das an sich zwar eine hedone hervorruft, nur nicht, falls sie allein erstrebt wird, die der Tragödie eigentümliche." It is not impossible that in seeking to detach visual and linguistic ekplexis, Aristotle is polemizicing against Gorgias, if indeed Gorgias' admiration for Aeschylus (B24) is behind the ekplectic view of Aeschylus in Frogs 961–62.

121. So Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 157–58. Immisch, however, (above, n. 11) 29–30, thinks that Gorgias is quoting Aristophanes rather than the reverse and that thus Gorgias lacks any systematic literary theory. Radermacher (above, n. 67), while upholding the view of Pohlenz against Immisch that Aristophanes is in fact quoting Gorgias and not the reverse, rejects the broader implications which Pohlenz draws. But, as Pohlenz' whole essay shows, some systematic literary theory is implied in the Frogs, and who but Gorgias is a likely source in the late fifth century? Gorgias is the older man, and his Helen,
which certainly adumbrates an aesthetic theory, was probably in circulation within the decade before the Frogs of 405 B.C. It is thus likely that his speculations on tragedy too (B23–24) also precede the Frogs, especially as the apate fragment (B23) is similar to the assumptions about apate in Helen 10. Hence the statements of B23–24 are most plausibly to be set in the period of the Helen itself or perhaps earlier; but at any rate the coincidence of B23 with the Helen (and perhaps of B24 with Hel. 17) would suggest that these ideas were in Gorgias’ mind at the time when he wrote the Helen, i.e., in the decade before the Frogs. Whether they were promulgated by Helen teachings or by a written treatise is, of course, uncertain, but the former is the more likely.

The careful study of C. T. Murphy, moreover, “Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric,” HSCP 49 (1938) 69–113, proves conclusively Aristophanes’ familiarity with the rhetorical activity of his day. Murphy concludes cautiously, “I will not venture to say that I have proved that he (Aristophanes) actually studied rhetoric or was acquainted at first hand with one of the early technai, but the clear and logical organization of the speeches treated above and the frequent appearance in them of rhetorical commonplace, in my opinion demonstrates his interest in and knowledge of the principles of the art” (p. 110). The earlier plays, it is true, show little or no direct influence by Gorgias (p. 111); but on the other hand the Ecclesiazusae 171–240 parodies the Gorgianic aesthetic style (393 B.C.). It is thus not impossible that Aristophanes would have been familiar with Gorgias’ work 12 years earlier, since Gorgias’ repute was well established all through the last quarter of the fifth century. Radermacher himself, moreover, in his commentary on the Frogs (above, n. 115, p. 284) noted the Gorgianic touch of the repeated interrogative of Frogs 977 ff (πῶς, ποθε, τίς) and compared Gorg. Pal. 22.

122. For Plato as the originator of a unified aesthetic, e.g., covering both tragedy and oratory in the Phaedrus, see G. Finsler, Platon u. die Aristotelische Poetik (Leipzig 1900) 181. See also Süss (above, n. 18) 87 ff, who tries to show that Gorgias is the source for the σφραγις image in Phaedr. 264 c, 268 d, and Aristotle Poet. 7.1450 b 22 ff, esp. 233 ff; but he describes as Plato’s creation “ein neues, Poetik und Rhetorik gemeinsam u mschlingendes Band” (p. 90).

123. See Süss (above, n. 18) 85 ff, with his parallels from Plato (Phaedr. 268 c) and Timocrates frg. 6. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 171–72 cites also Ion 535 b, Rep. 3.87 c, as well as Aristotle Poet. 19.1456 a 36 ff. See also Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 144 ff with n. 5, who reviews many of the same passages and notes a possible reference to the emotional tone of tragedy in Gorgias B27: ἀνεμίσθηνον δὲ λαταῖς ἀπειλαί καὶ εἴχας οἰμωγαί. G. Freytmuth, “Zur Miletou Halosis des Phrynnichos,” Philologus 99 (1955) 53 ff notes also an anticipation of the allotria pragmata idea of Hel. 9 of Herodotus’ description of the effect caused by the viewing of the οἰλέμα κακά presented in Phrynnichus’ play (Hdt. 6.21.2), where tears are also present. Freytmuth suggests that the fining of Phrynnichus was due as much to a psychological as a political reason (cf. pp. 60 ff). The association of Aristotelian katharsis and Gorgias Hel. 9 has, of course, frequently been made, notably by Howaldt (above, n. 40) and Rostagni (above, n. 30). The interpretation of katharsis itself is, of course, a matter of endless dispute, but the medical interpretation (which would help make the connection with Gorgias through Hel. 14) is strongly upheld in the recent articles by Schadewaldt (above, n. 108); Pohlenz, Hermes 84 (1956) (above, n. 43); and especially Flashar (above, n. 40). All of these scholars assume the connection of the katharsis of the Poetics with
that of the eighth book of the *Politics*; but see contra Else (above, n. 43) 224–32 with n. 36; 423–47, esp. 440ff; and Gresseth (above, n. 90) 329 n. 31.

124. Rogers' constitution of the text of *Frogs* 1028 is fairly satisfactory for the sense, though rather remote from the unmetrical MSS reading, . . . ἡνίκα ἡκονσα περί . . . See the discussion in his *Comedies of Aristophanes* (London 1902) V 157–58. V. Coulon's suggestion in the Budé edition, IV (Paris 1946) . . . ἡνίκα ἐκώκνας περί . . . gives essentially the same sense and has the further merit of greater palaeographical plausibility. For other, more conjectural restorations, see J. van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Ranae* (Leyden 1896) 158 and Radermacher (above, n. 115) 291–92, who inclines towards an emendation of Fritzsche.

125. For dramatic "distancing" through *apate*, see Rosenmeyer (above, n. 7) 236ff.

126. Pohlenz (above, n. 10) 172–73 doubts Süß's theory that the *pharmakon* image of *Hel.* 14 is to be taken literally. Similarly, Schadewaldt (above, n. 108) 165 n. 1 suggests that the comparison is purely analogical and that "was er (Gorgias) zeigen will, das ist die Allmacht des logos, und dazu dient ihm die Analogie der sowohl heilsamen wie todbringenden Gifte."

127. For this balance between reason and emotion, felt as much as an aesthetic as a moral attainment, see Eurip. *Medea* 824ff: Athens is the place of clean air and *sophia* where Harmonia begets the Muses (826ff), but Kypris also "breathes over the land temperate (metrias) sweet-blowing breezes"; and the presence of the Erotes with Sophia creates every sort of *arete*.

128. For Damon's applications of his psychological theories to the education of the *polis* as a whole, see Ryffel (above, n. 104) 32.

6+H.S.C.P.