ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

David D. Gilmore

Department of Anthropology, State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York, NY 11794

INTRODUCTION

Anthropology in the Mediterranean area is nothing new; some of the earliest ethnographies took place there (34, 175). But an anthropology of the Mediterranean area (23, 48) which includes both Christian and Muslim sides is both new and controversial. One reason for this development is the recent upsurge in south European ethnography. Favoring the most marginal areas of the south, Europeanists have gradually become aware of many affinities between their peoples and those of North Africa and the Levant. These resemblances start with environment but include many “core issues of life” (88, p. 10): male-female relations, community orientations, patron-client dependencies, and, more recently, a supposedly similar peripheral relationship to the core of industrial Europe.

A Pan-Mediterranean focus in anthropology goes back to Redfield’s observations in the 1950s about the anomalies of Mediterranean peasant personality (147, p. 66). Shortly afterwards, Julian Pitt-Rivers and Jean Peristiany organized a number of symposia to explore the question of Mediterranean distinctiveness. This collaboration gave rise to a number of collections. Some of these had a unifying theme like “honor and shame” (131), while others lacked any connection other than geography (132–134, 141). In the late 1960s, Wolf (180) and Gellner (73) compared society and religious symbolism in Latin Europe and the Muslim Middle East. But their coruscations did not ignite much commentary at the time. In 1971, Jane Schneider published a theoretical paper on the origins of the Pan-Mediterranean honor-shame complex (156). Her paper was important because it was the first to demarcate a continuum of material variables which hypothetically constituted the basis of Mediterranean unity.
By this time many anthropologists had accepted the idea of a Mediterranean specialty, but it took others by surprise. Anthropologists working in Spain, Greece, or Morocco regarded themselves narrowly as Europeanists or Islamicists. Finding themselves lumped together as “Mediterraneanists” created many problems. Who had time to learn another Great Tradition? Why should a student of Spain compare his material to Lebanon or Greece rather than Mexico or Guatemala? Skeptics claimed there was little intellectual justification for juxtaposing two such diverse culture areas as Latin Europe and the Muslim Middle East, despite surface cultural resemblances. Those who began calling themselves Mediterraneanists did not clearly define their field of study; nor did they provide sufficient theoretical basis for its distinctiveness. Skeptics were not impressed.

Davis’s watershed book, *The People of the Mediterranean* (48) helped to break this impasse. His work and a follow-up article by Boissevain (23) laid the first solid foundation for the construction of a discrete “Mediterranean” subspeciality in social anthropology. Approaching the existing literature comparatively and comprehensively, they demonstrated important underlying similarities between north and south, suggesting many areas for collaborative research. The enthusiasm touched off by their work generated many comparative studies, some of them sophisticated and provocative (18, 37, 93, 100).

In this review I have two goals. The first is to determine the criteria by which a “Mediterranean” area may be demarcated geographically and culturally. To do this, I will review the vicissitudes of the Mediterranean culture-area construct since Redfield. My second goal is to review critically the very extensive research appearing subsequent to Davis’s analysis (48), which left off in 1974. Here I will emphasize recent research on the common themes which contribute to the concept of a Mediterranean unity. For reasons of space, I will not consider material specifically on migration.¹ Only works in English are considered.

**RETHINKING THE MEDITERRANEAN CONSTRUCT**

According to Webster, “Mediterranean” is an ellipsis by which the Sea of that name is understood. Otherwise the word is an adjective and cannot stand by itself; it has to modify something else. Titles like “People of the Mediterranean” (48) and “Toward an Anthropology of the Mediterranean” (23) are solecisms. This is not just a grammatical quibble. Rather, I believe

¹For recent surveys on migration in the Mediterranean region and other tangential areas not touched on here see reviews by Cole (36), Fernea & Malarkey (66), Antoun (5), Rhoades (148), Gulick (88), and Eickelman (64).
that this thoughtless nominalization leads to a false sense of security that the field of study has been adequately defined when it has not been. It is a weakness of Davis's book that it fails to delineate or define the term "Mediterranean."

**Geo-environmental Approaches**

By definition, "Mediterranean" refers to the landlocked Sea. An anthropology of "the Mediterranean," strictly speaking, would be maritime and insular studies. This is obviously not what Davis or Boissevain intend. Still, the fact of an inner, enclosed Sea is a good starting point. Historically the Mediterranean Sea has acted more as a bridge than a barrier, encouraging trade and social contact between the countries bordering it. Goitein speaks of the "humdrum" quality of ancient and medieval voyages between Sicily and Tunisia, Marseilles and the Levant (87, 1:42). Braudel remarks that even the tempestuous Straits of Gibraltar united Europeans and Africans over the centuries more than it divided them (28, p. 117).

Perhaps then we should start with the fact of this landlocked Middle Sea as a unifier, a historical bridge. Then we could think about trading, seafaring, and common experiences. But if "Mediterranean" is to define those countries touching the Sea and sharing its commercial mutualism, then Portugal, a most typically Mediterranean country, would be excluded. It has no Mediterranean coast (4) and its explorations historically have been Atlantic. Libya and Egypt would be included despite their desert and riverine valley ecologies and their lack of a typical Mediterranean topography (5, p. 179–80). Obviously, then, "Mediterranean" implies much more than geography.

A better criterion for definition is ecology, including special types of both climate and topography. Climatically, the Mediterranean basin is distinguished by extended summer drought in combination with mild rainy winters and relatively uniform temperatures—an unusual seasonal cycle. Thus Braudel introduces his concept of Mediterranean unity with a 300-page discussion of a "homogeneous climate" (28, p. 234). He claims this climate historically has given rise to identical rural economies (28, p. 236), especially the dependence on the eternal triumvirate of crops—wheat, olives, and vines—and subtropical aboriculture. Often geographers equate this special Mediterranean climate with the natural boundaries of olive cultivation. This climatic criterion would include all the typically Mediterranean countries and parts of the marginal ones, such as the Rhone Valley of France. It would exclude Egypt, most of Libya, the southerly portions of the Maghreb, and more temperate places like Alpine Italy and Spanish Galicia.
A homogeneous climate sets the Mediterranean area apart, but does not make it unique as an ecological category. Climate plus topography do. For Pitkin, the defining features of this construct are the Mediterranean climate in combination with mountainous land forms and a close interdigititation of mountain, valley, and sea (140). The combination of cyclical precipitation and rugged relief, exacerbated by centuries of deforestation and pastoral depredations, results in poor soils (except in alluvial valleys), and denudation of hills and slopes. This geological uniformity has produced similar adaptations in cultivation and settlement patterns. Let us take the west as an example. For Braudel, as for many social geographers (99), ecological uniformity makes southern Iberia and northern Morocco a "bi-continent;" Andalusia appears as an extension of the Maghreb (28, pp. 117, 164).

Faced with virtually identical ecological problems, Mediterranean peoples have indeed responded historically in like ways. Settlement patterns are similar. Towns are nucleated, geographically isolated near scarce sources of water. The heavy-wheeled plow of the northern plain gives way to the Roman scratch plow. Systems of fallowing and crop rotation are similar. Settled cultivators and pastoralists coexist in an uneasy, dynamic symbiosis (21, 156). Most farming, depending on the vagaries of capricious winter rains, requires relatively large extensions of land for security. Commercial farming is indeed large-scale in the Mediterranean area; but adjacent subsistence plots of poor peasants and worker-peasants are tiny and often wildly fragmented. The end result is a polarized agrarian dualism of scale (21). This consists of the constant juxtaposition of great estates (latifundia) with minifundia, and of smallholding peasants with rural proletarians. These latter, incidentally, are a near universal social feature of the Mediterranean rural landscape: the braccianti of southern Italy, the braceros of Andalusia and the Algarve, the kemmes of Tunisia (60, p. 85). There are also parallels in the Sais and Atlantic Plains of Morocco (111), in Lebanon (84), in the Nile Valley (10), and in Turkey (7). These rural workers represent a true "Mediterranean" social category, and they deserve more attention than they have received in the literature.

**Culturological Approaches**

The relatively uniform Mediterranean ecology is a safe start. More controversially, the Mediterranean entity has been associated with a bundle of sociocultural traits. These are summarized by Boissevain (21–23), Davis (48), and others (88, p. 10; 140, 143). Briefly, these are: a strong urban orientation; a corresponding disdain for the peasant way of life and for manual labor; sharp social, geographic, and economic stratification; political instability and a history of weak states; "atomistic" community life; rigid sexual segregation; a tendency toward reliance on the smallest possible
kinship units (nuclear families and shallow lineages); strong emphasis on shifting, ego-centered, noncorporate coalitions (156, 159–161); an honor-and-shame syndrome which defines both sexuality and personal reputation (131). The dynamics of community life also bear many affinities. Most villagers share an intense parochialism or campanilismo, and intervillage rivalries are common. Communities are marked off by local cults of patron saints who are identified with the territorial unit. There is a general gregariousness and interdependence of daily life characteristic of small, densely populated neighborhoods. Mediterranean communities also feature similar patterns of institutionalized hostile nicknaming (11, 25, 35, 101). The evil eye belief is widespread (6, 69, 95, 128, 144, p. 269).

Religious and ritual factors, which one would think so dissimilar, have also been seen as providing correspondences. Some puritanical elements in Maghrebi Islam bear comparison to puritanical traditions in Spanish mysticism (28, p. 761). The North African local saint bears much in common with “southern European” patron saints, according to Geertz (70, p. 50). The pattern of religious orthodoxy in the states in the northern littoral is paralleled in the states on the southern shore. In the west, there is religious homogeneity; in the east, there is a mosaic of sects and faiths. As Gellner puts it, “in the East, diversity faces diversity, and in the West homogeneity faces homogeneity” (75, p. 11). Furthermore, religion plays an important institutionalized political role in both north and south, as do priests, saints, and holy men (63, 74, 91, 107).

Marriage patterns seem to vary greatly at first view. But on closer inspection underlying commonalities again emerge. Hughes identifies the practice of dowry as a distinction that “still sets the Mediterranean apart” (100, p. 263). Dotal marriage is practiced in only 4 percent of the world’s cultures, and is limited geographically to eastern Eurasia and the Mediterranean basin. Hughes argues that dotal marriage is both a synchronic and diachronic sign of the “much heralded unity and distinctiveness of Mediterranean culture” (100, p. 263).

There are important similarities in politics also. At the national level, bureaucracies are weak and do not survive strong leaders. Consequently, democratic regimes are inherently unstable, often alternating with dictatorships of both Right and Left. At the micropolitical level, this emphasis on informal personal power rather than formal institutions is reflected in the reliance on patronage. Davis argues that a highly personalistic form of clientage is both a “near universal” and a preferred form of adaptation to social inequality in the region (48, p. 150). He believes that a basic reliance on patronage as a strategy of advancement, rather than on bureaucratic sources or social mobility, is the principal form of political opportunism throughout the Mediterranean area. Patronage gives a certain flavor and distinctiveness to Mediterranean politics.
Cultural Contradictions

So far these cultural affinities have, for the sake of simplicity, been viewed in isolation as simple accretions, disconnected analogies. Yet the manner in which they are interwoven may be a more fruitful area for conceptualizing underlying patterns and for comparative research than simple typologizing. One striking commonality in the Mediterranean literature occurs at a deeper level than that of surface regularities. Everywhere one encounters implicitly an underlying theme of a dynamic tension between contrasting elements, a "structural dualism" (85, p. 42). This dynamic dualism occurs in all aspects of culture and ideology, in both conscious and unconscious processes. There is nothing unique about an element of ambivalence in belief systems and norms; and of course binary oppositions are universal. But in the Mediterranean lands these oppositions are so immediate and directly experienced that one may speak of internal cultural contradictions as being both more discernible and more systematic than in most other societies (15, 48, p. 181).

For example, community monographs are redolent with ethnocentric avowals of social egalitarianism. Yet this theme often coexists with blatant socioeconomic differentiation (48, p. 181; 166). There is a strong agnatic emphasis and an ideology of male dominance in the Mediterranean societies. Yet this attitude often coexists with a contradictory reality of matrifocality (33, 81, 153) and an unacknowledged tendency toward reliance on affines rather than agnates (135). The themes of family solidarity and the loyalty of siblings are universals in the region; yet they are frequently counterbalanced by intense intrafamily hostilities and the antagonism of brothers (81, p. 159; 94, 179). A machismo which denies even a suspicion of femininity in males often oscillates with festivals of male transvestism or with other manifestations of an insecure male identity (64, p. 64; 82). Villagers express deeply ambivalent attitudes about neighbors, viewing them alternatively as allies and antagonists (57, 58, 143). Agonistic perceptions of the collectivity coexist with strong sociocentric sentiments and loyalties. For Pitt-Rivers, the law of Mediterranean hospitality is itself "founded on ambivalence" (143, p. 107). Men hold individual autonomy the highest social goal, yet most are dependent upon more powerful others for their basic necessities (26, p. 127; 104, p. 349; 114).

Women are said to be private creatures who are inactive economically. Yet there is constant evidence of the importance of female contributions to the domestic economy (166, p. 168). The view of woman is itself dualistic: she is both madonna and whore (85, 144, 180). Everywhere there is a contradiction of "appearance and reality" in Mediterranean culture (4a) which suggests that what anthropologists impressionistically have felt to be
Mediterranean parallels reflect rather a sensitivity to some underlying dialectic or subsurface interplay of opposites. These contradictions need further study.

**Historical Approaches: Acculturation**

Pointing out structural, cultural, and ecological continuities is one way of justifying the Mediterranean synthesis. Another way is to stress the history of mutual influence among the peoples of the region. Ignoring ecology, Davis chooses instead a purely historical argument, his ideas deriving ultimately from historians who over the past 30 years have developed a "unitary vision" of Mediterranean history (96, p. 2). While most of these historians, including Braudel, wisely stop at the sixteenth century, for Davis the Mediterranean area is still a "unity." Davis argues that the intensity of contact between the peoples has not diminished in the modern period. "Over the millenia it has proved impossible for Mediterranean people to ignore each other. They have conquered, colonized, converted...the contacts are perpetual and inescapable" (48, p. 255). Thus the cohesiveness of the entity is from uninterrupted interaction and borrowing; diffusion and acculturation are the mechanisms of Mediterranean homogeneity (48, p. 14).

This sounds plausible, but is it? Many historians and anthropologists have implicitly affirmed Braudel's unitary vision and would agree with Davis that it describes the situation to the present. The idea is therefore an inviting one, but has become a cliché which needs sober reconsideration. Recently the case in the west has been challenged by the historian Andrew Hess (96). His thesis is that Braudel's unitary vision obscures the irreconcilable differences between the Christian and Islamic societies and the historical process by which these societies, so far from coming together and blending, turned away from each other irrevocably in the later sixteenth century. For Hess, the separation of the Mediterranean world into different well-defined cultural spheres is the main theme of its sixteenth century history (96, p. 3). Hess's point is not simply that north and south were hostile, warring civilizations—these too can influence each other—but rather that their cultural pluralism and their interest in each other was lost, their contacts "forgotten."

Even if Hess is wrong, intense mutual contact does not by itself justify a "unity" label. Were this so, then the entire Hispanic world would constitute a unity, and to stretch the point so would the Sea of Japan or even the North Atlantic. It is rather the combination of historical convergences with synchronic parallels in culture, all within a homogeneous environment, that provides both internal consistency and distinctiveness to the Mediterranean area.
Rather than emphasizing the continuity of internal contacts, some anthropologists look at the Mediterranean societies in global perspective in relation to the "world capitalist system." For them, the Mediterranean region is defined by a shared subjugation to external economic pressures. Here the Mediterranean region shares a similar peripheral (or perhaps semiperipheral—it is never clear) relationship to industrial northern Europe, and a similar fate. For example, Cole argues that the northern shore of the Sea has more in common with "the southern shore than it does with the industrial states across the Alps" (36, p. 372) in this respect. The Schneiders (156–161), Hansen (89), and Blok (16) have applied this model implicitly to southern Europe where they see a social uniformity forged by the experience of Spanish preindustrial hegemony followed by the incorporation of the entire area into the developing northern core. For these observers, Mediterranean "culture" is not a product of local or regional conditions, but a direct response to "de-development" by the core powers. Likewise "tradition," often used to explain backwardness, is perceived not as a tenacious hold of the past but a recent development (36, p. 364) set in motion by core area expansion (13, p. 23; 160, p. 228).

There are some dangers in overstressing this global perspective as a way of conceptualizing Mediterranean parallels. The most crucial is that it discourages the microsociological focus of anthropology. In doing so, it also has a tendency toward becoming only social history (44, p. 19; 157, 158, 165). Also, at an unsophisticated level, it can easily reduce everything to a simplistic Manichean contest between the forces of evil, represented by local elites and their foreign masters, and those of good, represented by "the poor," both categories dealt with in a cursory and undifferentiated manner (129). Even at a more sophisticated level, there is a tendency to reduce extremely varied local conditions and developments to a procrustean bed of a unitary model of origins. In underplaying the importance of local class systems, the world-system approach neglects the role of community stratification in the generation of group perceptions and collective consciousness. In discussions of political economy, social classes are usually understood as the operative units of predation and adaptation; but class analysis is by its very nature "context bound" (129, p. 403). The global perspective can easily lead to a simple reification of the concept of class and of class contradiction. It can thus encourage a disregard for painstaking research of local conditions in favor of ready-made formulas and prefabricated answers to all problems.

The globalists have also encountered methodological problems in applying an economic model of dependency in the Mediterranean basin as though
it were isomorphic to a geographic model. Pi-Sunyer (138, 139) has recently pointed out that the Schneider-Hansen model ignores autochthonous industrial development in certain Mediterranean subregions, especially Catalonia. This "core" of Wallerstein itself seems to be a pretty slippery concept to locate geographically. Where exactly is it? Within the periphery and semiperiphery there are pockets of independent or semi-independent industrial development. Do we define the core purely on economic grounds or geographically?

The shortcomings of a global view in anthropology go beyond its insensitivity to class dynamics and intraregional variation. Concerning the relationship between economy and politics, many sophisticated Marxists have repeatedly pointed out that there can be a relative autonomy between infrastructure and substructure. The degree of this autonomy is an empirical question to be dealt with in each case by empirical research (129). For anthropologists in the Mediterranean area in particular, the Wallerstein approach should therefore serve as a starting point in analysis, not an end. The emphasis should be on attempting to explain the mediating structures—demographic, ecological, and psychocultural—which link economic and political power to local cultural norms. Otherwise we are in danger of creating a new teleological functionalism in which everything is explained in rote terms as an adaptation to core expansion. Reading some of this work, one feels that anthropology in the Mediterranean area is being reduced to a perfunctory whodunit with "core capitalism" taking the place of the butler. The Schneiders explain Sicilian familism, "shrewdness," and honor (among other things) as responses to core pressures (160, p. 233). But they cannot specify why these solutions were chosen rather than some form of religious resignation or other "false" consciousness. They simply "assume" the causal connection is clear (160, p. 81). There are other problems. Are these peasant values shared by other social classes in the same area, for example the bourgeoisie? Brøgger (29, p. 115) and Douglass (52, p. 622) suggest they are. How then does one explain this coincidence of norms among exploited and exploiters by means of the world-capitalist model? These are questions which have to be addressed before the world-capitalist system can be used to explain anything, much less everything, in the Mediterranean societies.

A more judicious use of the world-capitalist model is to take an appreciation of the world economy as a backdrop. Then one may go on to an informed microlevel analysis of determinate social processes in determinate collectivities. A good example of this measured focus is the micropolitical approach of Hopkins (97, 98). Hopkins starts out with an adequate understanding of contextual political economy of petty commodity producers in a Tunisian community. However, he notes that within such communities
there exist varied forms of social cooperation which in themselves contribute to the social organization of production as integral structural elements. On this point, citing Marx, he argues that community "modes of cooperation" can be as important as exogenous pressures in determining social and economic relations (97, p. 454). Hopkins’ model of political economy is dynamic rather than linear, because it accommodates mutual feedback between economy and social organization. The "mode of cooperation" he speaks of can only be understood through empirical analysis of the forms of alliance within local community systems.

Summary
Each of the conceptual categories described above points out an important component of Mediterranean distinctiveness. We have seen that these include a geographic, an ecological, a political, an economic, and a cultural dimension. Each dimension is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for defining the Mediterranean construct. In my view, the "much heralded unity" of the Mediterranean emerges both synchronically and diachronically from an analysis of the unique concurrence of all these multiple factors.

ANALYTICAL FOCUS IN MEDITERRANEAN STUDIES

All of the societies around the Mediterranean Sea are complex societies. All are parts of nation-states. All have rural and urban sectors; some have important intermediary forms like suburbs, shantytowns, agro-towns. Originally the anthropology of Mediterranean societies was strongly community-village oriented. But since the 1950s, anthropologists have been debating the value of holistic community studies and have been trying to develop appropriate analytical models to accommodate the impinging forces of the wider world. The "village fetish" may now be over in Mediterranean studies, but there is little agreement on what should take its place.

For those working in southern Europe, the global approach manifests itself in a recent vogue of regional methodology. Here the local community is seen as simply part of a region, and the region is taken as the operative unit which participates in the economic and political processes of the wider world. While ethnographic data may still be gathered for illustrative purposes, the focus shifts to the surrounding region, usually one of marginal agrarian economy and relative underdevelopment. In the last decade a number of important monographs have appeared which reflect this focus with varying intensity. Hansen (89) attempts to show how the Franco government dominated wayward Catalonia by attacking regional autonomy and culture since the Civil War. Lockwood (113) studied regional integra-
tion through marketing systems in an ethnically heterogeneous part of Yugoslavia. Abu-Lughod (2) shows how French colonial policy in Morocco sparked the growth of class stratification in Rabat. Blok (16) and the Schneiders (159, 160) tackle the problem of Sicilian underdevelopment and *mafia*, arguing that these phenomena are the direct consequence of the history of Sicily's incorporation into the expanding world capitalist system.

An alternative solution to problems of analytical focus goes in the opposite direction. Here, instead of a passive reactor to the forces of world political economy, the ruralite is seen as a self-creating entrepreneur with untrammeled free will to enter into voluntaristic contracts with other like individuals. Underlying his view is the dubious notion that the structure of complex societies arises *a posteriori* from the aggregation of individual choice. Taken to a bizarre extreme by Boissevain (20), structural study in the sense of group analysis is abandoned entirely in favor of network analysis which is elevated to the status of theory. Some valuable work has been done along these lines in southern Europe and Morocco in contexts where this methodological individualism seems appropriate (30, 31, 71, 145, 146, 150, 151). However, in more stratified contexts, power and other resources are not distributed equally; thus the opportunities faced by individuals will naturally vary. Without an understanding of these structural constraints, the factors that determine individual choice can never be fully conceptualized.

Another way of getting beyond the limitations of single-village study in Mediterranean studies is through comparative study of community variation. One way of doing this is to compare social and cultural variation on the basis of concomitant ecological, historical, or demographic differences within nations or specific regions. The usual approach is to focus on the variables of internal stratification within selected communities, taking a "village outward" perspective (13, 24, 53, 81, 178). Here the emphasis is on class dynamics at the local level, and regional elites can be studied first hand as they operate as brokers, employers, or exploiters of labor. This both provides useful empirical data and promotes controlled comparative research.

**RECENT RESEARCH ON MEDITERRANEAN THEMES**

**Social Stratification**

For Davis, "The unequal distribution of crude material resources is a universal in the Mediterranean" (48, p. 125). Even if small peasant villages are egalitarian, the immediate vicinity is always stratified, and the village itself forms a class segment or fraction (117). But as Davis notes, one of the problems in social analysis in the Mediterranean region is a legacy of
subjectivism by which native statements of a social reality are taken as objectively true (46, 48, Chap. 3). Because of this, the analysis of objective socioeconomic inequality, and especially of social class, has not progressed very far in the past two decades. Carolyn White has stated the problem succinctly:

Incidental and allusory evidence in the monographs suggests that most Mediterranean villages are highly stratified, but the authors have a tendency to accept statements that “we are all equal here” as objectively true. Social constructions of reality are only interesting to the extent that one can measure the angle of distortion, yet many anthropologists have failed to portray the objective reality (178, p. 3)

The resulting weakness in class analysis may be the single most disturbing failure of Mediterranean anthropology to date. For example, there is an almost universal tendency to lump the concept of “class” and that of “status” under an undifferentiated rubric of social stratification. However, it has been well known in sociology since Weber that class and status are not the same and that there are many forms of stratification—ethnic, religious, genealogical—which may overlap with class structure in any given context but which must be analytically separated and compared with class structure. Status stratification has to do with subjective factors of prestige; it is not the same as social structure. Class has to do with the social organization of production, with the division of labor, and with the appropriation of value. The fundamental relations established between classes in modern societies are relations of opposition. Classes represent the principle contradictions in a society; they develop out of those contradictions and in turn contribute to their development. While class is a dynamic principle, status has no such connotation and may in fact represent forces of social and cultural conservatism. Status and prestige systems may also mask or blunt class oppositions. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between these various hierarchical categories in order to determine their relationship in any given context.

Confusion about class as a special principle of social organization is manifested frequently in discussions of Mediterranean material in which the discovery of “honor” or some other local prestige scale is offered as an alternative to class stratification. In one case, an anthropologist studying an egalitarian village in southern Italy (68) seriously ruminates on whether not men of “honor” form a “class,” as that term is used by Marx and Weber. Answering himself negatively, he then solemnly declares that classes do not exist. Another anthropologist thinks that class struggle was a stabilizing and integrating phenomenon in Franco Spain (54, p. 457).

Underlying this confusion is an uncertainty about what social class is—a lethal flaw in the study of southern Europe. For example, Davis makes
the unsupported claim that social class is not an important phenomenon in southern Italy or even throughout the Mediterranean area (45, p. 623). As Douglass notes (52, p. 621), this goes against the vast majority of literature on the area. Davis also insists that the concept of “class” should not be used by anthropologists in the Mediterranean area unless the people themselves use it (48, p. 107). For him class depends upon consciousness or awareness; it is a subjective category. Here, by ignoring the distinction between “class in itself” and “class for itself,” Davis has banished the elements of an understanding of structural dynamics throughout the area through a mere contrivance of definition.

The blindness to class is especially damaging in studies of southern Europe. This is true not only because of the importance of class struggle synchronically, but also because the recent histories of these countries are partly histories of violent class conflict. Since the 1930s, Spain, Italy, and Greece have experienced civil wars or partisan movements with strong class overtones (81, Chap. 2; 114; 121; 178). Yet these wars are rarely mentioned in the anthropology of these countries, as though the conflicts they expressed were somehow irrelevant or passé (121).

Only recently has this neglect been remedied in southern Europe. Belmonte (14) studied a *lumpenproletariat* of Naples, exploring the reasons for its political apathy. Loizos (114–117) studied the impact of political ideology on a town in Cyprus. I (81) studied a highly politicized rural proletariat in Andalusia, and Kertzer (107) studied a communist-leaning industrial proletariat in a suburb of Bologna. The latter two studies show the importance of class-based, horizontal organization and the prevalence of a radical proletarian consciousness in large segments of the south European working population. Recent studies by White (178), Bell (13), Silverman (164, 166), and Wade (171) also reveal the growing importance of class-based organizations and political ideologies among smallholders in Italy. Seddon (162, 163) studied this problem in rural Morocco. In Greece, only Loizos (114, 117) and to a lesser extent Schein (154, 155) have shown sensitivity to the problem of class, ideology, and national-level politics among ruralities.

In the Muslim areas, the study of social class and of class formation has progressed less than in Europe (64, pp. 163, 283–88; 97, 98). But there are mitigating circumstances, since these countries still have not yet developed capitalism to the point where class becomes “purely” manifested (56). Thus kinship, genealogy, and religious factors continue to overshadow class even when these immaterial forms of stratification coincide with extreme differences in wealth and occupation (30, 55, 56, 103, 104, 108, 151).

However, as Eickelman (64, pp. 285–88) and Hopkins (97) note, social class is rapidly becoming a major dimension of social life throughout the
Middle East. This is not a new observation. Over a decade ago, Waterbury noted that in Morocco there were important forces at work that “will lead to the gradual regrouping of factions in a more conventional class framework” (172, p. 74). Hopkins has studied the proletarianization of craftsmen in Tunisia (98). Brown notes the emergence of a new urban bourgeoisie in Salé, Morocco, and ties this to the structural exploitation of the people in the countryside (30, pp. 217–18). Hart predicts that the whole Aith Waryaghar, a Rifian tribe, “will soon be converted into a large rural proletariat” (91, p. 95; see also 118, p. 50).

These developments may bring many of the political problems characteristic of southern Italy and Spain. In Turkey, landless peasants swell the shantytowns around Ankara (56, 110); seasonal unemployment now stalks rural workers in Nador Province, Morocco (162, 163). With the growth of agrarian capitalism and the proletarianization of peasants, class polarization is beginning to have consequences. In Morocco, as Rabinow puts it, “Culture is becoming political” (145, p. 88). For Lebanon, Gilsenan notes that the real conflict on the Akkar plain today is between landowners and laborers (84, p. 175). Eickelman argues that in Lebanon most violent conflict is no longer sectarian; it is “class struggle” (64, p. 165). While all these studies prophesy ominously class polarization and conflict, only Hopkins has specifically studied the problem empirically.

**Recent Historical Studies**

Similar problems confront anthropologists in making systematic use of the past. Silverman (165) and Davis (48) have urged a more historically minded anthropology. Davis wants us to be innovative with historical data (48). Silverman says that we have to use historical data to the same extent as we use ethnographic (165).

Davis correctly identifies the major failure of historical anthropology in the Mediterranean region as the disinclination to study the near-universal abolition of agrarian communalism in the nineteenth century (48, p. 245). Every country in the area went through a period of accelerated change, either autochthonous or imposed by colonists, by which common lands were privatized, feudal protections and usages curtailed, and labor and land commercialized. In every case these changes had a cataclysmic impact on rural society. But the consequences were vastly different from country to country, region to region, even from village to village. These differences go a long way toward explaining present variations in rural tenure and systems of agrarian production. Yet these epochal transformations are probably the least studied of all pivotal events in the Mediterranean countries. It is the one area where historical-minded anthropologists, using primary archival data from local sources, could really contribute something original.
In the past few years, this neglect is being slowly rectified. Douglass compared the disentailment process in two adjacent Basque villages (53). White (178), Aya (9), Bell (13), and I (80) have shown how peasant and rural proletariat social movements in Spain and Italy can be traced back to the loss of communal rights and to the usurpations of a rising rural bourgeoisie. The apparent classlessness of Davis’s own Pisticci (47) and Galt’s Pantelleria (68) can be traced back to more successful agrarian reforms in the nineteenth century.

In North Africa, parallel historical processes were initiated somewhat later under French domination and continue today. Seddon has shown how commonly held duar land in northern Morocco has gradually become privatized. He then analyzes the impact of this progress upon a growing, seasonally unemployed rural work force (163, p. 187). Also in Morocco, Maher (118, 119), Abu-Lughod (2, pp. 202–3), and Rabinow (145, pp. 56–58) have shown how French policies deprived entire tribes of communal, crown, and religious trust domains, leading to their proletarianization and “ruination” (118, p. 50). This is one topic in social history which could lead to fruitful cooperation between Islamicists and Europeanists.

**Social Atomism**

Conflict and competition in the Mediterranean countries do not devolve only from class discontinuities. Within the classless communities, intense competition among social equals is a way of life. This competition is often conceptualized by anthropologists as a battle for personal honor or family reputation. Here the importance of the “moral community” as a principle of social organization is underscored. For the very fact of small-village life in conditions of material scarcity creates an autonomous social dynamic of its own. Neighbors are on the one hand perceived as dangerous rivals, but they are also recognized as sources of economic, social, and sexual needs, and as being necessary for the confirmation of personal status. This ambivalence of dependency vs opposition sets up an unusually powerful tension in interpersonal relations in Mediterranean communities. This tension is often resolved publicly through norms of superficial cordiality and ritualized reciprocity (78, 143, 146). But antagonisms remain in repressed form, finding expression in misanthropic perceptions and suspicions, and in other sublimated hostilities for which the models of the image of “the limited good” (15, p. 176), “social atomism” (78) and “the agonistic society” (143, p. 92) seem well suited as frames for analysis.

Banfield’s simplistic “amoral familism” is no longer accepted as an explanatory model in Mediterranean studies. But accumulating evidence indicates that it does describe something very real and pervasive in behavior and cognition (27, 32, 58, 78, 114, 115, 146, 179). Even while disclaiming
Banfield’s model, Loizos notes that anyone in Kalo (Cyprus) who is not a consanguine or affine is, to some extent, a hostile competitor (114, p. 65). He adds that any kind of behavior at the expense of another is “morally justified” if it can be held to advance or protect the well-being of one’s dependents (114, p. 66). For mainland Greece, Campbell remarks that “it may be generally accounted a virtue to cheat and deceive those who are not kinsmen” (32, p. 20). This tends to prevent the growth of “any widely based” cooperation within the community (32, p. 23). In Italy, the Millers, who have argued against the amoral familism model (124, 125), concede that psychological atomism does exist, and they state that when it comes to those who are not members of one’s own household, “the Terronesi expect the worst” (125, p. 119). Given the evidence from Sicily, even the Schneiders concede that intense competitive envy is a prevalent element of community life; but they suggest that it is “a dependent variable and not an independent variable” (159, p. 293). But does that make it less likely to generate behavior?

On the other side of the Sea, Rabinow describes Moroccan culture in similar terms (146, p. 77). Gilsenan describes something similar for Lebanon in his anatomization of kizb: lying, trickery, and deceit (83, p. 192). These phenomena should not be dismissed simply as “dependent variables.” They constitute an important element of social consciousness in the Mediterranean region and require further study, especially comparative study.

Conflict and the Family

Previously, in conceptualizing this Mediterranean atomism, a clear distinction was made between interfamilial and intrafamilial relations. While the former were regarded as inherently competitive, the latter were viewed as inevitably or irreducibly cooperative. Recent work on kinship has shown, however, that the family in the Mediterranean area is no stranger to conflict or tensions. For example, sibling solidarity is always an ideal, but it is often directly contradicted by open and often violent animosity between brothers (81, p. 157; 94, 102, 112, 179). In Tunisia, fraternal solidarity of the dar (household) is a primary life’s goal, but it is usually unattainable because the majority of disputes take place within the dar, not among them (3, p. 166). In Morocco, Hart reports many cases of “implacable hatred” between brothers, leading to open violence and occasionally to murder. Throughout the Mediterranean region, where partible inheritance is common, siblings are rivals, not allies, and it is “unusual” for brothers to work together (160, p. 73).

Conflicts between fathers and sons are also important, though these have been underplayed. This is especially true in southern Europe and the Maghreb. There, economic individualization has progressed far enough to separate fathers and sons as producers and occasionally to place their material
interests in opposition. Moss (127) notes that in Sardinia, fathers and sons are in open competition for flocks. Cronin speaks of "a real battle for supremacy" between fathers and sons (43, p. 82), and the Schneiders of frequent "animosity" between them (160, p. 73). Others have also mentioned the sharp rivalries between fathers and sons, their tense formality, their emotional distance—even to the point of avoidance (72, p. 333). It is time we stopped conceiving of the nuclear family as a unit of solidarity only in Mediterranean studies and began to study its intrinsic ambiguities and tensions.

**Honor and Social Status**

The concept of masculine honor is directly related to the competitive social dynamic of Mediterranean community life described above. Struggles over an immaterial honor create a symbolic arena or outlet for male aggressions and competitive tensions. Black-Michaud, I think correctly, sees the field of "honor" as a cultural displacement for powerful aggressive energies which might otherwise explode into open hostility: "Conflicts over honor make it possible for hostile groups to expend their aggressive energies upon each other without drawing in the society as a whole" (15, p. 194).

The Mediterranean honor concept is not monolithic, but a polysemic concept that needs the kind of clarification that comparative emic study or componential analysis could provide. Its meaning and its nuances vary from place to place and even among adjacent villages. As Herzfeld (93) points out, the English gloss "honor" collapses a wide range of subtleties and emphases in various native terms. Recent work by Davis (48), Black-Michaud (15), Herzfeld (93), Blok (17, 18), and others (19, 137, 143) has helped refine the notion beyond the undifferentiated moral "reputation" found in earlier Mediterranean ethnographies.

These works show that Mediterranean honor contains three separate vectors of competition: first, for wealth; second, for status in the sense of respect; and third, for a masculinity narrowly defined as virility. The latter is a measure of predation, which upon inspection turns out to be a zero-sum game. One man's success implies another's failure. Thus Hart found that for Rifian Berbers, "how to be a man involves cuckolding others" (91, p. 125). This is a sentiment we have heard often enough for the Christian countries (21, 51, p. 57).

Again, it is important to distinguish an honor of *position*, which is an ascribed category related to possessions, and a discrete *moral* category which devolves from achievement of reputation among social peers. In egalitarian contexts, male competitions subsumed by honor may be expressed in terms of "seniority," or "respect" (135, p. 64; 136). Or they may have to do with esteem deriving from personal probity and rectitude, as Herzfeld describes the Greek *filotimo* (93, p. 343). Or, honor may devolve
equally from "masculinity" both in the sense of sexual display and physical prowess (18, p. 433). However, since the various native words for honor also include a latent economic element, this suggests that class and power are also relevant depending upon context (48, pp. 90–99). For Campbell in Greece, for example, honor is directly tied to wealth (32, p. 21). When honor reflects this economic element, the ingredient of manual labor is often paramount as an index, either in a negative or positive sense. A most intriguing example of this labor content of honor is in the work of Gilsenan in Lebanon. He describes the rural "men of honor" in terms of their distance from despised manual work (84, p. 169). Their honor devolves from land ownership and the resultant freedom from labor: honor and leisure are inseparable, "work and honor are opposed" (84, p. 169). This is an interpretation which accords well with data from other class-stratified agrarian contexts in the Mediterranean where physical work is depreciated, especially Spain and Italy. In these contexts, where land and labor are inversely distributed and valued, honor as an index of social worth takes on a qualitatively different connotation from the egalitarian contexts. Here, honor in the sense of moral reputation or masculinity may have lost any current relevance; or it may be regarded as a quaint remnant of a feudal past. In the Fucino area of Italy, White reports that "honor" in the sense of personal moral reputation is regarded as something of a historic curiosity (178, p. 79).

**Patronage**

The Mediterranean societies are all undercapitalized agrarian civilizations. They are characterized by sharp social stratification and by both a relative and absolute scarcity of natural resources (15, p. 122). There is little social mobility. Power is highly concentrated in a few hands, and the bureaucratic functions of the state are poorly developed (76, p. 4). These conditions are of course ideal for the development of patron-client ties and a dependency ideology. In the various models of Mediterranean patronage developed in the literature, three ingredients stand out. First, patron-client ties are always characterized by clear-cut asymmetry between the actors in terms of wealth and power. The patron always has access to resources legally denied the client (31, pp. 313–14; 84, p. 167; 117; 173, p. 329). This suggests a social class background (52, p. 621). Secondly, there is some element of reciprocity; that is, both parties must exchange something of value (79, p. 456; 173, p. 331). This means that the patron needs something from the client, usually labor or sometimes votes. This in turn suggests certain forms of interdependence between the groups or classes involved. Third, there is an element of informality about the relationship, so that it can be conceptualized by clients as a "lopsided friendship," to use Pitt-Rivers' phrase (142, p. 140). Clientage also involves a strong element of deference, or as Davis says,
"submission" (48, p. 132). These observations suggest that patronage relations provide a consistent ideological support for social inequality and dependency throughout the Mediterranean area.

The apparent prevalence of patronage, both as a social relation and an ideology in the Mediterranean area, has led some working there to suppose that it is the dominant mode of political organization in the region (173). For Davis, "It is the bedrock of political life in most of these countries which anthropologists have studied" (48, p. 146). Gellner remarks that however deficient the data, Mediterranean societies clearly do have "a patronage image" (76, p. 4). Recently, a simple model of vertical integration through patronage has been superseded by a more profound understanding of how patronage articulates with its class and power contexts (22, 67, 77, 79, 136, 164, 173, 174, 178). A number of different approaches can be distinguished.

One approach is to view patronage as a dependent variable which takes its shape from political-economic relations between producers and nonproducers. Here patronage is seen basically as a mode of integration between social classes (67, p. 383), paralleling the flow of the appropriation of surplus value. In some recent work patronage is seen more starkly as an elite instrument for class domination. It is interpreted as an imposed relation of dependence which "masks" underlying exploitation or dominance (126, p. 123), in Silverman's term, a "myth" (164). Reviewing the literature on Mediterranean patronage, Waterbury summarizes this "mystification" view:

In the poorer societies patronage helps obscure and disorient class alignments and to perpetuate the power advantage of the dominant groups by the conscious cultivation of vulnerability and dependency (173, p. 340) ... Patronage networks are in direct contradiction to the formation of strategies based on "horizontal" or class linkages ... (173, p. 333).

Other anthropologists have taken this class manipulation model further. Working in areas where class relations are conflictive, they have seen elites using patronage to block rather than to broker the state's resources (79, 84, 169). Ultimately, patronage in such contexts works to maintain rather than minimize the distance between elites and laboring classes. According to Gilsenan, "what is withheld is more important than what is granted" by patrons (84, p. 179). Here the volitional element of clientage is also questioned. This view is summarized by White:

If we return to the assertion that clientism is an "integrative mechanism," I would argue that far from performing the function of closing the "gaps" between the local community and the "wider society" as Wolf, Silverman and others have all argued, patrons need to make sure that they alone pass across the "gap" and can prevent clients from making direct contacts with employers and bureaucrats (178, p. 165).
Patronage, then, is viewed in much recent work as an elite strategy in class struggle. However, as White concludes, there is much recent evidence that patronage as a model of political process in the Mediterranean region may have been somewhat exaggerated (178, p. 166).

Some corroborating evidence for this revisionist view comes from recent work in Iberia. In Portugal, Riegelhaupt (67, 114) notes that inequality does not by itself generate patronage inevitably in class relations. Rather there must be "willing candidates," and some concrete advantage must accrue to acting like a patron. Thus in the corporate states of Iberia during the dictatorships, local elites needed nothing from the poor but labor. Since there was an overabundance of that commodity, there was no reason or advantage for anyone to be a patron (149, p. 187). In Riegelhaupt's village, patronage was virtually nonexistent, and she notes that patronage is not an appropriate term for what did go on between classes (149, p. 184). The same was true of Franco Spain in the latifundio regions of Andalusia (79, p. 456; see also 37).

All of this shows that patronage can no longer be viewed in isolation as an autonomous system, but has to be placed within its political and economic contexts. An important element is labor, its organization, and its disposition. As Weingrod (174) stresses, however, the wider picture must include more than class dynamics in a given locale; it must also take into account the exact political nature of the state and the distribution of political power. Also crucial are the existence or lack of electoral politics (67), the ratio of available work to labor force (79), and the degree and nature of class consciousness. Waterbury summarizes:

... it is important to join the examination of any of its [patronage's] discrete manifestations with that of the general politico-economic context in which it is found. It is this context that can "explain" the characteristics of patronage networks rather than the other way around (173, p. 340-41).

Male and Female

Patterns of intersex relations constitute a major category of Mediterranean unity. Almost every anthropologist who has worked in the area speaks of an unbridgeable gulf between a male "public" and a female "private" sphere. These are often described as functionally complementary and discontinuous. As Duvignaud puts it, they "are two separate worlds, which pass without touching" (60, p. 16).

Until recently, most anthropologists tended to focus on the public sphere, both because it is more accessible and seemed more important. Subsequently a somewhat distorted male-oriented image of both worlds has emerged. This is not to say that female roles have been neglected, but rather that they have been treated in an unidimensional fashion as a residual
"world apart" of limited social significance (170, p. 2). This obliquity comes across in the image of women in these societies as somehow foreign or isolated from the "real life" of the community. They appear in most accounts to be "strangers" (109), "outsiders" (112, p. 307), "the foreign sex" (48, p. 190). They are presented as being alienated from the society which they, in large measure, maintain, maintain, nurture, and reproduce.

In the Mediterranean literature, the "outsider" quality of this imagery is exaggerated by a powerful quantity of male anxiety and fear about an ungovernable female sexuality. Women are repeatedly portrayed through male eyes as a threat, a symbol of disorder and chaos (150). Woman "is fitna, the polarization of the uncontrollable" (122, pp. 12-14). She is a lascivious temptress (119, p. 119; see also 61). She is "of the devil" (26, p. 76; 57, pp. 101ff), "the rope of Satan" (150, p. 568), a sorceress (85, p. 418), sexually rapacious (143, p. 82). She is explosive "like gunpowder" (65, p. 258).

This apprehensive view of women obviously reflects powerful elements of male psychic projection. Some perceptive anthropologists have noted this in passing (65, p. 259; 109, p. 264), but they have not probed the issue further. This particular aspect of male-female relations is important and it deserves further study—I would hope by male and female ethnographers possessing some degree of psychological sensitivity. But uncritically accepting an arbitrary male viewpoint with all its inherent distortions and compartmentalizing women's world as something "apart" has impeded study of women and of the private domain. For example, it is very often assumed that since women are sequestered they have few friends and that their social networks are confined to close kin. It is also often stated that their participation in the public realm is minimal at best. In Spain, while studying male camaraderie, for example, I was unable to document female friendships, although I suspected they were just as important as those of men (78, p. 323). Douglass approvingly quotes a Basque proverb, "married women can have no friends" (53, p. 40), as expressing a reality. Whitaker conjectures that in Albania "womenfolk . . . seemed to achieve no close relationship with anyone" (176, p. 201; see also 177). However, all these anthropologists are unable to confirm or deny their impressions, for as Whitaker admits, "as a male my examination of relationships between women was necessarily restricted . . ." (176, p. 200). All of this suggests that we are caricaturing 50 percent of the Mediterranean world.

In Muslim studies, anthropologists are rapidly correcting this neglect (12). Aswad (8) and the Fallers (65) in Turkey, and H. Geertz (72), Mernissi (122, 123), and Maher (119) in Morocco, have delved into the invisible world of womenfolk. They have shown how drastically women's networks have been underplayed in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern literature (8,
Aswad found that the kabul, a women’s visiting society, brought together women from all over the community and gave rise to lasting friendships both of an instrumental and emotional utility. Mernissi describes a female devotional society which provides a densely interwoven community of supporters and advisers (123, p. 105). The Fallers describe how Turkish women have created a richly textured “shadow world” in private. They argue that this private world is just as complexly ordered as the male world outside (65, p. 248).

Women’s studies in southern Europe are just beginning to break this untrodden ground (27, 50, 85, 158). Cronin notes that the private world in Sicily is not so private after all, but is “filled with people” and spills out into neighborhoods (43, p. 77). Cronin also observes that village women are not the demure figures they are often presented as being. In her town in Sicily, it is the wife, not the husband, who represents the family before the government officials. The same is true of parts of Spain (79, p. 454). And in Portugal, when families squabble publicly, it is “always” the women who get involved in physical fighting (149, pp. 175–76). In the small communities of southern Europe, as Cornelisen (38) has argued for Italy, women’s networks form the structural core of neighborhoods. Families are often female-dominated and sometimes uxorilocal; and women, through gossip, virtually run the daily life of villages, maintaining social control through the power of their tongues. So, paralleling the political control of men in the Mediterranean region, there appears to be an oral dominance of women (90). These observations should spark serious reconsideration of the dichotomous and hierarchical model of sex roles.

The participation of women in economic production is also being reexamined. Previously the standard male view of women as restricted to nonproductive domestic chores was often blithely accepted, but it is becoming increasingly clear that women do work outside the home and in domestic manufactories, contributing to production in terms of both use value and exchange value. Most of the evidence for the importance of women’s labor power again comes from the Middle East, but the Europeanists, especially Jane Schneider (158), are making progress.

In Morocco, Maher (119) and S. S. Davis (49) note that women provide not only some of the labor in the fields, but in fact as much as men. In Turkey, Coşar (39) reports that women make bricks, care for animals, and pick fruits; in Lebanon, Peters remarks that women put in long hours alongside men in the fields (137, p. 334). In most cases, the products of their labor are appropriated by men, who control finances. Among the Rifian Berbers, Hart notes that women and girls pasture animals, gather wood and water, harvest some crops, and in fact work “harder and longer” than men (91, pp. 47–48). In pre-war Albania, also Muslim, Whitaker observes that
women did most of the manual work in the fields and that men stayed at home "polishing their arms" (177, p. 150). All this points to an unacknowledged, but critical public role of women in Mediterranean societies. Duvignaud, writing about Tunisia, has summarized this well: "Because woman profits from man's dependence on her for food, sexual gratification, and children, she is a powerful, if hidden and unacknowledged, factor in the public life of Tunisia" (60, p. 104). For southern Europe, Schneider has shown that in nineteenth century Sicily, women producing embroideries for trousseaux contributed a critical resource to household viability. She argues that Sicilian households, "as manufactories of cloth, which had exchange potential, were not wholly private domains" (158, p. 351).

**PSYCHIC THEMES: OCULAR AGGRESSION, SHAME, THE EVIL EYE**

The most dramatic affinities within the Pan-Mediterranean region are not structural but psychocultural and psychosexual. These involve sexual norms, female seclusion, and psychological mechanisms of defense by which ego-dystonic impulses are projected on immediate others within the community. All of these themes are undoubtedly related, contributing to a prevalent type of personality structure or psychic constellation. Considering that this colorful personality type affords a rich field for comparative study, it is disappointing that so little psychologically oriented work has been undertaken in the Mediterranean area (32, 40–42, 59, 66, 92, 152, 168). In southern Europe, the work of Anne Parsons (130) on Oedipal themes in Italy has not stimulated much interest by anthropologists. This is particularly unfortunate, because southern Europe is an ideal area for testing hypotheses in psychological anthropology. Contemporary Spain and Italy have many social institutions comparable to those of nineteenth century northern Europe where modern psychiatry and psychoanalysis developed. Thus the usual objections about misapplying Western models are less valid in southern Europe than almost anywhere else that anthropologists study today.

One interesting area of psychocultural convergence in the Mediterranean countries is the strong emphasis on the visual propensities of things: on "seeing" as the only reliable confirmation of reality, on the significance of the *eye* as an instrument of knowledge, power, predation, dominance, and sexuality. In southern Europe, both moral and affective states are commonly expressed by a visual metaphor of physical beauty. A solecism or untoward emotion is "ugly," while correct behavior is "pretty" (81, p. 85). To "see" others voyeuristically without being seen gives intense pleasure and a feeling of superiority (26, p. 7). Vision also expresses concepts of
ego-boundary and fears about personal integrity and bodily intrusion. The "seer" visually incorporates the object, consumes it, dominates it: "in these parts, to look is to steal" (60, p. 228).

The eye is also the erogenous zone par excellence throughout the Mediterranean culture area. Mernissi notes that in Morocco it is often equated with the penis and is thought to do equal damage (122, p. 82). Simply to be "seen" in these societies conveys powerful erotic overtones; and there is a strong element of both voyeurism and its converse, unconscious exhibitionism, in Mediterranean culture by which public "exposure" means violation of the body (92, p. 293; 95, p. 569). Much of this may have to do with female seclusion. For where the opposite sex is hidden from sight, then sight itself becomes invested with erotic meaning, "libidinized," as Freud might say.

As well as having erogenous properties, the eye is also the instrument for prying and "ferreting out" of closeted information. This ocular trespass provides the ammunition for gossip, and for the aggressive use of a punitive morality in the battle for reputation, and for shaming (19). Fear of public exposure is the main means of social control in Mediterranean cultures—for both women and men. As Garrison and Arensberg point out, these are shame cultures par excellence (69, p. 325). Shame differs from guilt in that it requires an audience; shame is visual. Thus in the mechanism of shaming, it is concretely the eyes of others that are responsible for one's plight, and the very powerful antagonisms that one feels toward one's antagonists are naturally directed toward their organs of sight.

The principal cultural mechanism by which these ocular tendencies are expressed is the evil eye belief (6, 51, 69, 95, 128, 167). The latter is probably one of the few true Mediterranean universals. It is also one of the oldest continuous religious constructs in the Mediterranean area (128, p. 13). A recent anthology of the evil eye belief shows that its geographic distribution corresponds rather well with the seclusion of women, climaxing in the Mediterranean basin and southwest Asia (120). Probably, as Garrison and Arensberg argue, the evil eye belief calls for an eclectic interpretation in which a structural hypothesis must complement psychological, functional, and world-view explanations (69, p. 304). Still, as Spooner points out, the choice of the eye and not some other sense organ as the receptacle for anxieties and hostilities requires a psychological insight which so far has been lacking in Mediterranean studies (167, p. 79).

The possibilities for interdisciplinary research here are exciting. This is another area where Europeanists and Islamicists can and should collaborate. For fruitful work to be done, however, we need more information on child-rearing, sleeping arrangements, and other traits pertaining to the hidden world of women and children. So there are many reasons to enter that shadowy realm.
CONCLUSIONS

An anthropology of the Mediterranean region has grown to the point where it may now be considered a legitimate subspecialty. This has occurred mainly under the aegis of Davis and Boissevain. If it has not quite come of age, it is at least a vigorous adolescent waiting for a professional *rite de passage* to pass into a healthy adulthood. It still needs much parenting: we need to know more conclusively what the continuities really are that make north and south more than simply adjacent culture zones sharing a similar environment. This will require less insularity and provincialism among all the workers in the region. Davis's main contribution is to make us aware of this. Perhaps others, as Davis has done, will make field trips to the opposite shore; at least they will read more widely.

Without being overly sanguine, we may say that many of Davis's criticisms have been seriously addressed since 1975. Comparative studies have progressed geometrically, leading to some insights about class formation, political economy, community dynamics, the history of land tenure, and patronage as general processes rather than serendipitous analogies. Urban anthropology is getting off the ground in Mediterranean countries (1, 62, 105, 106, 108, 144). Recent diachronic research by Schneider, Silverman, Brown, Abu-Lughod, and others is sometimes imaginative and even innovative. Many of these authors use historical data organically to enrich and deepen our understanding of the present. A wider perspective developing out of Wallerstein's core-periphery model has been applied occasionally with vigor, making valuable contributions especially in Italy, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Despite these relative successes, there are problems which continue to retard the growth of the field. I have tried to point out some of these in the preceding pages. The honor and patronage concepts have to be refined. A good understanding of social class dynamics is still lacking. Anthropologists who go to southern Europe need a thorough grounding in the sociology of class (history is necessary, but not sufficient). In the 1980s, this is becoming true of the Muslim countries as well. Without this training, we will remain the dilettantes we have been accused of being (cf 36, p. 353). This does not mean we have to re-invent sociology (or history, or political science), but we must be aware of the contributions of the other social sciences to the study of Mediterranean societies. Simply to jump beyond class to the presumed monolithic "forces" of world capitalism is a way of avoiding the issue and escaping much hard work in the field.

Finally, I would like to urge that focus on class analysis and an emphasis on psychodynamics are not incompatible approaches. Rather, together they form the kind of broadly informed framework needed in Mediterranean studies today. Throughout this review I have argued that the underlying
unity of the Mediterranean region does not devolve from a simple inventory of shared traits. If there is a source of unity, it derives from a similar dynamic, often contradictory, "fit" among these traits. Understanding the feedback between family and political-economic context must be linked organically to an understanding of the conflicts (both external and internal) faced by individuals within determinate collectivities. Regional analyses and studies of the world capitalist system are not enough, although they give the necessary background. To make this background come to life we need to populate it with communities, families, and living, working men and women.

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